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UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE, AND TRANSNATIONAL PUBLICLAW LITIGATION AFTER KIOBEL
ERNEST A. YOUNG†
ABSTRACT
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), enacted in 1789 as part of the first
Judiciary Act, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations . . . .” Although the statute lay
dormant until the 1980s, the ATS has since become the font of
transnational public-law litigation in American courts. This litigation,
frequently involving largely foreign parties and events, is a form of
civil-side universal jurisdiction. Like more traditional forms of
universal jurisdiction, the ATS allows American courts to hear
human-rights claims based on the enormity of the offense, even when
the claims lack any significant ties to the United States. But unlike
traditional universal jurisdiction, which is overwhelmingly a criminal
phenomenon, ATS suits place control over initiation and conduct of
this litigation in private hands and engage the exceptional machinery
of American civil justice.
The Supreme Court sharply limited ATS suits in the 2013 case of
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. This Article defends the
Court’s rejection of universal jurisdiction in Kiobel and assesses the
future of human-rights litigation in American courts. I submit that the
scope of human-rights litigation under the ATS is best viewed not as a
sui generis problem of foreign-relations law, as most lawyers and
scholars have treated it, but instead within the more traditional
federal-courts framework of implied rights of action and federal
common law. Kiobel’s concerns about extraterritorial application of
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the ATS fit comfortably within this framework, and they suggest that
the Court will be extremely cautious about expanding the scope of
ATS litigation in future cases. I also situate the ATS within the context
of broader debates about enforcement of international human rights.
These debates raise two crucial questions of institutional design:
reliance on supranational or national institutions, and public or
private control of enforcement. This debate, too, can be usefully
informed by domestic debates about regulatory enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1991, Harold Koh articulated a broad vision of
“transnational public law litigation” as a parallel to the domestic
public-law litigation that had desegregated American schools, cleaned
up prisons and mental hospitals, and reformed a broad range of other
1
public institutions. “Like its domestic counterpart,” Dean Koh wrote,
“transnational public law litigation seeks to vindicate public rights
and values through judicial remedies. In both settings, parties bring
‘public actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms,
2
often with the goal of provoking institutional reform.” The
centerpiece of Koh’s vision was claims by victims of torture and other
human-rights violations against their abusers, brought in American
federal courts under the long-dormant Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision
3
recognizing such a claim in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala was, in Koh’s view,
the “Brown v. Board of Education” that “inaugurated the era of
4
transnational public law litigation in which we now live.”
The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
5
violation of the law of nations . . . .” Although the statute lay
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991)
[hereinafter Koh, Transnational Public Litigation]. For the domestic version, see generally
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
2. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2347–48.
3. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2366 (citing Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The
Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 601 (2013) (observing that
since Filártiga, “the ATS has garnered worldwide attention and has become the main engine for
transnational human rights litigation in the United States”).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). This provision has been part of the judicial code since 1789.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Courts and commentators refer to § 1350
as both the “ATS” and the “Alien Tort Claims Act,” or “ATCA.”
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dormant for much of our history, for the past thirty-five years it has
been a prominent vehicle for international human-rights litigation.
Initial claims focused on individual perpetrators of abuses in foreign
lands, but more recent plaintiffs have sued multinational corporations
alleged to have participated in such abuses. By one count, “there have
been about 173 judicial opinions regarding the ATS [since Filártiga].
One hundred fifty-five ATS cases have been filed against
corporations in federal courts, with about six-to-ten ATS cases being
6
filed annually.”
The Filártiga line of cases employed the ATS as a form of civilside universal jurisdiction, offering recourse against serious violators
of international law despite the absence, in many if not most cases, of
any significant connection between the parties or events in issue and
the United States. Jurisdiction rested not on particular U.S.
connections or interests, but on a “more general obligation to help
redress certain violations of international law as such, regardless of
7
where they may have occurred or the identity of the victim.” The
American human-rights community has viewed the ATS as “a badge
of honor” that “contribute[s] . . . to the moral and political standing of
8
the United States as a champion of international law,” and vigorously
9
defended the statute’s role as a form of universal civil jurisdiction.
Critics have worried about the potential of universal jurisdiction to
undermine American foreign policy and criticized broad ATS
10
litigation as a threat to international business.
The Supreme Court sharply limited the ATS’s role in Kiobel v.
11
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which held that the ATS generally has
no extraterritorial reach—that is, foreign nationals cannot sue foreign
defendants for actions unconnected to the United States. Significant
uncertainty remains, however; the Kiobel majority’s analysis seemed
to leave open the possibility for a significant range of human-rights
6. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012).
7. Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter), The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464 (1989).
8. Id. at 464, 493.
9. E.g., Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 146–48 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 323, 325 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction]; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER &
NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at
37–43 (2003).
11. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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litigation under the ATS, and various concurring opinions suggested
that the universal-jurisdiction view of the statute is far from dead.
This Article defends the result in Kiobel and explores the implications
of its reasoning. I argue that the Court rightly situated the ATS within
established federal-courts doctrines governing implied rights of
action, and that these doctrines can also resolve many future
questions concerning the scope of ATS claims.
Contemporary debates over the proper scope of ATS litigation
12
reflect continuing tensions in American law and politics. There is,
first, the perennial tension between desire to vindicate universal
principles of human rights abroad and aversion to foreign
entanglements. George W. Bush’s proclamation that “[t]he best hope
13
for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world,”
for example, contrasts with John Quincy Adams’s insistence that
“America . . . goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is
the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the
14
champion and vindicator only of her own.” A related tension exists
between an “ideological fervor and messianic streak” and “offsetting
tendencies” toward “[p]ragmatism” and “a willingness to compromise
15
to achieve vital goals.” Hence, Anne-Marie Slaughter highlights a
clash between narrow interpretations of the ATS based on “cramped
and circumspect” views of the national interest grounded in
“prudence” and broader readings grounded in “honor,” “virtue,” and
“a vision of the United States at the forefront of efforts to strengthen
16
the rule of law in international as well as domestic affairs.”
As it has developed in recent years, however, the ATS
jurisprudence also reflects some less familiar tensions. One is between
12. See David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 475, 477–84 (2001) (framing the ATS debate within competing ideological traditions in
U.S. foreign-relations law); Wuerth, supra note 4, at 601 (“[T]o the extent the ‘culture wars’
have played out in U.S. foreign relations law, the ATS has been their center of gravity.”).
13. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/925/925-h/925-h.htm#link2H_4_0056; see also John B. Bellinger
III, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and
Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, Address Delivered at Vanderbilt
University Law School (Apr. 11, 2008), in 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2009) (“U.S. foreign
policy—under every Administration—involves promoting respect for human rights around the
world.”).
14. President John Quincy Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on
Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3484.
15. GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
SINCE 1776, at 5 (2008).
16. See Burley, supra note 7, at 489, 493.
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models of international law grounded in official state practice and
international institutions, on the one hand, and a more decentralized
model that emphasizes the role of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and national courts. This divide emerged in Kiobel itself, as
national governments tended to oppose broad forms of ATS
17
litigation, while NGOs vigorously promoted them. A comparable
tension exists on the domestic level between public enforcement of
regulatory standards by government agencies and enforcement by
“private attorneys general,” often through common-law litigation that
substitutes courts and juries for legislatures and expert
18
agencies. Any effort to resolve continuing uncertainties under the
ATS or to amend its provisions should take account of these broader
tensions regarding the role of domestic courts in the development and
enforcement of international law.
Part I of this Article describes the background of the ATS and its
development into a form of civil-side universal jurisdiction. Part II
shows why universal jurisdiction meshes poorly with the ATS’s
structure, which lacks any express private right to sue. An aggressive
implied right of action in transnational human-rights cases cuts
against the grain of federal-courts doctrine counseling restraint where
Congress has not explicitly authorized private litigation. This tension
has surfaced in recent decisions narrowing the ATS. Part III turns to
ATS litigation after Kiobel; I then step back to consider ATS
litigation in light of broader tensions in both domestic and
international law enforcement. Any viable human-rights regime must
rely significantly on national courts, and involvement by U.S. courts
can further not only human rights but America’s pragmatic interests
as well. Achieving such a regime, however, will require careful
institutional design with support and leadership from the political
branches.

17. Compare, e.g., Brief of the Gov’ts of U.K. of Great Britain and the Netherlands as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 6–7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Great Britain & Netherlands Brief] (filed Feb. 3,
2012) (urging the Court to reject corporate liability in ATS suits), with Brief of Amici Curiae
International Human Rights Organizations and International Law Experts in Support of
Petitioners at 2–4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)
(filed Dec. 21, 2011) (urging the opposite); see also Bellinger, supra note 13, at 14 (urging that
promotion of human rights abroad be left to the professionals in the Executive branch).
18. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009).
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I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AS CIVIL-SIDE
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Judge Henry Friendly famously described the ATS as “a kind of
19
legal Lohengrin . . . . [N]o one seems to know whence it came.”
Whatever its original purpose, the ATS has served in modern times
primarily as a vehicle for human-rights claims brought by aliens
against other aliens for human-rights violations committed outside
the United States. Beth Stephens has called these “core Filártiga
20
lawsuits,” after the Second Circuit’s seminal decision in Filártiga v.
21
Peña-Irala, which initiated the modern era of human-rights litigation
under the ATS.
Used in this way, the ATS amounts to a uniquely American form
of universal jurisdiction. The ATS, as understood in Filártiga and its
progeny, opens American courts to victims of human-rights abuses
whenever the perpetrators may be found within the jurisdiction of
those courts, regardless of whether the relevant events have any tie to
the United States. This Part traces that development. I begin with a
brief overview of universal jurisdiction in international law, then turn
to the story of the ATS.
A. Universal Jurisdiction over Human-Rights Claims
Debates about the ATS raise several distinct jurisdictional
questions. It is helpful, at least to a point, to distinguish between a
state’s jurisdiction to prescribe (to apply its own law), to adjudicate
(to subject a legal dispute to the state’s own tribunals), and to enforce
(to compel compliance with the applicable law, generally through
22
executive action). An American court might assert jurisdiction to
adjudicate a dispute, for instance, but apply international law as the
rule of decision on the ground that the United States lacks
jurisdiction to prescribe in the relevant circumstances. But these
categories blur, overlap, and connect in myriad ways. For example,
international law typically does not prescribe remedies for
19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). For non–opera buffs, Lohengrin
was the mysterious knight in the eponymous opera by Richard Wagner.
20. Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2002)
[hereinafter Stephens, Translating Filártiga].
21. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (distinguishing these three
forms of jurisdiction).
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23

violations, yet adjudication often involves fashioning a remedy,
which in turn involves elements of both prescription and
enforcement. Moreover, the Legal Realists taught that the law is
often at least somewhat indeterminate, so adjudicating a claim under
a particular legal principle will involve a degree of lawmaking as the
24
court applies that principle to particular cases. That is one reason
parties care not only about what law will govern their case but also
about what court will apply that law. Adjudication almost always
involves some degree of prescription.
Jurisdictional questions in this area also arise under two distinct
bodies of law (international and domestic), and the domestic
questions concern both the federal Constitution and the relevant
jurisdictional statutes. This Section deals primarily with the
permissible exercise of jurisdiction under international law; I discuss
some constitutional questions in passing in Part II.B. But it is worth
remembering that these questions are interconnected. The statutory
and constitutional provisions empowering the U.S. federal courts
constrain those bodies far more than do the capacious principles
found in international law, but it remains likely that international
principles governing the appropriate exercise of prescriptive and
adjudicatory authority shaped the vision of the judicial power
reflected in Article III and the first Judiciary Act. And to add one
more layer of complexity, the international law that influenced the
Framers is quite different from the international law that exists today.
This Section traces the outlines of universal jurisdiction in
international law and practice as a backdrop to the development of
the American ATS. Three points are crucial: universal jurisdiction is
unsettled and controversial in principle; its exercise is extremely rare
23. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law:
Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 244
(2011) (“The topic of remedies is one of the most undeveloped areas of international law.”).
Efforts by international treaties and institutions to develop principles of individual remedies
remain fairly embryonic. See, e.g., Liesbeth Zegveld, Remedies for Victims of Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 497, 497–98 (2003). In particular,
“the concept of a private civil action in which one person sues another for violation of
international law is virtually unknown to international law.” William R. Casto, The New Federal
Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 643
(2006) [hereinafter Casto, New Federal Common Law]. For example, the United Nations
Human Rights Commission’s “Principles on the Right to a Remedy” “are first and foremost
concerned with domestic remedies.” Zegveld, supra, at 513 (emphasis added).
24. See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 32, 102–05 (2013) [hereinafter Young, Erie] (explaining how courts
make law by interpreting it).
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in practice; and when other countries do employ it, it is nearly always
a tool of criminal (not civil) enforcement.
1. The Bases of Jurisdiction in International Law. “The startingpoint in this part of the law,” according to Sir Ian Brownlie’s leading
25
treatise, is “that, at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is territorial.”
Jurisdiction is generally a function of sovereignty, and sovereignty—
26
even in this day and age—remains grounded in territory. As Cherif
Bassiouni has explained, “[s]overeignty, jurisdiction, and territory
have traditionally been closely linked . . . due to the recognized
importance of avoiding jurisdictional conflicts between states and
27
providing legal consistency and predictability.” Traditionally,
extraterritorial jurisdiction was largely limited to offenses committed
28
by a state’s own nationals abroad. Other forms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction developed in the last century: states base jurisdiction over
non-nationals in cases involving actions outside their borders on a
“protective principle” (preventing conduct that may cause harm
within their borders) or “passive-personality principle” (redressing
29
extraterritorial crimes committed against a state’s own nationals).
Although extraterritorial in reach, both protective and passivepersonality jurisdiction retain a link to territoriality and nationality
30
through their emphasis on the impact of the action in question.

25. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed. 2008); see
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International
Law [hereinafter Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction], in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION] (“Throughout
the course of legal history, jurisdictional powers have primarily been exercised in accordance
with the principle of territorial jurisdiction.”).
26. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 301; Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy:
Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 188 (2004)
[hereinafter Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy] (“[C]ontrol over territory is the hallmark of
sovereignty.”).
27. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 40; see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 168, 171–72 [hereinafter Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction].
28. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 303–04; Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 25, at 41.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 402; BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 304–05;
LOUIS HENKIN, GERALD L. NEUMAN, DIANE F. ORENTLICHER & DAVID W. LEEBRON,
HUMAN RIGHTS 657 (1999); Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 41.
30. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 42. Moreover, each of
these bases for jurisdiction remains subject to a general requirement of reasonableness. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 403(1).
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Universal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over “acts committed
outside [states’] territory by non-nationals whose victims also were
31
32
not their nationals” —arises instead from the nature of the offense.
Section 404 of the Restatement (Third) of American Foreign Relations
Law states the common understanding in the international-law
community:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in
33
§ 402 is present.

As used here, universal jurisdiction is primarily jurisdiction to
34
adjudicate crimes defined by international law. It is thus important
to distinguish between universal jurisdiction to adjudicate, on the one
hand, and universal condemnation of certain crimes, the
extraterritorial reach of national legislation, and the universal reach
of international adjudicative bodies (which may or may not rely on
35
universal jurisdiction for their authority).

31. HENKIN, NEUMAN, ORENTLICHER & LEEBRON, supra note 29, at 657.
32. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 305 (stating that universal jurisdiction is typically
recognized where “the nature of the crime . . . justif[ies] . . . repression . . . as a matter of
international public policy”); Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The
Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1, 1 (2011) (“The jurisdictional claim is predicated on the atrocious nature of the crime and
legally based on treaties or customary international law.”).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404; see also THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Principle 1.1, at 21 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES],
available at https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is
criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.”).
34. It remains jurisdiction “to prescribe” in the sense that the state exercising universal
jurisdiction must liquidate the meaning of often-amorphous concepts in treaties and CIL. This
sort of lawmaking is not the same as the normative discretion enjoyed by common-law courts
authorized to shape, say, rules of tort. See Young, Erie, supra note 24, at 32, 102–05.
35. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Stephan
A. Oxman, Comment: The Quest for Clarity, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 64.
Universal jurisdiction ordinarily does require the presence of the accused, although Mr. Oxman
notes a “super pure” case of universal jurisdiction “in which jurisdiction would exist even
without the presence of the accused.” Id.; see also A. Hays Butler, The Growing Support for
Universal Jurisdiction in National Legislation, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at
67, 69 (describing the Belgian statute).
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Universal jurisdiction is typically justified on the ground that the
“exceptional gravity” of the offense “affect[s] the fundamental
36
interests of the international community as a whole.” Universalist
prosecutions thus rest on a consensus of nations, reflected in
37
customary law, as to a particular crime’s extraordinary depravity.
This is not the only account of universal jurisdiction, nor does it best
fit universality’s historical antecedents. But it is the account that
dominates contemporary discussions of universal jurisdiction over
war crimes, torture, genocide, and the like—the human-rights
38
violations typically giving rise to ATS litigation.
Both proponents and critics of international human-rights
litigation agree that the turn to universal jurisdiction reflects the
weakness of criminal-enforcement institutions at the international
level. A report by Human Rights Watch argues that
despite the creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals . . .
vast gaps persist in the ability to bring to justice persons accused of
the gravest international crimes . . . . Even with the advent of a
permanent International Criminal Court, it is expected that there
will remain an “impunity gap unless national authorities, the
international community and the [ICC] work together” . . . . [A]
critical role thus remains for national courts and tribunals through
39
the exercise of universal jurisdiction.

Universal jurisdiction thus counts on domestic courts to enforce
40
principles of international law. Serious resource and personnel

36. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 33, Introduction, at 23; see also Slaughter,
Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 169, 173 (observing that the “standard account” of
universal jurisdiction aims at “crimes under international law” that are “so heinous that they
strike at the ‘whole of mankind’ and shock ‘the conscience of nations’”) (quoting Attorney Gen.
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 280 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962)).
37. See Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 175 (“The inherent limits built
into this account flow from the combination of the degree of depravity or fundamental
inhumanity necessary to classify certain acts as international crimes and the necessity of
agreement on that classification by a considerable majority of sovereign states.”).
38. See, e.g., NEHAL BHUTA & JÜRGEN SCHURR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART 1, 34 (2006), available at http://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] (advocating
the assertion of universal jurisdiction over “the gravest crimes recognized by the international
community”); Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 204–07 (documenting the
centrality of the “heinousness principle” to contemporary thinking about universal jurisdiction).
39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 1.
40. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168. Critics of international criminal
institutions have similarly argued that international courts have had mixed results, at best,
especially in the area of human rights. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL
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constraints limit international criminal courts’ ability to deal with
41
more than a fraction of the potential cases within their jurisdictions.
Only domestic courts will generally enjoy the extensive remedial
powers necessary to grant effective redress in human-rights cases. In
many cases, domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction afford an
attractive avenue for those seeking to vindicate claims under
international law.
2. Universal Jurisdiction in Practice. Three aspects of the
contemporary practice of universal jurisdiction are critical for present
purposes. First, universal jurisdiction as practiced by other countries
42
is always criminal in character. The Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction, for example, explicitly state that “universal
43
jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction.”
Domestic legislation
implementing the “prosecute or extradite” provisions of the postwar
44
human-rights conventions was framed in criminal terms. Likewise,
the later wave of domestic statutes implementing the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which imposes a duty on
“every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
45
responsible for international crimes” —also involved criminal, not
46
civil, sanctions. The aspiration of these treaties and domestic statutes
LEGALISM 150–74 (2009); Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 639–41 (2010).
41. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 676–77 (describing how limited funding
constrains international courts); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 1 (“With finite
resources, international courts and mixed ‘internationalized’ tribunals can try only a relatively
small number of perpetrators, and the courts’ mandates are generally limited to crimes
committed in specific territories and conflicts.”).
42. William Dodge has suggested that the distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction
is irrelevant to the legality of universal jurisdiction under international law. E-mail from William
Dodge to Ernest Young (Apr. 23, 2014) (on file with author). My point in this article, however,
is that domestic law frequently does make this distinction important, and that the distinction has
important functional consequences that both foreign-relations law and international law must
take into account.
43. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 33, Principle 1.1, at 28. The Restatement (Third)
does state—presumably with the ATS in mind—that “jurisdiction on the basis of universal
interests has been exercised in the form of criminal law, but international law does not preclude
the application of non-criminal law on this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or
restitution for victims of piracy.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 cmt. b.
44. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68.
45. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, pmbl. (1998).
46. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68–72. See generally Loi relative à la répression des
violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Act Concerning the Punishment of Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law] of Feb. 10, 1999, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 23, 1999, reprinted at 38 I.L.M. 918 (Belgium); R.S.C. 2000,
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has been to establish “a system of international criminal justice . . . in
which both international criminal tribunals and national courts have
an important and mutually reinforcing role to play in the enforcement
47
of international criminal norms.”
Several of the European universal-jurisdiction statutes did
incorporate elements that Americans associate with civil justice, such
as an initiating role for victims and some compensatory remedies.
Victims of persecution initiated the case against former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet in Spain, for example, and Iraqi families
initiated Belgium’s abortive case against various U.S. officials arising
48
out of the Iraq War. Some European civil-law countries recognize
the action civile, which allows a civil claim for compensation to be
49
attached to a criminal proceeding. Nonetheless, the criminal nature
of the suit, with public control of the proceedings, remains primary;
under the civil law’s inquisitorial model, for instance, the judge will
control the investigation and exercise prosecutorial discretion even
50
when private victims initiate the lawsuit. Moreover, these civil-side
features have been among the most controversial aspects of universal
jurisdiction in other countries, with statutory reforms frequently
51
curtailing or eliminating them.
The second general point is that “the exercise of pure universal
52
jurisdiction is actually very rare.” International treaties do not
authorize universal jurisdiction as broadly as one might infer from the
proposition that universality is appropriate to punish the gravest
53
international crimes. A number of the broad human-rights
conventions proposed and ratified after World War II, such as the

c. 24, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en (Canada); International Criminal Court Act 2001, c.
17, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010017.htm (United Kingdom). For an
account of the British and Belgian experiences, see Langer, supra note 32, at 15–19 (Britain),
26–32 (Belgium).
47. Butler, supra note 35, at 76.
48. See Langer, supra note 32, at 29 (discussing the Belgian case); Richard J. Wilson,
Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 3, 3 (1999).
49. See generally Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 154 (collecting provisions).
50. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 32, at 36 (describing the Pinochet proceedings).
51. See infra text accompanying note 71.
52. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168–69.
53. See, e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2001, at 87 (“[N]one of these steps”—including “the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, the genocide convention of 1948 . . . the antitorture convention of 1988” or the
human-rights provisions of the “Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe”—“was conceived at the time as instituting a ‘universal jurisdiction.’”).
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54

1984 Torture Convention, required states to criminalize the relevant
conduct in their domestic law and to prosecute or extradite persons
accused of such conduct. Absent extradition, prosecution by state
55
parties would often rely on universal jurisdiction, and many
countries adopted laws providing for universal jurisdiction over such
56
crimes. Some of these domestic laws were tied to particular human57
rights conventions; others provided for domestic jurisdiction not
only over specific international crimes but also over “any other
offense which under international treaties or conventions, should be
58
prosecuted” in the forum country. However, universal jurisdiction is
conspicuously absent from some of the more important human-rights
conventions; neither the Geneva Conventions on war crimes nor the
Genocide Conventions, for example, explicitly provide for it despite
the widespread contention that war crimes and genocide are universal
59
offenses. Although universal jurisdiction over these crimes is now

54. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Art. 7(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, draft reprinted in 23 I.L.J. 1027 (1985) (“The
State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any
offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”).
55. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 55 (distinguishing
between “extradite or prosecute” provisions and pure universal jurisdiction, but conceding that
absent extradition, any prosecution of persons without national or territorial links to the forum
state must rely on universal jurisdiction); see also Lori F. Damrosch, Comment: Connecting the
Threads in the Fabric of International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 94
(“[A]t a minimum all the prosecute-or-extradite crimes are ones as to which there is an option
to exercise jurisdiction without any link to the crime other than custody of the offender.”).
56. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68; Mark Chadwick, Modern Developments in Universal
Jurisdiction: Addressing Impunity in Tibet and Beyond, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 359, 362–64
(2009).
57. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52 (United Kingdom).
58. See, e.g., Amendments to the Law on Judicial Power art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 1/2009) (Spain)
(amending Organic Law on the Judiciary art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 6/1985)). On the Spanish experience,
see Langer, supra note 32, at 32–41.
59. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 (asserting that universal
jurisdiction extends to genocide and war crimes), with Bassiouni, History of Universal
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 51 (noting that “[n]o convention dealing with the law of armed
conflict contains a specific provision on universal jurisdiction,” and “customary international
law as reflected by the practice of states does not, in the judgment of this writer, mean that
universal jurisdiction has been applied in national prosecutions”); id. at 53 (noting that the
Genocide Convention makes no provision for universal jurisdiction); see also Madeline H.
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
337, 347 (2001) (noting that “[u]niversal jurisdiction over genocide was proposed but rejected
during the negotiation of the Genocide Convention, in view of strong opposition by France, the
Soviet Union, and the United States”).
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widely thought to be part of CIL, “[t]he origin and basis of this
60
development . . . are actually questionable.”
More important, nations simply do not exercise universal
61
jurisdiction when they have it. For example, David Scheffer, the U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, reported in 2000 that
“governments [are] almost universally determined not to use the
62
universal jurisdiction tools they have to prosecute.” This is true both
at present and historically. Allied prosecutions of Nazi war criminals
after World War II, although sometimes viewed as instances of
universal jurisdiction, were grounded firmly in national jurisdiction
63
and the rights of the victor states as participants in the conflict.
Spain’s famous effort to prosecute Augusto Pinochet, which Human
Rights Watch described as a “wake up call” demonstrating the
64
potential of universal jurisdiction, relied partially on universal
65
jurisdiction but also on injuries to Spanish nationals. More generally,

60. Morris, supra note 59, at 347; see also infra notes 68–82 and accompanying text.
61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 2 (“On paper, a great many countries
around the world appear to recognize that they can and should exercise universal jurisdiction
over international crimes such as torture and war crimes, by passing laws that permit the
prosecution of such crimes. But practice has generally lagged far behind laws on the books.”);
Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 170 (“[A]t least at this stage in the evolution
of universal jurisdiction, . . . although the basis for jurisdiction over war criminals and
perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity has been established in many countries,
the actual prosecutions have been blocked in many cases.”).
62. David Scheffer, Opening Address, Universal Jurisdiction Conference, Dec. 2000, in 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 233, 234 (2001); see also Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra
note 25, at 62 (“The tendency of state practice has been not to apply [universal jurisdiction].”).
63. Gary J. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and National Jurisdiction, in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 77, 81–83; Bassiouni, History of Universal
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 51–52; Morris, supra note 59, at 341–45; see also Bass, supra, at 83
(noting that “the focus of the Nuremberg prosecution of top Nazi leaders was aggressive war,”
not violations of human rights). Israel’s famous prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, following his
abduction from Argentina, was in large part for crimes against the Jewish people—not simply
for crimes against humanity generally. See Bass, supra, at 85; Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 27, at 172 (noting that “the Eichmann prosecution relied on both passive personality
and the protective principle in addition to universality”).
64. See The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals
Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 1, 1998), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/
precedent.htm; see also Amnesty International USA, Universal Jurisdiction: Questions and
Answers, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/counter-terror-with-justice/reports-statementsand-issue-briefs/universal-jurisdiction/page.do?id=1108003 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (“The
Pinochet case, is the most well known case where states have exercised universal jurisdiction.”).
65. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2001) (noting that prosecutions of Pinochet in Spain and
Belgium emphasized crimes against citizens and residents of the respective forum states);
Wilson, supra note 48, at 3.
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a 2003 study by one of the the ICC’s architects found that “increasing
numbers of states are enacting laws that provide for universal
jurisdiction,” but “it has not yet been supported by the practice of
states. In fact, there are only a few cases known to scholars in which
66
pure universal jurisdiction . . . has been applied.” A more recent
survey found that, out of “1051 complaints or cases considered by
public authorities” in European nations with universal-jurisdiction
67
statutes, “only 32 have actually been brought to trial.”
It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that universalist prosecutions
68
have been confined to a handful of states in Western Europe; hence,
69
it is difficult to say that universal jurisdiction is part of CIL.
Certainly, American law lacks any examples of classical universalist
70
criminal prosecutions. Countries like Belgium and Spain that had led
the way with broad assertions of universal jurisdiction appear to have
66. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Stephen
Macedo, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 8 (“[U]niversal
jurisdiction is not as well established in international law as some human rights organizations
and others have claimed.”); Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 172 (noting that
“many national courts have purported to exercise universal jurisdiction while actually requiring
some kind of more traditional nexus to nationality or territory”).
67. Langer, supra note 32, at 7.
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 4 (“[A] handful of EU member states
have been at the center of developments in the exercise of universal jurisdiction.”).
69. See also John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study, Customary International Humanitarian
Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 465–71 (2007) (refuting, on behalf of the U.S. State
Department, assertions that universal jurisdiction is supported by the practice of nations or by
adequate opinio juris); Sienho Yee, Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 503, 529–30 (2011) (denying that universal jurisdiction has become part of
international custom outside the context of piracy). Some states have argued that CIL
“authorizes, or at least does not prohibit, the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the core
international crimes.” Langer, supra note 32, at 4. There is, of course, quite a difference
between “authorizes” and “does not prohibit.” And, as Langer ably demonstrates, there is no
consistent or uniform practice of states exercising universal jurisdiction, even among those
Western European states that have experimented with it. See id. An argument for universal
jurisdiction under CIL would thus have to emphasize evidence of opinio juris over the actual
practice of nations. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 470 (2000) (criticizing this tendency in contemporary invocations of CIL);
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1992) (same).
70. The federal piracy statute is the best example of American adoption of universal
jurisdiction. But as Professor Bassiouni points out, virtually all the Marshall Court’s cases under
the piracy statute involved American nationals. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 25, at 279 n.55. Recent opinions applying the piracy statute have invoked universal
jurisdiction, but the cases involved attacks on U.S. nationals. See, e.g., United States v. Shibin,
722 F.3d 233, 236, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2013) (attack on German and American vessels); United
States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449, 469 (4th Cir. 2012) (attack on a U.S. navy vessel).
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beaten significant retreats. Belgium, for example, famously
entertained an effort by Iraqi families to prosecute former highranking U.S. officials involved in the Gulf War, including President
George H.W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, and General Norman Schwarzkopf. But when
American officials suggested that NATO’s headquarters could be
withdrawn from Brussels, amendments that drastically narrowed the
71
Belgian statute followed in short order.
The third striking feature of universal jurisdiction in actual
practice is that it tends to diverge from the standard account resting
on the “heinousness” of the underlying offense. Historically, universal
jurisdiction was limited largely to piracy, which continues to provide
72
the paradigm case of legitimate universal jurisdiction. Eugene
Kontorovich has persuasively argued, however, that piracy is not a
73
particularly outrageous offense in comparison to other crimes. After
all, virtually every state once employed its own privateers (basically,
licensed pirates) without any sense that their actions were morally
outrageous, and the law treated piracy as simply robbery occurring on
74
the high seas. The best rationale for universal jurisdiction over
piracy, while not always articulated, seems to have rested on the
statelessness of the perpetrators or perhaps on the difficulty of laying
75
hold of them. There was, on the other hand, generally no recognition
of universal jurisdiction over genocide or war crimes even though
71. See Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 890–
91 (2003). For Spain’s amendment of its universal-jurisdiction statute to cut back on aggressive
prosecutions, see Langer, supra note 32, at 32–41.
72. See, e.g., Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 47–49; see also
United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820) (stating that pirates “are proper
objects for the penal code of all nations”).
73. Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 186; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63,
70 (1996) (acknowledging that piracy “neither threatens peace and security nor shocks the
conscience of humanity, though it may have at one time”).
74. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 210–29.
75. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71
(1769) (emphasizing that the pirate had placed himself back in the state of nature vis-à-vis
victims and prosecuting states); Samuel Shnider, Universal Jurisdiction over “Operation of a
Pirate Ship”: The Legality of the Evolving Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 473, 491 (2013) (suggesting that piracy is “a crime that could only be
addressed by interstate cooperation, and that by its nature, location, and effects defines a shared
interest that can be applied with minimal disruption of the world order”); Expert Declaration of
Madeline Morris at 14–15, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d. 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No.
00-11695) (noting that pirates “preyed upon the nationals, vessels, and commerce of all states,
but came within the jurisdiction of none”).
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those crimes were recognized offenses centuries before Nuremberg.
The idea that universal jurisdiction follows whenever a crime is
77
universally thought to be awful is thus a very new development.
A similar disconnect exists with respect to current practice
concerning other crimes. Universal condemnation is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition for universal jurisdiction. The
international conventions dealing with war crimes and genocide lack
any specific provision for universal jurisdiction, and whether that
78
jurisdiction may be inferred is controversial; on the other hand,
international conventions tend to call for signatories to exercise
universal jurisdiction most frequently in cases of less serious crimes,
79
such as narcotics offenses or destruction of cultural property.
Equally important, Máximo Langer has demonstrated that states do
not decide to exercise universal jurisdiction simply as a function of the
enormity of the offense; rather, prosecutions reflect a weighing of
costs and benefits by political-branch officials in the prosecuting
80
state. These incentives “tend to favor [assertion of universal
jurisdiction] over low-cost defendants—those who can impose little or
no international relations, political, economic, or other costs on
potential prosecuting states—and especially over those low-cost
defendants about whom the international community has reached

76. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 227–28.
77. Piracy is also a poor precedent for modern universal jurisdiction because it was defined
to exclude official actions on behalf of governments. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 59, at 339–40
(“By excluding state acts from the definition of piracy, the law of piracy was designed to prevent
universal jurisdiction over piracy from becoming a source of interstate conflict.”).
78. See Langer, supra note 32, at 4. For diverging views, compare Universal Jurisdiction
over War Crimes, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/universal-jurisdiction-over-war-crimes-factsheet (“While the Conventions do not
expressly state that jurisdiction is to be asserted regardless of the place of the offence, they have
generally been interpreted as providing for mandatory universal jurisdiction.”), with Yee, supra
note 69, at 511–19 (arguing that the major human-rights conventions do not authorize universal
jurisdiction).
79. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 56–61.
80. Langer, supra note 32, at 3–10. This gap between availability of universal jurisdiction
and actual prosecutions is equally pronounced for piracy. See generally Eugene Kontorovich &
Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
436, 452 (2010) (concluding that “under normal circumstances, nations use universal jurisdiction
against a tiny fraction of high seas piracies”). The overwhelming majority of U.S. prosecutions
for piracy have involved attacks on American citizens. See Bassiouni, History of Universal
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 279 n.55. Jurisdiction would thus have rested on the passivepersonality principle rather than the universal condemnation of piracy.
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81

broad agreement.” As Eugene Kontorovich has concluded, “The
endorsement by nations of universal jurisdiction as an international
legal norm seems almost entirely unrelated to their willingness to put
82
it into practice.”
3. Continuing Controversy over Universal Jurisdiction.
Traditional theories of jurisdiction were means of allocating
sovereignty and minimizing conflict among states. Universal
jurisdiction, by contrast, reflects the more general shift in
international law from regulating relations among states to regulating
states’ treatment of their own citizens and other individuals within
their control. It is avowedly reformist. As the authors of the Princeton
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction affirm, “impunity for the
commission of serious crimes must yield to accountability”; hence,
83
universal jurisdiction “holds out the promise of greater justice.”
Universal jurisdiction is thus a “potent weapon” that “would cast all
the world’s courts as a net to catch alleged perpetrators of serious
crimes under international law. It holds the promise of a system of
global accountability—justice without borders—administered by the
84
competent courts of all nations on behalf of humankind.”
But notwithstanding frequent assertions that universal
85
jurisdiction is now well accepted, scholars lament that “[t]he
doctrine . . . has evolved . . . through a process that has been less
86
circumspect and deliberate than we might have hoped.” Often the
academic literature has leaped ahead of realities on the ground; as

81. Langer, supra note 32, at 5. By “agreement,” Professor Langer means agreement on the
culpability of the defendants and the desirability of prosecution, not the seriousness of the
alleged crime. See id. at 9 (stressing the lack of protest by the accused’s state of nationality).
82. Eugene Kontorovich, Measuring International Law Through Piracy, INST. LETTER, 8
(Fall 2012), https://www.ias.edu/files/pdfs/publications/letter-2012-fall.pdf.
83. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, Introduction, supra note 33, at 23–24.
84. Macedo, supra note 66, at 4.
85. See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 604
(2005) (asserting that “[s]tate practice establishes . . . as a norm of customary international law”
that “[s]tates have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war
crimes”); Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/10-1491-tsacsb-Yale-Law-School-Center-for-Global-Legal-Challenges.pdf
(arguing
unequivocally that, aside from substantive principles like sovereign immunity, international law
imposes no restrictions on universal jurisdiction to adjudicate international-law offenses).
86. Morris, supra note 59, at 351–52.
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Professor Bassiouni recognizes, “The writings of scholars have driven
the recognition of the theory of universal jurisdiction for serious
international crimes and have offered new interpretations of CIL,
87
albeit without much support in the law and practice of states.” Even
advocates admit that “the jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction is
88
disparate, disjointed, and poorly understood.”
I have already discussed the disconnect between the historical
precedent of universal jurisdiction over piracy and the contemporary
grounding of universalist prosecutions in the heinousness of the
89
offense.
Other controversies concern whether universalist
90
prosecutions rest on international or national law and whether the
91
accused must be present within the prosecuting jurisdiction. And the
broader notion of national-court intervention in the affairs of other
nations has engendered significant controversy. As George Fletcher
has observed, “many are outraged by Belgian, Canadian, German,
and other claims to have the right to judge crimes no matter where
92
they are committed.”
Criticism comes from three main quarters. The first includes
American scholars and public officials, often—but not always—of a
nationalist bent, who are concerned about the impact of universal
jurisdiction on international relations. Henry Kissinger argued that
universal jurisdiction is potentially unfair to defendants, may
undermine emerging democracies’ efforts at national reconciliation,
and risks arbitrary use by national authorities to pursue their own
93
political or ideological agendas. Similarly, Curtis Bradley has
worried that “prosecution of foreign citizens under this concept—
87. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Macedo,
supra note 66, at 8 (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is not as well established in international law as
some human rights organizations and others have claimed.”).
88. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, Introduction, supra note 33, at 24; see also Arrest Warrant of
11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Van Den Wyngaert) (“There is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction
in conventional or customary international law.”).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77.
90. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 179–81.
91. See, e.g., Matthias Goldmann, Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Jan. 2009,
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1249?rskey=klJi44&result=6&q=&prd=EPIL (discussing the International Court of Justice’s
(ICJ’s) conflicting opinions on this issue in the Arrest Warrant case).
92. George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 580, 580
(2003).
93. See Kissinger, supra note 53, at 90–92.
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especially foreign leaders—will undermine peaceful international
94
relations.” These concerns have echoed in numerous briefs filed by
95
Republican administrations in ATS cases.
More opposition comes from foreign states, many of them in the
developing world, that find themselves frequent targets of universalist
prosecutions. States of the African Union have been especially
outspoken against the exercise of universal jurisdiction, particularly
by former colonial powers in Western Europe. Following a Belgian
court’s issuance of an arrest warrant for the incumbent minister for
foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the DRC sued Belgium in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging, inter alia, that Belgium’s
96
assertion of universal jurisdiction violated the DRC’s sovereignty.
This incident and others ultimately led the African Union Assembly
to adopt several decisions condemning the use of universal
97
jurisdiction as “judicial overreach.”
A third criticism comes from criminal lawyers worried about the
rights of the accused. Professor Fletcher, for example, has argued that
universal jurisdiction’s rhetoric of “prevent[ing] gaps” in the criminal
law and ending impunity reverses the traditional priorities of Western
domestic criminal law, subordinating the rights of the accused to the
98
interests of victims and the state. He also contends that universal
jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple prosecutions, thereby
94. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 325; see also Morris, supra note 59, at
354 (anticipating that universal jurisdiction “will become a source and an instrument of
interstate conflict”).
95. See Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute
Litigation, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 504–17 (2013); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at
305 (concluding that “Anglo-American opinion is hostile to the general principle involved [in
universal jurisdiction]”).
96. See Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44
(Feb. 14); Goldmann, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 15–18 (noting that although the DRC prevailed on
immunity grounds and the ICJ did not rule on the universal-jurisdiction point, dueling
supplemental opinions revealed the depth of disagreement on the court as to the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction).
97. See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union (AU), Decision on the Report of the
Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Decision No.
Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/14 (XI), 30 June–1 July 2008, x 5 and xx ii
and iii; see also Harmen van der Wilt, Universal Jurisdiction Under Attack: An Assessment of
African Misgivings Towards International Criminal Justice as Administered by Western States, 9
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1043, 1044 (2011); Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to
End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
419, 441–43 (2011).
98. Fletcher, supra note 92, at 581–82.
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raising double-jeopardy problems. And my colleague Madeline
Morris has pointed out that because “[u]niversal jurisdiction
empowers the courts of all states to exercise jurisdiction over the
relevant crimes,” those “[j]udicial systems that are corrupt, abusive or
lawless are empowered equally with others”; such jurisdiction thus
raises due-process problems because it “extends extraterritorially the
100
powers of non-independent or otherwise flawed judiciaries.”
I lack space here to comprehensively catalog, much less assess,
these arguments about universal jurisdiction. My point is simply to
demonstrate that there is no consensus about universal jurisdiction’s
legitimacy—even among academics, much less in the real world. The
more sober advocates of universal jurisdiction are hardly blind to
these concerns. Cherif Bassiouni, for example, has recognized that
“[e]ven with the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction can be used
imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions between states, potential
abuses of legal processes, and undue harassment of individuals
101
prosecuted or pursued for prosecution under this theory.” Likewise,
Anne-Marie Slaughter acknowledges “the common-sense intuition
that universal jurisdiction is a potentially fearsome power that should
102
only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances.” These advocates
thus accept that “[s]urely universal jurisdiction cannot be exercised
whenever the international community recognizes that the territorial
103
state will be unlikely or unable to prosecute.”
The hard question, of course, is whether some of universal
jurisdiction’s laudable goals may be achieved while minimizing its
risks. As Kenneth Anderson put it, “universal jurisdiction for certain
99. Id. at 582–83. One might argue that multiple prosecutions should be permitted by
analogy to the “dual sovereignty” exception to domestic double-jeopardy principles. See, e.g.,
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927) (Holmes, J.). It is far from clear, however,
that this exception should apply to prosecutions by different nations for the same international
crime. After all, the exception “turns on whether the two [prosecuting] entities draw their
authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 88 (1985). Both nations would be prosecuting a breach of the same international norm.
Nonetheless, the American cases do not generally differentiate between the source of law that
makes the act illegal and the law that empowers the government to prosecute. See, e.g., United
States v. Wheeler, 453 U.S. 313, 316–26 (1978). Those sources of law diverge when national
authorities prosecute an international crime, complicating any answer to the double-jeopardy
problem based on American analogies.
100. Morris, supra note 59, at 352, 354.
101. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 82 (2001).
102. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 175.
103. Id. at 183.
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truly awful things is not truly in dispute, [but] there is no getting
around the internal drive of schemes of universal jurisdiction to
104
become a one-way ratchet of expansion.” The United States has not
generally gone in for the sort of universal jurisdiction provided for—
and occasionally practiced—in Western Europe. We have, however,
developed our own uniquely American practice of universal
105
jurisdiction under the ATS, and the tendency toward expansion
noted by Professor Anderson has had a powerful influence on that
statute. The next two sections discuss how that came about, and how
the Supreme Court more recently has sought to impose some limits.
B. The ATS and the Rise of Filártiga Suits
Congress enacted the ATS in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary
Act, which established the federal judicial system. We know relatively
little about the intent behind the Act’s provision for federal
jurisdiction over a “civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
106
in violation of the law of nations,” and there are very few cases
prior to 1980. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in Kiobel, “the ATS
was invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more
107
over the next 167 years.” Things have become considerably more
interesting, however, in the last three and a half decades.
1. Originalist Takes on the ATS. The original understanding of
the ATS has proven elusive. Curtis Bradley has argued, for example,
that the ATS may well have been intended simply to implement
108
Article III’s alienage jurisdiction. Although the 1789 Judiciary Act

104. Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort Statute’s
Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149, 154 (2013). But see
Morris, supra note 59, at 361 (asking “whether in practice, a regime of universal jurisdiction will
do more good or more harm overall”).
105. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 201 (“[U]nlike other nations, the
United States has confined [universal jurisdiction] to civil litigation.”).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
107. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (citing Moxon v.
The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9895) (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Fas. 810 (No. 1607)
(D.S.C. 1795); O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908); Khedival Line, S.A.E. v.
Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam)).
108. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 591
(2002) [hereinafter Bradley, ATS]; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1223–26 (1988). Article III’s alienage jurisdiction
extends to “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a critique of the alienage interpretation,
see generally, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
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contained a general provision for suits involving aliens, it covered
109
only cases in which at least $500 was in controversy. The ATS, on
Professor Bradley’s account, would have allowed the United States to
honor its international-law obligation to provide redress for alien tort
claimants—most of whom could not have met the $500 threshold
110
under the Judiciary Act’s general alienage provisions —without
opening the federal courts generally to most British creditors’ claims
111
for debt against American citizens. By contrast, the United States
would have had no international-law obligation to provide a forum
for suits between aliens, especially for controversies arising
112
elsewhere.
Other lawyers and scholars have advanced interpretations that
ground the ATS in Article III’s provision for jurisdiction over cases
113
“arising under” federal law. The Reagan Justice Department, for
example, took a “denial of justice” position that the ATS was
designed to provide a remedy to foreigners in situations where failing
114
to do so would breach the nation’s duty to another nation. On this

Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge, Text and
Context] (raising textual and historical objections to Bradley’s argument); Burley, supra note 7,
at 469 (“[I]t is implausible that the primary purpose of the Alien Tort Statute was to avert the
denial of justice to aliens. The broad sweep of this explanation simply does not fit with the
precise and narrow wording of the Statute.”).
109. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
110. See Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 625–26; William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 467, 497 n.168 (1986) [hereinafter Casto, Protective Jurisdiction].
111. Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 625–26. As Dean Slaughter notes, however, British
creditors’ claims were the category of claims in which the state courts were most notoriously
denying justice to foreigners; hence, their exclusion from the ATS would have vitiated any effort
to use that statute to ensure compliance with the United States’ international-law obligations.
Burley, supra note 7, at 467–68.
112. See Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 630 (citing Vattel and Blackstone).
113. But see id. at 597–619 (offering extensive historical evidence that the law of nations did
not fall within the original understanding of the “Laws of the United States” as used in Article
III).
114. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 15, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d. 493 (D. Haw.
1986) (No. 86-0297) (arguing that the history of the ATS “indicates that the Statute’s scope is
limited to torts (amounting to violations of either a treaty or the law of nations) committed by
citizens of the United States or other persons subject to its jurisdiction, under circumstances in
which the United States might be held accountable to the offended nation”); see also Kenneth
C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 20–21, 60–61 (1985) (agreeing that the ATS was enacted
primarily to prevent denials of justice to aliens injured within the United States, but arguing that
the language of the statute sweeps more broadly to cover extraterritorial human-rights suits by
aliens against other aliens).
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view, the ATS was meant to prevent international breaches that
might plunge the young nation into war. More recently, A.J. Bellia
and Bradford Clark advanced a variant of this position, arguing that
“the ATS was originally enacted to enable the United States to
remedy a specific, but important, law of nations violation—the
intentional infliction of harm by a US citizen upon the person or
115
personal property of an alien.” Such torts “violated the law of
nations and, if not redressed by the perpetrator’s nation, gave the
116
victim’s nation just cause for war.” In their view, then, “the ATS is
best understood as a self-executing, fail-safe measure that enabled the
United States to avoid responsibility for law of nations violations” by
117
providing redress in its own courts.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, on the other hand, understands the ATS
“as fulfilling a more general duty under the law of nations,” that is,
“to uphold the law of nations as a moral imperative—a matter of
118
national honor.” On this view, the framers of the Judiciary Act used
the ATS as a step toward affirming the validity of international law
and securing the young nation’s place in the international legal
system. The framers’ notion was not entirely altruistic, Dean
Slaughter notes, because “a system in which all states were virtuous
119
would be a much better place for the United States.” William
Dodge has similarly argued that “the original intent of the Alien Tort
Clause was to provide [a] broad civil remedy for violations of the law
of nations,” and that the ATS’s framers anticipated that the content

115. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 452 (2011) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations]; see
also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 18
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609, 1609 (2014) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Two Myths].
116. Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115, at 454.
117. Id. Tom Lee’s argument that the ATS was meant to provide redress for violations of
“safe conducts” has similar implications. See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the
Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006) [hereinafter Lee, Safe Conduct]. Professor
Lee recovers a broad historical understanding of safe conducts, including not only explicit
documents such as passports but also the implicit obligation to protect all friendly and neutral
aliens within a nation’s territory or territory it controls. See id. at 836–37. He thus concludes that
the ATS provides “redress of torts against aliens that the United States had a commitment
under international law to protect.” Id. at 907.
118. Burley, supra note 7, at 482, 488.
119. Id. at 486.
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of the international-law norms to be vindicated would evolve over
120
time.
In the end, Dean Slaughter may be right that “definitive proof of
the intended purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute is
121
impossible.” It is hard not to agree with Judge Pierre Leval,
however, that contemporary use of the ATS as a vehicle for suits
against multinational corporations over events occurring in foreign
122
lands is a “historical accident.”
In any event, lawyers must
determine what the ATS means in a world much changed from 1789.
The relevant changes include an international law that now governs
not only relations between states but also a state’s treatment of its
123
own citizens. That treatment—that is, a state’s violation of its
citizens’ basic human rights—took center stage in the revival of ATS
litigation beginning in 1980.
2. The Filártiga Line. Joelito Filártiga was the seventeen-yearold son of Dr. Joel Filártiga, a Paraguayan physician and opponent of
the military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner. In 1976, a Paraguayan
police officer named Américo Norberto Peña-Irala tortured Joelito to
death in retaliation for his father’s political activities. Two years later,
Joelito’s sister Dolly came to the United States on a visitor’s visa and
sought political asylum. She soon discovered that Peña-Irala had also
entered the United States and was living in Brooklyn. Dolly and her

120. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
“Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237, 241–43 (1996) [hereinafter Dodge,
Historical Origins]; see also Dodge, Text and Context, supra note 108, at 701–11.
121. Burley, supra note 7, at 463.
122. Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law: Giving Victims of Human Rights
Abuses Their Day in Court, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2013, at 16, 20; see also Anderson, supra
note 104, at 151–52 (observing that “the ahistorical construction [exemplified by Filártiga] could
not purport to explain . . . why Congress in 1789 would ever have enacted the ATS”).
123. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, Introductory Note (observing
that “[t]he contemporary international law of human rights . . . reflects general acceptance . . .
that how a state treats individual human beings, including its own citizens . . . is not the state’s
own business alone . . . but is a matter of international concern and a proper subject for
regulation by international law” and acknowledging that this principle “has developed largely
since the Second World War”), and Burley, supra note 7, at 490 (describing this development as
“[t]he cornerstone of 20th-century human rights law”), with MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2d ed. 1993) (observing that before World War
II, “it was thought to be antithetical for there to be international legal rights that individuals
could assert against states, especially against their own governments”).
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father sued Peña-Irala for Joelito’s torture and death, filing suit under
124
the ATS in the Eastern District of New York.
The facts of the Filártiga litigation are paradigmatic of the first
wave of modern human-rights litigation under the ATS. All relevant
actors were foreign nationals: Joelito Filártiga, the torture victim; his
father and sister, who brought the lawsuit as plaintiffs; and Peña125
Irala, the defendant. The events in question—Filártiga’s torture at
the hands of Paraguayan security personnel in retaliation for his
family’s political opposition to the government—occurred in
Paraguay without any significant effect within the United States. The
American courts’ jurisdiction over the case arose solely because the
126
defendant happened to have moved, later in life, to New York City.
Doctrinally, Filártiga made two crucial moves. First, it held that
ATS suits brought to vindicate principles of CIL fell within Article
III’s “arising under” jurisdiction because “the law of nations . . . has
127
always been part of the federal common law.” And second, Filártiga
held that federal courts may apply CIL without awaiting statutory
incorporation of customary norms by Congress, notwithstanding
Article I’s express delegation to Congress of authority to “define and
128
Punish Offences . . . against the Law of Nations.” The Filártigas
were thus able to proceed with their claims under the ATS and, on
129
remand, won a judgment of over $10 million.
The Second Circuit decided Filártiga against a backdrop of
expanded human-rights advocacy in both the public and private
sectors. The Carter administration had made promotion of human
130
rights a centerpiece of its foreign policy in the 1970s. When humanrights treaties and legislation stalled in Congress, the administration
turned to the courts; hence, it filed an important amicus brief in the

124. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980); Stephens, Translating
Filártiga, supra note 20, at 6.
125. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 885; see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156–57.
128. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 886–87 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10); Ku & Yoo, supra
note 127, at 157.
129. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864–67 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). This judgment was
never actually collected, however, as Peña-Irala was deported while Filártiga’s appeal was still
pending. See Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic
Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
STORIES 45, 60 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007).
130. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 15, at 833–34.
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Second Circuit supporting the Filártigas’ claim. This push from the
Executive coincided with the development of a strong human-rights
advocacy network of public-interest groups, legal academics,
132
politicians, and journalists. These developments encouraged courts
to take on a more aggressive role in human-rights enforcement.
The American Law Institute (ALI) published a “Tentative
Draft” of its Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law in
1980—the same year as Filártiga—and that draft endorsed both
133
aspects of the Second Circuit’s decision. Although each aspect of
Filártiga would prove controversial by the late 1990s, that decision
reflected a broad consensus among international-law scholars about
the domestic status of the law of nations. Louis Henkin summarized
the prevailing view as follows:
[T]here is now general agreement that international law, as
incorporated into domestic law in the United States, is federal, not
state law; that cases arising under international law are ‘cases arising
under . . . the Laws of the United States’ and therefore are within
the judicial power of the United States under article III of the
Constitution; that principles of international law as incorporated in
the law of the United States are “Laws of the United States” and
supreme under article VI; that international law, therefore, is to be
determined independently by the federal courts, and ultimately by
the United States Supreme Court, with its determination binding on
the state courts; and that a determination of international law by a
state court is a federal question subject to review by the Supreme
134
Court.

131. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 495–99 (discussing the political
background of the Carter administration’s decision to support ATS litigation).
132. See Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 499.
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980), pt. I, ch. 2 introductory note at 41 (asserting that CIL
“has come to be regarded as federal common law”). The final version, published in 1987, put the
point even more strongly. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111 n.3 (“[T]he modern
view is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its determination
by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”); id. § 111 n.4 (“Matters arising under
customary international law also arise under ‘the laws of the United States,’ since international
law is ‘part of our law’ . . . and is federal law.” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 703 n.7 (citing Filártiga with approval with respect to
individual remedies for CIL violations).
134. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1559–60 (1984).
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On the other hand, many scholars of foreign-relations law—that is,
the domestic law governing the interaction of the U.S. legal system
135
with international actors—rejected this consensus. They pointed out
that the Restatement relied on cases that did not address the domestic
status of CIL, and that the ALI’s pronouncement simply reflected the
136
views of prominent international-law scholars. For a time, however,
those scholars’ views would prove highly influential.
Filártiga “gave . . . new life” to proposals by “leading
international legal scholars [who] advocated the use of domestic
137
courts to incorporate international law into domestic law.” And it
caught on with international human-rights advocates in the courts.
Over the next two decades, “[f]ederal courts . . . assumed jurisdiction
over cases between aliens alleging abuses such as genocide, war
crimes, summary execution, disappearance, and arbitrary detention,
138
as well as torture.” Because the defendants were generally persons
without substantial financial assets, like Peña-Irala, plaintiffs
139
recovered little in the way of damages; however, human-rights
advocates saw vindication of their legal claims as worth the expense
135. For a critique of the Restatement’s authority on these points, see Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 834–37 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Critique]; see also sources cited infra note 165.
136. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 135, at 834–36. The Restatement cited
only two decisions in favor of its rule: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 22, § 111, Reporters’ Note 3. Sabbatino was a case about the act-of-state doctrine and
refused to apply CIL; as I have explained elsewhere, Sabbatino does not support the notion that
CIL is federal common law. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 438–45 (2002) [hereinafter Young, CIL]. Chisholm
concerned state sovereign immunity; it involved neither foreign parties nor international law,
and it was promptly overruled by the Eleventh Amendment. It would be a considerable
understatement to say that the Restatement had “weak” precedential support. See also sources
cited infra note 165.
137. Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 157 (citing Richard Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 9 (1970); RICHARD FALK, THE ROLE
OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964)); see also Paul B.
Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The Intellectual Origins of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.
33, 47 (2003) (recognizing that Filártiga triggered a “revolution in U.S. foreign relations law”).
138. Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 7 (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. SuarezMason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
139. See, e.g., Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 460 n.16 (2007) (noting that “[m]ost individual ATS
defendants are judgment proof—either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact”).
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of litigation in many instances. These early cases were relatively
uncontroversial, as they tended to involve “individual foreigners
affiliated with governments no longer in power or viewed with
141
disfavor by the U.S. government.”
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, the human-rights bar
developed a more promising approach that focused on multinational
corporations rather than present and former officials of foreign
142
governments. The seminal case was Kadic v. Karadžić, which
involved claims by Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina
against the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, alleging rape, torture, and
genocide. Mr. Karadžić argued that he was a private actor and
143
therefore not bound by norms of international law. The Second
Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds: first, some
international-law norms—such as those prohibiting piracy and
144
genocide—extend to nonstate actors; and second, private persons
may be held liable for acting in concert with state actors to violate
145
international law. These holdings—particularly the latter, which
supported aiding-and-abetting liability for private actors—opened the
door to ATS suits against multinational corporations that could be
146
connected to human-rights violations abroad.

140. See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 n.11 (2008) (“ATS judgments against individual defendants provide
invaluable symbolic vindication.”); Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2368
(“Although no Filártiga-type plaintiff has apparently collected full compensation for his injuries,
many have expressed satisfaction simply to have won default judgments announcing that the
defendant had transgressed universally recognized norms of international law.”). Some plaintiffs
were able to extract significant damages awards from former dictators like Ferdinand Marcos,
who had fled to the United States, but collection has generally remained extremely difficult. See,
e.g., Robert A. Swift, A Human Rights Class Action in the Philippines, THE PHILADELPHIA
LAWYER, Winter 2012, at 37, 40, available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/
PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/TPL.winter12_philipines
.pdf (describing the difficulty of collecting and distributing to plaintiff class members $10 million
of a nearly $2 billion judgment against Marcos’s estate).
141. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 177 (2004) [hereinafter Stephens,
Checks and Balances].
142. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
143. See id. at 239. This argument cited the lack of a recognized Bosnian Serb state,
although Karadžić also claimed to be President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska. See
id.
144. Id. at 241–43.
145. Id. at 245; see also Stephens, Checks and Balances, supra note 141, at 176–77.
146. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 5.
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Suits against multinational corporations offered far better
prospects for meaningful financial recovery than the first wave of
147
and they avoided many of the jurisdictional,
Filártiga suits,
immunity, and act-of-state doctrine hurdles associated with suing
148
governments and their officials. A recent survey reports that, “[a]s
of late 2006, approximately half of the post-Sosa reported ATS
149
Most of these
decisions involved corporate defendants.”
corporations were alleged to have aided and abetted human-rights
150
violations rather than to have committed those violations directly.
151
Doe v. Unocal Corp. is a good example of this “second wave”
of ATS litigation. Unocal, an American company based in California,
became involved in a project to build an oil pipeline across Burma.
The plaintiffs, Burmese villagers from a rural area through which the
pipeline was to run, alleged that they had been forced to work on the
152
pipeline and subjected to murder, rape, and torture. Agents of the
Burmese military government had allegedly committed the atrocities,
but the plaintiffs claimed that Unocal had employed the military to
provide security for the pipeline project and assisted the military
while knowing that it was using forced labor and committing other
153
abuses. A panel of the Ninth Circuit held that Unocal could be held
liable for forced labor without any showing of state action and that it
could also be sued for aiding and abetting if it provided “knowing
practical assistance or encouragement that ha[d] a substantial effect
154
on the perpetration of the crime.”
Unocal involved an American defendant, but many second-wave
ATS suits featured foreign plaintiffs, foreign events, and foreign
defendants. For example, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.

147. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that, as of 2003, “more
than 50 MNCs [were] in the dock; and the damages claimed exceed[ed] $200 billion”).
148. See id. at 5; Childress, supra note 6, at 723–24.
149. BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & MICHAEL
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 23 (2d ed. 2008).
150. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 140, at 62–63.
151. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 978 (2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (2005).
152. Id. at 939.
153. Id. at 937–42.
154. Id. at 946–47. The Ninth Circuit later vacated that decision when it agreed to rehear the
case en banc, and Unocal ultimately agreed to a settlement. See Rachel Chambers, The Unocal
Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights
Abuses, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13, 14, 15 (2005).
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155

Talisman Energy, Inc., Sudanese citizens alleging human-rights
abuses by the Sudanese Government sued a Canadian oil company
for aiding and abetting those abuses. Similarly, in Kiobel v. Royal
156
Dutch Petroleum,
Nigerian citizens sued Dutch, British, and
Nigerian oil companies for aiding and abetting Nigerian military
forces who carried out torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes
against humanity. These suits, in which all parties are foreign and the
events in question took place overseas, are called “foreign cubed”
157
cases.
Filártiga and other “first wave” ATS suits had likewise been
foreign-cubed cases, but objections to such suits were pursued more
158
aggressively by second-wave corporate defendants. By implicating
large multinational corporations with substantial litigation budgets,
the second wave of ATS litigation pulled in sophisticated defense
159
counsel. Second-wave suits also intensified political opposition by
“mobiliz[ing] domestic business constituencies that had remained
160
relatively agnostic when ATS litigation started in the early-1980s.”
Foreign states likewise intervened in defense of their own
multinational corporations by filing amicus briefs opposing broad
161
theories of ATS liability. Around the same time, the advent of the
War on Terror shifted the foreign-policy spotlight to security
concerns. ATS litigation threatened to complicate antiterror
cooperation with foreign governments and also raised the specter of
162
suits against U.S. officials. Not surprisingly, the George W. Bush
administration filed a series of briefs urging federal courts to radically
163
narrow the scope of ATS suits.
155. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
156. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
157. See also Childress, supra note 6, at 720–21 n.84 (collecting other foreign-cubed ATS
suits). Foreign-cubed suits were also an issue under the federal securities laws, but the Court
seems to have largely eliminated them. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010).
158. See Childress, supra note 6, at 718–19 (suggesting that defendants in first-wave suits,
who tended to be present or former government officials, focused on personal-jurisdiction and
official-immunity defenses).
159. In Kiobel itself, for example, Royal Dutch Petroleum was represented in the Supreme
Court by Kathleen Sullivan, former dean of the Stanford Law School and a partner at the
leading litigation firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.
160. Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 510.
161. See id. For a recent example, see Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17.
162. See Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 508–09.
163. See id. at 511–12; e.g., Reply Brief for the U.S. as Respondent Supporting Petitioner,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 577654.

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

ALIEN TORT LITIGATION

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

1055

Each wave of Filártiga claims provoked controversy on both
jurisprudential and functional grounds. The jurisprudential objection
arose from most ATS claims’ reliance on CIL rather than on treaties
ratified by the United States. Patrick Kelly and other internationallaw scholars attacked the coherence of CIL itself, arguing that
modern customary norms are largely indeterminate and not grounded
164
in the actual practice of nations. More prominently, a group of
scholars led by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith challenged the
conventional wisdom that CIL has the status of federal law within the
165
domestic legal system. There was thus no “federal question” in
Filártiga suits, and in the absence of some form of party-based
166
jurisdiction, asserting federal subject-matter jurisdiction over them
167
under the ATS would violate Article III.
The jurisprudential objection to CIL-based litigation ran beyond
jurisdiction, moreover. Plaintiffs’ claims in ATS litigation generally
relied on principles that appear in multilateral treaties, but that could

164. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449 (2000); Simma & Alston, supra note 69, at 82; see also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young,
How Customary is Customary International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885 (2013) (arguing
that the link between practice and customary law has always been problematic); Eugene
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of
the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 155–61 (2004) (arguing that modern
human-rights claims resting on CIL are not analogous to the sorts of CIL offenses recognized by
the ATS’s framers).
165. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111 Reporters’ Note 3 (“[T]he
modern view is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its
determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”), with Bradley & Goldsmith,
Critique, supra note 135 (rejecting the Restatement view as unconstitutional). For earlier denials
that CIL is federal law, see Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669–70 (1986); Weisburd, supra note 108, at 1239–40. Many
international-law scholars, of course, have hotly disputed this view. See, e.g., Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) [hereinafter Koh,
State Law]; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). For a general
survey and assessment of the debate, see Young, CIL, supra note 136; Daniel J. Meltzer,
Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513
(2002).
166. Article III independently confers subject-matter jurisdiction for suits “affecting”
ambassadors, as well as for suits between a U.S. citizen and a foreign citizen or state. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. But Filártiga suits generally involve foreigners suing foreigners.
167. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 320, 357 (1997) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet
and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2167 (1999) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet]; see also Childress, supra note 6, at 719–20 (discussing the
impact of Bradley and Goldsmith’s scholarship).
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not be invoked directly because the United States had either failed to
ratify those treaties or ratified them subject to reservations,
understandings, and declarations forbidding their invocation in
168
domestic litigation. Plaintiffs argued, however, that the treaties had
somehow become part of international custom; hence, “this treatyderived CIL can be applied as domestic law in human rights cases
even though the treaties themselves cannot be applied
169
domestically.” ATS suits thus represented an end run around the
political branches’ control of the domestic incorporation of
170
international law.
Functional objections to Filártiga suits began with their potential
to undermine U.S. foreign policy. John Bellinger, speaking as the
legal adviser to the State Department during the George W. Bush
administration, argued that “the ATS has given rise to friction,
sometimes considerable, in our relations with foreign governments,
who understandably object to their officials or their domestic
corporations being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction for activities taking
place in foreign countries and having nothing to do with the United
171
States.” And Julian Ku and John Yoo insisted that, as a matter of
comparative institutional competence, “[f]ederal courts suffer from
many institutional shortcomings, especially when compared to the
172
executive branch, in achieving national goals in foreign relations.”
Moreover, as ATS litigation shifted from foreign official
defendants to multinational corporations, second-wave suits aroused
traditional business objections to “strike suits” against “deep pocket”
173
corporations. Nor are the potential costs limited to the corporate
targets themselves. According to one study, widespread ATS
168. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2167–68; see also Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341,
344 (1995).
169. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2168; see also Richard B. Lillich,
The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 855–57 (1989)
(applauding this circumvention of limits on treaties’ domestic effect).
170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2168 (“[I]t seems illegitimate for
federal courts to apply as domestic law a CIL of human rights based almost exclusively on
human rights treaties that the political branches have taken pains to ensure do not apply as
domestic law.”).
171. Bellinger, supra note 13, at 2; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167,
at 2181.
172. Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 220.
173. See, e.g., Bill Reinsch, The Alien Tort Statute’s Impact on the Business Community,
WORLD COMMERCE REV., June 2012, at 28–30, available at http://www.worldcommerce
review.com/publications/article_pdf/612.
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litigation may depress U.S. exports, cost tens of thousands of jobs,
174
and discourage foreign investment both abroad and in this country.
In light of these concerns and their aggressive presentation by
well-financed defense counsel, it is unsurprising that plaintiffs have
175
obtained few judgments in second-wave cases. But the small
number of plaintiffs’ judgments masks the significance of these suits.
Defendants risk significant litigation expense and potentially
176
embarrassing public disclosures about corporate activities abroad.
These realities have enabled plaintiffs to obtain settlements in some
177
significant cases, including Unocal. And even unsuccessful claims
may bolster a political strategy aimed at curbing human-rights
178
abuses. Indeed, the mere threat of suit may alter corporate
behavior.
Both first- and second-wave ATS suits thus assumed an
importance that transcends the still-relatively-meager results obtained
by plaintiffs. And as ATS litigation expanded to draw in major
multinational corporations and leading national counsel, the Supreme
Court finally took an interest.
C. The Supreme Court Limits ATS Litigation: Sosa and Kiobel
The Supreme Court’s first straight-on encounter with the ATS
arose out of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operation
179
gone awry in Mexico. Enrique Camarena-Salazar was abducted,
tortured, and killed in 1985 while working undercover in Mexico. The
DEA subsequently identified a Mexican physician, Humberto
174. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 37–43 (attempting to quantify these
impacts).
175. See Childress, supra note 6, at 713 n.25.
176. See, e.g., Reinsch, supra note 173, at 29–30.
177. See Chambers, supra note 154, at 15 (reporting that the Unocal settlement provided
both “direct compensation and ‘substantial assistance’ via funds for programs to improve living
conditions, health care, and education”).
178. Cf. Childress, supra note 6, at 725 (suggesting that some human-rights plaintiffs may
sue under the ATS rather than more legally promising foreign or state law theories because of
the political impact of branding the defendant as a violator of international law).
179. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Court did consider an ATS claim in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), which was a suit by
two Liberian corporations against Argentina for an attack on their oil tanker during the
Falklands War. The Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330 et seq., provides the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle for suits against foreign nations,
preempting jurisdiction under the ATS. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434–39; see also Koh,
Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2372 (noting that Amerada Hess “has chilled
international tort suits against foreign sovereigns”).
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Alvarez-Machain, as having assisted Camarena’s kidnappers by
keeping Camarena alive for further torture. When Mexico refused to
extradite Dr. Alvarez to the United States, the DEA hired two
Mexican nationals, including Jose Francisco Sosa, to kidnap Alvarez
and bring him to El Paso. A federal trial court acquitted Alvarez,
180
however, and he then sued both the United States and Sosa.
Alvarez’s claims against Sosa rested on the ATS, alleging arbitrary
181
arrest and detention in violation of CIL.
182
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court rejected Alvarez’s
claim. Justice Souter’s majority opinion resolved some longstanding
ATS debates but left considerable uncertainty in its wake. The Court
found “implausible” Alvarez’s argument that the ATS itself created a
183
cause of action for violations of international law. “As enacted in
1789,” Souter said, “the ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction,
184
not power to mold substantive law.” But the Court also rejected
Sosa’s suggestion “that the ATS was stillborn because any claim for
relief required a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of
185
causes of action.” “[T]he First Congress did not pass the ATS as a
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future
Congress,” the Court said, concluding that the statute was “meant to
186
have a practical effect.” Although the ATS did not create a federal
cause of action, it presupposed the existence of such a cause of action.
The right to sue in ATS cases is thus best understood as an implied
187
right of action created by federal common law.

180. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–99. Alvarez brought his claim against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–80, but it foundered under
the FTCA’s statutory exception barring claims “arising in a foreign country,” § 2680(k). See
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.
181. See id. at 734–36.
182. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
183. Id. at 713.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 714.
186. Id. at 719.
187. See id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”); see also
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 265 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (“Sosa makes clear that all ATCA litigation is in fact based on federal common law,
rather than a statutory cause of action.”); Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at
638 (“Sosa squarely holds that ATS litigation is based upon a federal common law cause of
action and involves judicial lawmaking.”); Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do With
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Sosa’s recognition of a federal-common-law cause of action
obviated one longstanding debate about the ATS’s constitutionality.
That debate had focused on whether ATS cases “arise under” federal
law for purposes of Article III. But as Justice Holmes famously
observed, “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
188
action.” Sosa’s conclusion that the ATS presupposes an implied
federal right of action under federal common law thus disposes of the
Article III objection to Filártiga suits. And because Article III is
189
satisfied so long as there is a “federal element” in the suit, it no
longer matters whether the CIL principles that supply the rule of
decision are also federal in nature. It is not uncommon, after all, for a
plaintiff’s case to rely on one sort of law for the right to sue and
190
another sort of law for the substantive rule of decision. Sosa thus
moots the longstanding debate about whether CIL is “federal” within
the meaning of Article III—at least for purposes of the ATS.
Whether or not CIL is federal common law, the Sosa cause of action

Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719,
1725 (2014) [hereinafter Vázquez, Presumptions]; Ernest A. Young, Response, Federal Suits and
General Laws: A Comment on Judge Fletcher’s Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 33 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview
.org/files/young.pdf [hereinafter Young, Comment on Fletcher]. The other logical possibility
would be to ground the cause of action in international law, but even proponents of ATS
litigation have not asserted that international law supports a right to sue in Filártiga cases. See,
e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS 112–18 (1996) (urging federal courts to imply a right of action under domestic
law); Casto, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 110, at 475 (“There is serious doubt . . . whether
international law, unassisted by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may be invoked in
domestic courts by private individuals.”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of
Filártiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J.
INT’L L. 65, 101 (1995) (acknowledging that “no other nation invites such cases into its courts”).
188. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); see also
Young, Comment on Fletcher, supra note 187, at 35–36 (elaborating on this reading of Sosa).
American Well Works construed the statutory reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but its conclusion
applies a fortiori to Article III itself. A federal right of action is not a necessary condition for
arising under jurisdiction, even under § 1331, but it is certainly a sufficient one. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 864 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
189. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–23 (1824).
190. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (involving a state
tort claim in which plaintiffs invoked breach of a federal regulatory standard to establish the
element of fault); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (providing a federal right of
action against federal officers, but incorporating state law to provide the standard of liability).
See generally Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at 639–40 (discussing analogous
“hybrid” causes of action in domestic law); Young, Comment on Fletcher, supra note 187, at 34–
35 (developing this point).
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is, and that is enough for Filártiga suits to arise under federal law for
191
purposes of Article III.
Justice Souter’s opinion in Sosa did, however, impose significant
192
limits on the substance of ATS claims. The historical record
indicated that “Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for
a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of
nations”—primarily involving assaults on ambassadors, violations of
193
safe conducts, and piracy. Although the majority rejected the notion
that federal courts are “categorically precluded . . . from recognizing a
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law,” it
insisted that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations
[must] rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
194
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” The
191. For general discussions of Sosa’s impact on the debate over CIL, compare Curtis A.
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) (reading Sosa to validate the
revisionist critique of CIL), with William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the
Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007), available at http://www.harvard
lawreview.org/media/pdf/dodge.pdf (accusing Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore of misreading
Sosa). My own view is that Sosa is incompatible with the “modern position” that CIL is federal
common law, and that the best reading of Sosa largely supports the revisionist view. See Ernest
A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28
(2007),
available
at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/feb07/young.pdf
[hereinafter Young, Retail Incorporation]. Whether or not one agrees with that reading,
internationalists like Ralph Steinhardt are simply wrong to assert that, under Sosa, “the courts
may do the one thing that the ‘revisionists’ said was illegitimate, viz., infer a cause of action from
customary international law.” Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Traffic Light Theory of Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 272, 273 (2007) [hereinafter
Steinhardt, Traffic Light]. As Professor Steinhardt has acknowledged elsewhere, there is no
customary international practice permitting Filártiga-type suits; the United States stands alone
in that regard. See Steinhardt, Marcos, supra note 187, at 101. That is why Sosa said that federal
courts may “recognize private claims under federal common law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732
(emphasis added); see also supra note 187 (collecting internationalist sources rejecting the idea
of resting a cause of action on international law).
192. See, e.g., Steinhardt, Traffic Light, supra note 191, at 273 (“Sosa’s ‘yellow light’ is its
rule of evidence that an international norm can be actionable under the ATS only if it is
‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’”).
193. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also id. (“[T]he common law appears to have understood only
those three . . . as definite and actionable, or at any rate, to have assumed only a very limited set
of claims. As Blackstone had put it, ‘offences against this law [of nations] are principally
incident to whole states or nations,’ and not individuals seeking relief in court.” (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769))).
194. Id. at 725; see id. at 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
enacted.”). Importantly, this was a requirement that actionable CIL be as determinate as these
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Court derived this constraint from concerns about both the legitimacy
195
of judicial lawmaking grounded in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
196
and the risk of interfering with foreign policy.
197
These cautions proved “fatal to Alvarez’s claim,” which relied
upon a customary international norm barring arbitrary kidnapping or
detention. As the Court construed his complaint, “Alvarez . . .
invoke[d] a general prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ detention defined as
officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain
198
under the domestic law of some government.” But the Court found
“little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding
customary norm today,” and it noted with evident concern that such a
sweeping prohibition would “support a cause of action in federal
court for any arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law
199
of the jurisdiction in which it took place.” “[A]lthough it is easy to
say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad
that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race,”
Justice Souter wrote, “it may be harder to say which policies cross
that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common
200
law offenses.” Under the circumstances, the Court was simply not
prepared to exercise its “residual common law discretion” to
201
vindicate an “aspiration” for stricter limits on arrest and detention.
Both the human-rights community and ATS skeptics claimed
Sosa as a victory. EarthRights International called Sosa “a crucial
202
victory for human rights,” and Martin Flaherty announced that
Sosa’s “import is to confirm that international custom was part of
common-law examples—not an effort to freeze the content of actionable CIL at the commonlaw baseline. Compare, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that ATS claims should be limited to the offenses
recognized in the Founding era), with Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 120, at 241–43
(criticizing this view).
195. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore,
supra note 191, at 902–10 (discussing Erie’s relevance to Sosa).
196. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26 (citing Erie as counseling against judicial creation of
private rights to sue); id. at 727 (citing foreign-policy concerns as a reason for limiting implied
rights of action in the ATS context).
197. Id. at 725.
198. Id. at 736.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 737.
201. Id. at 738.
202. EarthRights International, In Our Court: ATCA, Sosa, and the Triumph of Human
Rights 5 (2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/in-ourcourt.pdf.
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judicially enforceable federal law even in the absence of a statute.”
Beth Stephens was more circumspect but nonetheless optimistic,
claiming that the lower courts had acted “cautiously” under Filártiga,
and that “[t]he Supreme Court validated their cautious approach in
Sosa, preserving a measured mechanism for human rights
accountability that affirms a narrow but very significant role for U.S.
domestic courts in providing redress for victims of egregious human
204
rights abuses.” Filártiga’s leading academic critics, on the other
hand, saw Sosa as a clear rejection of the “modern position” that CIL
205
is supreme federal law, readily enforceable by American courts.
And the business community “welcome[d] the Court’s ruling” as
“clearly indicat[ing] that the ATS should not be used to institute
206
foreign policy in American courts.”
The Court revisited the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
207
Co., limiting the ATS even more sharply. The plaintiffs were
residents of Ogoniland, a region of Nigeria in which the defendant
corporations were engaged in oil exploration and production.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants enlisted Nigerian government
forces to suppress environmental protests against the defendants’
operations, and that those government agents committed extrajudicial
killings, torture, and other human-rights violations. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability,
208
barring any ATS claim against the defendants. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider that question, but after oral argument
the Court ordered supplemental briefing and argument to consider
“[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to

203. Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004); see also, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John
Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004) (contending that “all of the . . . circuits have [embraced the modern
position] (and now the U.S. Supreme Court has as well, in the Alvarez-Machain case)”).
204. Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” For Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 567 (2004) [hereinafter Stephens, Sosa].
205. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 191, at 902; see also Young, Retail
Incorporation, supra note 191 (taking a similar view).
206. Elizabeth Ann Chandler, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S. Supreme Court Decision to
More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step in Curbing Erroneous Lawsuits,
NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 30, 2004) (quoting Bill Reinsch), available at
http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1691.
207. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
208. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
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recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
209
States.” In June of 2013, the Court held that the ATS generally does
not permit extraterritorial suits; hence, the Court unanimously
concluded that “petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the
210
law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court’s five conservatives,
relied primarily on the presumption against extraterritoriality—a
canon of statutory construction holding that “[w]hen a statute gives
211
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”
“This presumption,” the Chief Justice wrote, “‘serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
212
nations which could result in international discord.’”
More
generally, it “helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy
213
consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.” Under
this presumption, Kiobel was an easy case because “all the relevant
214
conduct took place outside the United States.” All the parties were
foreign as well. Although the Court acknowledged that other cases
might present a more difficult question, it insisted that “even where
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
215
extraterritorial application.” Kiobel thus seemed to rule out foreign-

209. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012).
210. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
211. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)); see
also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (recognizing a
“longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’” (quoting
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).
212. Id. (quoting ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1669.
215. Id. Justice Alito, with Justice Thomas, joined the majority opinion but wrote separately
to suggest a narrower view, under which “a putative ATS cause of action will fall within the
scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Although Alito plainly meant to push the ATS in a narrower direction, he may
have encouraged future courts to read the majority opinion more narrowly. After all, Alito
opined that the majority’s discussion of claims that “touch and concern the territory of the
United States” “obviously leaves much unanswered,” and he suggested that “perhaps there is
wisdom in the Court’s preference for this narrower approach.” Id. at 1669–70.
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cubed cases under the ATS, and it suggested a tough road for other
ATS claims as well.
Kiobel was unanimous as to its result, and that is worth pausing
over for a moment: Although most observers predicted a closely
216
divided court split along political lines, it turned out there was no
support for entertaining a representative example of second-wave
ATS litigation. Eugene Kontorovich has noted that “[w]hen the
Second and Ninth Circuit[s] began questioning ‘foreign cubed’ suits a
few years ago, the great majority of scholars dismissed [the courts’]
claims as entirely spurious. The conventional wisdom was very much
on the side of universal jurisdiction over corporate human rights
217
abuses.” But after Kiobel, foreign-cubed claims are gone—and by a
9-0 vote. Despite ATS advocates’ widespread belief that “the foreign
cubed issue [was] a conservative invention to roll back human rights
218
litigation,” concerns about overextension of implied rights of action
and interference with the political branches’ conduct of foreign policy
turned out to be widely shared.
Notwithstanding Kiobel’s unanimous result, its concurring
opinions are likely to extend debate about the ATS’s scope. Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court’s four liberals, concurred only in the
result and rejected the presumption against extraterritoriality as an
219
appropriate framework for interpreting the ATS. Breyer suggested
instead that jurisdiction should lie under the ATS whenever “(1) the
alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and
220
adversely affects an important American national interest.” He
made clear, however, that the national interest “includes a distinct
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other

216. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel and Academic Fall[i]bility, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/17/kiobel-andacademic-fallability (“Everyone, including myself, predicted a decision closely divided on
ideological lines.”).
217. Id.
218. Id. For examples, see Stephens, Checks and Balances, supra note 141, at 7.
219. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer
reasoned that although the presumption “‘rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters,’” “[t]he ATS was enacted with ‘foreign
matters’ in mind.” Id. at 1672 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255
(2010)). Moreover, “at least one of the three kinds of activities that we found [in Sosa] to fall
within the statute’s scope, namely piracy . . . normally takes place abroad.” Id.
220. Id. at 1674.
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221

common enemy of mankind.” By citing Filártiga (as well as the
Marcos litigation) with approval, Breyer made clear that he would
222
not read the ATS to exclude all foreign-cubed cases. But by
agreeing with the majority that the Kiobel defendants’ minimal
presence in the U.S. was insufficient, he suggested a minimum
condition that alleged violators of international law be found seeking
223
“safe harbor” within the United States.
The broader view of ATS litigation taken by four Justices itself
suggests that the universal-jurisdiction vision of the ATS is hardly
dead. Justice Kennedy’s one-paragraph concurrence strengthened
that impression. He noted that “the Court is careful to leave open a
number of significant questions regarding the reach and
interpretation” of the ATS, and he agreed that “that is a proper
224
disposition.” Kennedy warned, moreover, that “[o]ther cases may
arise” involving serious human-rights violations “covered neither by
the [Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)] nor by the reasoning
and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial
225
application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”
Without specifying how he might part company with Kiobel’s
majority in a future case, Kennedy undermined any sense of certainty
that the majority opinion might otherwise have imparted.
At least in the near term, post-Kiobel debate about the ATS is
likely to focus on two sets of questions: First, was Kiobel right to
reject a universal-jurisdiction reading of the ATS? Second, how much
scope for human-rights litigation remains after the Court’s ruling?
II. THE TROUBLE WITH PRIVATIZED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
A universal-jurisdiction model of ATS litigation has its
attractions. The plaintiffs in Filártiga-style cases generally present
compelling injuries, and the perpetrators of the charged abuses
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1675 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)); Hilao v. Marcos
(In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495–96, 500 (9th Cir. 1992)). Justice Breyer also cited with approval
the practice of those countries that “find ‘universal’ criminal ‘jurisdiction’ to try perpetrators of
particularly heinous crimes such as piracy and genocide” and that permit related forms of civil
suits. Id. at 1676.
223. Id. at 1678.
224. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id.
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include some of the most notorious figures of the modern era. In this
respect, ATS suits illustrate one of the “clear triumphs of the
American legal system”: “its remarkable ability to hold the powerful
226
to account while treating the weak with some respect.”
To the extent that deep-pocket corporate defendants can
convincingly be implicated as aiders and abettors, moreover, the
second wave of Filártiga litigation offers victims a hope of meaningful
compensation that was generally lacking in the first. By imposing
liability on powerful economic actors, courts might encourage those
227
actors in turn to pressure foreign governments to clean up their acts.
And in many instances, the domestic situation in the relevant foreign
nation is such that an extraterritorial suit in U.S. courts offers the only
228
realistic hope of subjecting the atrocities involved to the rule of law.
As Judge Leval recently observed, ATS suits “give substance to a
body of law that is crucial to a civilized world yet so underenforced
229
that it amounts to little more than a pious sham.”
Universalist ATS litigation also promises to boost American
courts’ involvement in the development of international law. Dean
Koh’s vision of “transnational public law litigation” envisioned the
U.S. federal courts as vital instruments not only for compensating
victims and deterring perpetrators of human-rights violations, but
also for “norm-enunciation” as participants in the development of

226. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 737
(2006).
227. See, e.g., David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The
Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack
Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 336 (2011) (urging that “[t]he end
objective” of ATS litigation against corporations “is that the corporate sector can ‘right the
system,’ namely by challenging and attempting to correct the governmental or societal
challenges to international law principles, . . . thus enhancing the social environment for future
business growth”).
228. See, e.g., Katie Shay, The Wrong Decision for Human Rights, HUFFINGTON
POST, Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katie-shay/kiobel-vs-shell_b_3113133.html
(complaining that “[t]oday’s decision leaves Esther Kiobel and plaintiffs like her with little
recourse against some of the largest corporations in the world” and suggesting that corruption
and dependency on multinational corporations would prevent any remedy in the Nigerian
courts); Brenda Bowser Soder, Kiobel Ruling Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-on-human-rights (“In many countries,
especially those with weak and non-independent justice systems and where the government is
either the violator or is complicit in human rights violations committed by corporations, the only
remedy and the only deterrent is the risk of being held accountable in another country.”).
229. Leval, supra note 122, at 16.
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230

international human-rights law. “[O]ur constitutional and historical
traditions,” he insisted, “not only charge the courts with chief
responsibility for preventing abuse of state power against individuals,
but also with giving domestic meaning to the shared public values
231
expressed by treaties and customary international law.” ATS cases
thus facilitate the U.S. judiciary’s involvement in shaping the content
232
of international human-rights law, and Kiobel is likely to renew
longstanding complaints that American courts are too unwilling to
233
construe and enforce international law.
The deterioration of the federal courts’ role obviously worries
human-rights advocates, who warn that decisions like Kiobel “will
234
undermine the United States’ status as a leader on human rights.”
But it should also concern those who worry that international law
threatens American interests. After all, international law is hardly
likely to become more congenial to American perspectives and
235
interests if American courts get out of the business of construing it.
I will return to these concerns in Part III.
We must also count the costs of transnational public-law
litigation in the Filártiga mold, however. Those costs are considerable.
They plainly moved the Court in Kiobel, and they are certain to
230. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2368.
231. Id. at 2396. This conception of the courts’ role is in considerable tension with Dean
Koh’s assertion that domestic courts “find” CIL rather than make it. See id. at 2385; see also
Henkin, supra note 134, at 1561–62 (“In a real sense federal courts find international law rather
than make it . . . as is clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law
pursuant to constitutional or legislative delegation.”). To my mind, the view that federal courts
will help shape CIL to the extent that they consider CIL claims under the ATS is considerably
more plausible. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System,
54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1122 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement] (arguing that this is
a reason to support involvement by domestic courts in international cases).
232. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 4, at 24 (“ATS litigation has the potential to play an
important role in the development and enforcement of customary international law” because
“[d]ecisions of national courts can constitute state practice and evidence of opinio juris.”).
233. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk
for a Short Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 845 (2013) [hereinafter Steinhardt, Long Walk]
(“[W]hat is clear in Kiobel is . . . a continuing, seemingly visceral resistance to treating modern
international law in both treaty and customary form as law of the United States.”); see also Koh,
Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2377 (“Since Sabbatino, American courts have
given undue credence to separation of powers and judicial incompetence in international law
cases. That decision has unfortunately contracted American courts’ once-vibrant, historically
important role in the development of international law.”); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2278–79 (1991) (lamenting
reluctance of American judges to apply international law).
234. Soder, supra note 228.
235. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1122.
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profoundly influence the future course of ATS litigation. This Part
addresses those costs from two different perspectives. Section A
situates both Kiobel and Sosa as part of the Supreme Court’s evolving
case law concerning implied private rights of action. Implied rights of
action are a familiar feature of domestic securities-fraud and
employment-discrimination litigation; they also provide a vehicle for
constitutional claims against federal officials. In all these fields, the
Court has been increasingly reluctant to recognize private rights to
sue under federal statutes or the Constitution in the absence of an
express statutory provision. Sosa was a rare instance in which the
contemporary Court recognized a new implied private right of action
(or, more precisely, endorsed an old one), and Kiobel’s limitation of
that right’s extraterritorial effect reflected the Court’s more general
discomfort with federal-common-law remedies. Just as the Court’s
implied-rights jurisprudence has become increasingly restrictive in
recent years, those same concerns are likely to generate additional
constraints on ATS litigation going forward.
We cannot understand Kiobel simply as a foreign-affairs case
apart from this more general background of domestic federal-courts
236
doctrine.
Just as domestic principles governing the relations
between the state and federal judiciaries provide valuable guidance
concerning the relations of domestic and supranational courts,
established domestic principles governing remedies and judicial
lawmaking should (and do) govern the implied-rights issues posed by
Sosa and Kiobel. Kiobel’s analysis is thus best understood not as a
237
simple weighing of functional concerns or even as an application of
238
the extraterritoriality canon in foreign-relations law. As I explain in
Section B, both Kiobel’s application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and its analysis of functional concerns about ATS
litigation make most sense within the broader framework of concerns
about judicially created rights to sue.
Section C shifts to the perspective of international law and
foreign experience with universal jurisdiction. The debate over the
scope of ATS litigation is often portrayed as a clash between
domestic and international-law concerns. Here, however, the high bar
236. See id. at 1151–63 (arguing that foreign-relations law should not be treated as a distinct
field, isolated from domestic public law).
237. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 181–99 (comparing the institutional competence
of courts and political actors in foreign-relations cases).
238. David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without Rationale, 28 MD. J.
INT’L L. 241, 245–50 (2013).
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for universal jurisdiction in international law and the general
reluctance of foreign nations to exercise the universal jurisdiction
they do have cut in the same direction as domestic concerns about
judicial lawmaking. Even more significant, the criminal nature of
universalist prosecutions abroad highlights the unique and
unprecedented quality of Filártiga’s vision. Simply put, foreign
experience suggests that prosecution of universal-jurisdiction cases
should remain primarily in public hands, and that the unique qualities
of the American civil-justice system are likely to exacerbate the
disruptive impact of universal-jurisdiction suits under the ATS.
These points support the Court’s decision in Kiobel,
notwithstanding early criticism of that decision by internationalist
scholars. They also suggest that the Court is likely to decide questions
that remain open under the ATS in a similarly restrictive manner—a
matter I take up in Part III.
A. Filártiga Claims as Implied Rights of Action
Proponents of transnational public-law litigation tend to
downplay the domestic-law limits on public-law litigation generally.
But those limits are well developed and significant in American law.
They include a strong presumption against implying private rights to
enforce substantive legal norms when Congress has not expressly
authorized such suits. Where implied rights have been recognized,
similar presumptions limit their scope. And even where Congress has
enacted broad private rights of action in public-law cases, such as in
42 U.S.C. § 1983’s general right of action against state and local
government officials for violations of federal law, the federal courts
have narrowed those remedies. If Filártiga claims are to be justified as
analogous to domestic public-law litigation, then the substantial
limitations on such litigation must be understood and respected.
1. The General Decline of Implied Private Rights Under Federal
Statutes and the Constitution. The Court appears to have first
239
recognized an implied right of action in 1916, but it created only one
240
more over the next fifty years. The Court became considerably

239. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
240. See Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (recognizing
an implied right to sue under the Railway Labor Act of 1926); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 732–42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (surveying the development of the
implication doctrine).
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more generous in the 1960s. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak —the “high water
242
mark of judicial implication of remedies” —recognized an implied
right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which prohibits fraud in the solicitation of proxy material, and the
Court recognized a similar implied right under the Securities and
243
Exchange Commission’s general antifraud rule seven years later.
During the same period, the Court implied additional rights under
244
various civil-rights laws.
Implied rights of action soon ran afoul of longstanding concerns
about judicial lawmaking, however. As early as 1963, the Court noted
that “we are not in the free-wheeling days ante-dating Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins. The instances where we have created federal common
245
law are few and restricted.” The Court began to cut back on implied
246
rights in its 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash, rejecting an implied right
of action under a criminal provision of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Although the Court recognized an implied right under
the nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the Education
247
Amendments of 1972 in Cannon v. University of Chicago, Justice
Powell filed a powerful dissent arguing that “a federal court should
not infer a private cause of action” under a federal statute “[a]bsent
248
the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent.”
Subsequent cases made clear that “Justice Powell lost the battle in
249
Cannon, but he won the war.”
Since Cannon, the Court has generally narrowed its inquiry from
a broad purposive analysis to a narrower focus on “proof that
250
Congress intended to create a private right of action.” The leading
251
contemporary case is Alexander v. Sandoval, a 2001 decision

241. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
242. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 705.
243. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
244. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 728 (Powell, J., dissenting).
245. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938)).
246. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
247. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
248. Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
249. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 706; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights
and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113,
126–33 (2010) (tracing the post-Cannon development of the doctrine).
250. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 706; see, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (rejecting an implied right under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1934).
251. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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rejecting an implied right of action to enforce disparate-impact
regulations issued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Sandoval made clear that “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
252
Congress.” Hence, courts must determine whether the relevant
statute “displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
253
private remedy.” Without such evidence of Congress’s intent, “a
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
254
compatible with the statute.” The Court thus endorsed Justice
Scalia’s earlier statement that “‘[r]aising up causes of action where a
statute has not created them may be a proper function for common255
law courts, but not for federal tribunals.’”
The Court’s decisions on implied rights of action for
constitutional violations have taken a similar path. Although federal
law provides a statutory cause of action against state and local
officials for violation of federal constitutional (and some statutory)
256
rights, no such statutory remedy exists for similar violations by
federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
257
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court recognized an implied
private right of action for damages under the Constitution itself for
individuals injured by a federal official’s violation of their
258
constitutional rights. Emphasizing that “[t]he present case involves
no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress,” the Court held that an individual has an implied
right to sue under the Fourth Amendment for damages arising from
259
an unconstitutional search and seizure.
252. Id. at 286 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578).
253. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)).
254. Id. at 286–87.
255. Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
257. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
258. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 726–42 (discussing the Bivens
remedy); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens
Question, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 509 (2013) (surveying the Court’s cases in this area). Before
Bivens, plaintiffs seeking damages for a constitutional violation by federal officers had to rely on
state common-law tort actions. In this scenario, the alleged unconstitutionality of the officer’s
action would enter the case as a response to the officer’s likely defense of official authority. See
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390–91.
259. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
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The Court initially expanded Bivens to other constitutional
260
claims and other types of federal officials. But just as with the cases
dealing with implied rights under federal statutes, the Court switched
course in the 1980s. The first set of cases held that Congress’s
provision of an alternative remedy forecloses Bivens relief, even if
that remedy is not as generous to the plaintiff as a Bivens claim might
261
be. A second set of cases rejected Bivens claims even absent a
statutory alternative remedy, based on the existence of “special
262
factors counselling hesitation” about an implied remedy. Although
these cases arose in the military context, the Bivens Court itself
263
included “question[s] of federal fiscal policy” as another such factor,
and lower courts have recognized other “special factors” in a broad
264
set of national-security cases. One of the Supreme Court’s most
recent decisions suggests that the mere prospect of opening the door
to “an onslaught of Bivens actions” is itself a reason to restrict the
265
right. Finally, a third set of cases has refused to expand the class of
266
potential defendants in Bivens actions.
260. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (permitting an Eighth
Amendment claim for inadequate medical care by federal prison officials); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (permitting an administrative assistant to a congressman to sue under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for alleged gender discrimination that resulted
in her termination).
261. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (rejecting a due-process claim by
plaintiffs alleging wrongful denial of Social Security disability benefits, based on availability of a
statutory remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (denying a Bivens remedy for a
federal “whistleblower” employee who claimed to have been fired in retaliation for exercising
his First Amendment rights, based on the availability of a civil-service remedy).
262. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (denying a Bivens remedy to a
former serviceman claiming to have been subjected to LSD experiments by military officers
without his consent); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens suit
by Navy-enlisted men against their superior officers alleging racial discrimination).
263. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311
(1947), in which the Court declined to recognize an implied right of action on behalf of the
United States against a tortfeasor who negligently injured a soldier).
264. See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d
390, 394–96 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548–55 (4th Cir. 2012); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563, 574 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 563 F.3d 527, 532
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see generally Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (surveying the cases).
265. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007).
266. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (rejecting a Bivens claim under the Eighth
Amendment against individual employees of a privately operated federal prison for providing
inadequate medical care); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (rejecting a Bivens
claim under the Eighth Amendment against a private corporation operating a prison on behalf
of the federal government); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (rejecting a due-process claim
against a federal agency).
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The upshot is that “three decades after its inception, Bivens
appeared intact at least on its own facts, but its successful extension
267
into any new contexts seem[s] decidedly unlikely.” The Court has
been virtually unanimous in refusing to extend the Bivens right of
268
action in every circumstance presented over the last three decades.
This bleak outlook, moreover, is of a piece with the more general
decline of implied rights of action in the statutory context. As Justice
Scalia has explained, “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this
269
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.”
Across the board, the Court has been hostile to judicial recognition of
270
private rights to sue for over three decades.
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the Court has likewise
narrowed the scope of statutory rights to sue under the general
federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides an
express right of action against persons acting “under color of” state
law—generally state and local officials—when they violate “the
271
Constitution and laws” of the United States. Although § 1983
remains a broad and powerful statute, the Court has recognized
several important limits over the past several decades. In particular,
the Court has said that narrower remedies specific to particular
272
federal statutes may supersede § 1983’s broad right to sue, and it has
frequently held that particular federal statutes simply do not create

267. Vladeck, supra note 264, at 265.
268. See generally Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (noting that since 1980, the Court has
“consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of
defendants”); Elliot J. Weingarten, Minneci v. Pollard and the Uphill Climb to Bivens Relief, 7
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 95, 95 (2012) (“Over the past thirty years, the Court
has consistently denied Bivens expansion to new categories of plaintiffs.”); Laurence H. Tribe,
Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (2007) (concluding that Bivens is “on life support with little
prospect of recovery”).
269. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3.3 (5th ed. 2007) (“In
general, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create new causes of action, even in areas
where it has been willing to develop common law rules.”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343, 357–62 (characterizing the
Court’s implied-right-of-action cases as part of a broader trend in which “the Court sounds the
theme that its power (or, more generally, that of the federal courts) is sharply limited and that
Congress has primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for fleshing out the operation of schemes
of federal regulation”).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
272. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005); Middlesex Cty.
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 188, at 970–72.
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273

individually enforceable rights. These cases, which cite the Court’s
implied-right-of-action jurisprudence, are somewhat surprising given
274
§ 1983’s express provision for a private remedy. In any event, even
under § 1983—where textual and historical support for federal private
rights of action is strongest—we see a strong narrowing trend. That
trend may indicate a general skepticism of private enforcement; it
may also reflect the modern proliferation of express rights to sue
under specific statutory schemes. But the direction of doctrinal
movement is unmistakable.
This, then, is the doctrinal landscape that any assertion of an
implied private right of action must confront. The remainder of this
Section fits Sosa’s implied right of action for violations of the law of
nations into this framework. Justice Scalia noted in Sosa that Bivens
275
“provides perhaps the closest analogy” to ATS claims, and the Sosa
majority cited recent cases rejecting implied rights in both
constitutional and statutory cases as reasons for caution about claims
276
like Sosa’s under the ATS. This landscape will seriously constrain
the scope of ATS litigation going forward.
2. Sosa’s Translation Problem and the Domestic-Law Limits on
Private Rights Under the ATS. In Sosa, the Supreme Court
recognized that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action,” but nonetheless found that “[t]he jurisdictional
grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential for personal
277
liability at the time” of its enactment. This cause of action is best
understood as an implied right of action under federal common law.
Some of the limits on that cause of action come from international
law, in the sense that the Court has understood ATS claims as limited
to a subset of rights that international law recognizes with requisite
273. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002) (construing the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 968–70.
274. These decisions may reflect skepticism about the Court’s decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), which extended § 1983 to cover all federal statutory violations
despite significant historical evidence indicating a narrower intent. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 188, at 967–68.
275. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
276. See id. at 727 (majority opinion) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)).
277. Id. at 724.
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clarity. Hence, the Sosa right enforces “norm[s] of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to . . . the 18th-century paradigms we have
278
recognized.” But the Court also made clear that ATS claims are
limited not only by the substantive content of international law, but
279
also by a broader set of concerns about federal judicial lawmaking
and its potential to interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the
280
political branches of the U.S. government. These latter concerns
arise from domestic law, resting on the likely purposes of the ATS
itself and the demands of the Constitution’s separation of powers.
It is thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition that ATS
plaintiffs ground their claims in well-established principles of
international law. Domestic law also constrains ATS claims. Sosa
emphasized three legal changes since the ATS’s drafting that
provided “good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a
281
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action.”
First, post-Erie principles of separation of powers limit the lawmaking
role of courts, especially with respect to recognizing implied private
282
rights of action. Second, separation-of-powers principles also limit
judicial intrusion into the conduct of foreign affairs by the President
283
and Congress. Third, Congress has taken the lead in defining and
enforcing international human-rights law, suggesting that courts
should confine any implied rights under the ATS to a very narrow
284
scope. Each of these “good reasons” is a question of domestic law,
and each thus supplements the constraints on ATS suits imposed by
the substantive reach of international norms. I discuss the first
point—limits on implied rights of action—in this Section, then turn to
the second and third points in the next Section.
The Founding generation did not think of “causes of action” in
the same way that contemporary lawyers do; plaintiffs’ rights to sue in

278. Id. at 725.
279. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (noting
that instances of federal common law “are ‘few and restricted’” (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963))).
280. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (recognizing
the act-of-state doctrine to avoid judicial actions that undermine the conduct of foreign affairs
by the political branches).
281. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
282. Id. at 725–27.
283. Id. at 727–28.
284. Id. at 728.

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

1076

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

[Vol. 64:1023
285

the early Republic derived from the common-law “forms of action.”
Hence, it was enough for Congress to create jurisdiction in the ATS
and then rely on the common law for the plaintiff’s right to sue. But
as the Sosa Court noted, we do not think of the common law in the
same way today, nor do we view federal courts as having broad
286
authority to fashion common-law remedies. Sosa thus posed a
difficult problem of translation, requiring the Court to take into
account “the interaction between the ATS at the time of its
287
enactment and the ambient law of the era,” as well as the changes in
288
that ambient law since Erie.
Undertaking to transpose the Founders’ understanding of a tort
in violation of the law of nations into the modern context of implied
remedies, Justice Souter noted that “the absence of congressional
action addressing private rights of action under an international norm
is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it
289
creates a statute.” The First Congress, after all, would have
considered such norms presumptively enforceable under the common
290
law without need for a statutory remedy. Crucially, the Court found
291
that the ATS would have been “stillborn” without such a right.
The Court thus concluded that “[t]he jurisdictional grant is best
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at
292
the time.” This meant that “the First Congress understood that the

285. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV.
777 (2004) (describing the common-law understanding of rights to sue); see also Dodge,
Historical Origins, supra note 120, at 239 (arguing that requiring an express cause of action for
ATS suits “would have mystified the First Congress”).
286. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26. Erie itself has been under siege in recent years, and at least
some of the attack seems motivated by dissatisfaction with the limits Erie places on the domestic
reception and vindication of CIL. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
595, 623–24 (2008). For a response, see Young, Erie, supra note 24.
287. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
288. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–27 (discussing the impact of Erie). On translation as a
problem of interpretation, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1165 (1993).
289. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
290. See id. (concluding that “history and practice give the edge” to the view that “torts in
violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the
time”). The Court noted, however, that only “few . . . torts in violation of the law of nations
were understood to be within the common law.” Id. at 720.
291. Id. at 714.
292. Id. at 724.
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district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain
293
torts in violation of the law of nations.” The only way to replicate
this authority under contemporary jurisprudence—assuming that the
294
ATS is itself purely jurisdictional —would be to recognize an
implied right of action as a matter of federal common law. To impose
onto the venerable Judiciary Act the current doctrine’s insistence on
strong evidence of Congress’s intent to create a federal remedy would
prevent the federal courts from hearing a significant set of cases that
the ATS was clearly intended to cover.
My own view is that although Justice Souter’s effort at
translation made Sosa more complex, it is the only way to be faithful
both to contemporary jurisprudential categories and to what the
framers of the first Judiciary Act tried to achieve. The difficulty is
whether Souter’s approach gave adequate effect to legal
developments since the Founding. As he acknowledged, “the
prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1789,”
and along with “that conceptual development in understanding
common law has come an equally significant rethinking of the role of
295
the federal courts in making it.” In the “ambient law” of our era, “a
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
296
And although the majority opinion
legislative judgment.”
emphasized over and over that its implied ATS cause of action should
be narrow, its statement that “the door is still ajar . . . and thus open
to a narrow class of international norms today” left a wide scope for
297
creativity in the lower federal courts.
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence focused on this potential for
lower-court adventurism. He noted that the standard the majority
intended to constrain lower courts—that the CIL norms in question
298
must be “specific, universal, and obligatory” —was precisely the test
293. Id.
294. See id. at 713 (holding the ATS to be purely jurisdictional, and citing with approval
William Casto’s declaration that any contrary reading is “simply frivolous”) (citing Casto,
Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 110, at 480).
295. Id. at 725–26.
296. Id. at 727 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)).
297. Id. at 729. Justice Souter said that “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping,”
id. (emphasis added), and he suggested that some prior lower-court findings of actionable norms
“reflect[ed] a more assertive view of federal judicial discretion over claims based on customary
international law than the position we take today,” id. at 736 n.27.
298. See id. at 732 (majority opinion) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.,
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)) (explaining that the Court’s standard “is generally consistent
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that the lower courts had previously employed in finding a broad
299
range of actionable violations. Indeed, it was the standard that the
Ninth Circuit had applied in upholding the claim for “arbitrary
300
arrest” that the Supreme Court rejected in Sosa itself. Justice Scalia
worried that the lower courts would abuse this discretion, “usurping
[Congress’s] lawmaking power by converting what they regard as
301
norms of international law into American law.” And indeed, Sosa
302
did not seem to put much of a damper on ATS claims.
Justice Scalia’s focus on the standard for an actionable CIL
violation, however, seems misdirected in hindsight. It is true that,
post-Sosa, some lower courts have permitted ATS claims for
303
violations that Justice Souter likely did not intend to reach. And
human-rights advocates have urged plaintiffs to use the ATS for an
304
even broader set of substantive claims. But most ATS claims
advance the same core human-rights concerns of Filártiga, and these
claims surely satisfy the “specific, universal, and obligatory
305
standard.” Because Sosa’s substantive filter has little bite in this
context, transsubstantive limits such as a bar to corporate liability or
the presumption against extraterritoriality took on a more prominent
role in Kiobel.

with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this
Court,” and citing with approval the “specific, universal, and obligatory” formula from Marcos,
25 F.3d at 1475).
299. See id. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citing Marcos, 25 F.3d
at 1475; Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
300. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
301. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
302. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 13, at 5 (“Notwithstanding the [Sosa] Court’s directive
for restraint, almost four years later, [ATS] litigation has showed no signs of slowing down.”);
Richard O. Faulk, The Expanding Role of the Alien Torts Act in International Human Rights
Enforcement, Class Action Litigation Report, 10 TXLR 294, at 4 (2009) (listing “creative and
expansive post-Sosa attempts to invoke the ATS”).
303. See, e.g., Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–16 (D. Mass.
2013) (holding that a claim that an anti-gay preacher had aided and abetted the persecution of
homosexuals in Uganda passed Sosa’s test).
304. See, e.g., Jaclyn Lopez, The New Normal: Climate Change Victims in Post-Kiobel
United States Federal Courts, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 113, 115 (2013) (arguing “that there is an
emerging international norm of limiting contributions to climate change, and that a plaintiff
bringing an ATS claim regarding climate change may succeed on the merits of the case”).
305. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 139, at 459 (observing that “[p]ost-Sosa, no one
would doubt that claims of extrajudicial killing, state-sponsored rape, and forced labor would
qualify under Sosa’s analysis to create ATS liability”). But see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d
877, 883–86 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that torture and extrajudicial killing are not actionable
under the ATS).
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B. Extraterritoriality as a Constraint on Sosa’s Right of Action
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Kiobel rested entirely
on the canon of statutory construction “provid[ing] that ‘[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
306
has none.’” The canon is a venerable one, traceable at least as far
back as the Court’s refusal in 1818 to construe a federal piracy statute
to cover a robbery on the high seas by foreign citizens on board a
307
foreign ship. Like many canons of construction, the presumption
against extraterritoriality has both descriptive and normative
308
dimensions. Descriptively, it “rests on the perception that Congress
309
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”
The canon also serves normative values (which Congress may or may
310
not share): It promotes compliance with international law; it
311
protects the foreign-policy primacy of the political branches; it
avoids clashes between American law and the laws of other
jurisdictions; and it limits foreigners’ exposure to the wild and woolly
312
ways of the American civil-justice system.

306. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Morrison
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
307. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643 (1818); see also William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 n.2
(1998) (collecting other early instances).
308. See id. at 112–23 (surveying reasons for the canon). On the distinction between
descriptive and normative canons, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of
Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743,
749 (1992) (distinguishing between “descriptive” canons, which “implement what Congress
really wanted, but expressed inartfully or incompletely,” and “normative” canons, which
“implement an important ‘public value’ through the mechanism of statutory interpretation”);
Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (same); see also Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1549, 1586–87 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Constitutional Avoidance].
309. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255; see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)
(“[T]he presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the least of which is the
commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”).
310. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011)
(“The presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the marriage of the Charming Betsy
canon . . . and an international law rule that jurisdiction was generally territorial.”); Sloss, supra
note 238, at 241–42.
311. See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“The presumption against extraterritoriality guards
against our courts triggering . . . serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such
decisions . . . to the political branches.”); Sloss, supra note 238, at 245–46 (calling this the
“international relations” rationale).
312. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270 (worrying that the United States “has become the
Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

1080

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

[Vol. 64:1023

Although early commentary has argued that Kiobel is out of step
313
with these justifications, I reach the opposite conclusion. Kiobel was
a particularly appropriate case for judicial caution about the
extraterritorial reach of American law. I begin, however, with
objections that the canon simply does not apply either to the ATS or
to Sosa’s right of action.
1. Extraterritoriality, Jurisdiction, and Implied Rights of Action.
The first difficulty with applying the extraterritoriality canon in
Kiobel was that, as Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, “[w]e
typically apply the presumption to discern whether an Act of
314
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad.” The ATS, however,
“does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief”; it is, as the Court
315
held in Sosa, “‘strictly jurisdictional.’” For many of Kiobel’s critics,
this renders the presumption irrelevant. Carlos Vázquez, for example,
has argued that the extraterritoriality canon is categorically
316
inapplicable to jurisdictional statutes.
He suggests that the
317
presumption applies only to statutes that regulate conduct. This
objection, however, gives the canon far too narrow a scope.
The problem is that the substantive–jurisdictional distinction is
insufficiently clear-cut to bear the weight that critics would place on
it. International law has long regulated jurisdiction to prescribe (to
regulate conduct) and jurisdiction to adjudicate, suggesting that each
318
raises significant extraterritoriality concerns. Jurisdiction to decide
is, in any event, always to some extent jurisdiction to prescribe a rule
for that case. One need not be a hard-core Legal Realist to
acknowledge that adjudication frequently involves some degree of
lawmaking; applying a preexisting legal standard in a new factual
securities markets”); Paul B. Stephan, Response Essay—Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial
Modesty?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
553, 554 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011); Sloss, supra note
238, at 251–54 (calling this the “domestic judicial policy” rationale).
313. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 238, at 243, 246–47, 253–54.
314. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
315. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).
316. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1723; see also Steinhardt, Long Walk,
supra note 233, at 841 (charging that “Kiobel is the first time that the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been applied to a purely jurisdictional statute”).
317. Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1723.
318. Notably, Justice Breyer’s concurrence rejecting application of the extraterritoriality
canon argued that ATS jurisdiction was consistent with international norms—not that
jurisdictional statutes raise no extraterritoriality concerns. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673–77
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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context, for example, inevitably shapes the meaning of that standard.
And extension of federal jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under
international law increases the likelihood that American judges will
come into conflict with foreign jurists over the meaning of
319
international legal principles. The potential for judicial lawmaking
and transnational disagreement, in turn, creates incentives that
influence litigant conduct. The history of federal-courts doctrine is
replete with examples of litigants altering their conduct in order to
320
fall within one or another court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate.
The extraterritoriality canon’s underlying concerns, then, do not
fall neatly on one side of a bright line between prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction. They suggest that Kiobel’s reasoning might
apply to other “strictly jurisdictional” statutes, such as the general
federal-question statute or the alien–citizen diversity provision, in a
future case in which the ATS is not in play. But Kiobel itself is best
read as applying the presumption not to the ATS itself, but rather to
the implied right of action that Sosa recognized. As Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, “the principles underlying the [extraterritoriality]
canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes
321
of action that may be brought under the ATS.” This application
gives rise to two further objections: that Sosa does not involve the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and that the canon in any
event does not apply to federal-common-law causes of action.
The first objection notes that “it is debatable whether the Kiobel
plaintiffs were even asking U.S. courts to apply U.S. law
extraterritorially. Arguably, it would be more accurate to say that the
Kiobel plaintiffs were asking U.S. courts to apply international law
322
extraterritorially.” The canon should not apply, in other words,
because the substantive rules of conduct enforced by Sosa claims

319. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy,
and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 71–72 (2009) (acknowledging the
risk that greater national-court involvement in deciding international-law questions may lead to
more conflict among courts of different nations).
320. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (bank assigned a mortgage to an
out-of-state party in order to facilitate access to federal court in a foreclosure suit). Much of the
point of federal diversity jurisdiction was to encourage the development of interstate commerce
by assuring out-of-state businesses that they would have access to a federal forum in the event
of a dispute. See RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
FEDERALISM 67–68 (1977).
321. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
322. Sloss, supra note 238, at 243.

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

1082

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1023

323

derive from international law. But the Court’s implied-right-ofaction jurisprudence has always understood creating a right to sue as
324
itself an important exercise of power. And that right is a creature of
325
federal—not international—law. As both supporters and critics
326
have noted, America’s recognition of a private civil remedy for
human-rights violations is unique—neither foreign nor international
law offers any ready analogues. It ignores reality to characterize Sosa
claims as a passive procedural mechanism rather than as an important
327
assertion of American sovereignty with far-reaching consequences.
As such, those claims should be governed by the same general rules
of extraterritoriality as other assertions of national legal authority.
The latter objection is that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should not apply to determine the scope of federalcommon-law rules (like Sosa’s implied right of action), because there
328
is no congressional intent to construe in such cases. This is an odd
argument, because it suggests that courts may impose extraterritorial
obligations less easily when there is legislative support for those
obligations—that is, an enacted statute—than when the courts
themselves have created the right to sue. Canons guide statutory
construction by identifying either things Congress is unlikely to want
to do (e.g., legislate extraterritorially) or values that are important
enough to push back against Congress’s likely intent (e.g., avoiding
conflict with other nations). It is hard to imagine why either sort of
principle should not also constrain courts when they make law on
their own. Federal common law is, after all, always subordinate to
329
federal statutes. Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, “the
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
323. Id.; see also Leval, supra note 122, at 21 (making a similar argument).
324. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(stating that implying private rights of action “allows the Judicial Branch to assume
policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch”); accord Carlos M.
Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and
Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495,
1504, 1547 (2011) (agreeing that Sosa claims involve an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, not
just to adjudicate).
325. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 104, at 182; Leval, supra note 122, at 18.
327. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS 156 (2014) (characterizing the rise of ATS claims after Filártiga as a critical
development shaping the international legal landscape).
328. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1731.
329. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011); Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981).
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policy”—a principal concern underlying the extraterritoriality
canon—“is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question
330
is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”
2. Did Congress Intend to Reach Foreign-Cubed Cases? Justice
Breyer’s primary argument in his Kiobel concurrence did not reject
any of this reasoning. He instead suggested that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should not apply because “[t]he ATS . . .
331
was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind.” David Sloss rightly
notes that “[n]o one seriously disputes the proposition that Congress
enacted the ATS to influence foreign affairs. Congress’s primary goal
when it enacted the ATS was to reduce a source of friction with
332
important U.S. allies.” In his view—and Breyer’s—that should be
sufficient to overcome any presumption that Congress was “primarily
333
concerned with domestic conditions.”
It does not follow, however, that Congress meant federal law to
apply extraterritorially simply because it was concerned about
“foreign matters.” Imagine that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
334
permissive construction of the Takings Clause in Kelo, Congress
worries that local takings of foreign-owned property would offend
other nations. It enacts a statute prohibiting (and providing a
compensatory remedy to aliens for) “any expropriation in violation of
customary international law.” This hypothetical statute would have
been plainly “enacted with foreign matters in mind,” but does that
make it more likely that Congress also intended the statute to allow
foreign property owners to sue foreign governments for

330. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). Cf. David H.
Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2006)
(“[A]s a rule, congressional intent is the threshold for federal judicial authority to apply
[customary international law] as federal law . . . .”).
331. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). This point makes
more sense as a way of rebutting the presumption—we know that Congress meant to legislate
extraterritorially because it was dealing explicitly with international matters—than of rendering
the presumption inapplicable. For example, in Morrison the Court evaluated textual evidence
that the federal securities laws touch on foreign activities and transactions as evidence to rebut
the presumption of extraterritoriality. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 263
(2010). It is not clear whether this distinction makes any practical difference, however.
332. Sloss, supra note 238, at 4.
333. Id. at 4 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating the usual
presumption)); accord Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
334. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding a local government’s use
of eminent domain to take private residential property and give it to a private corporation in
order to promote economic development).

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

1084

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

[Vol. 64:1023

expropriations taking place in foreign countries? That conclusion
would transform a statute meant to avoid international controversy
into one guaranteed to engender it.
Parallels to the actual history of the ATS should be obvious. As
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, Congress legislated in response to
worries about the capacity of the state courts to provide reliable
remedies for law-of-nations violations occurring within American
territory, and the federal courts’ early applications of the statute
335
likewise involved domestic occurrences. In this vein, my colleague
Curtis Bradley has argued that the “the text and structure of the First
Judiciary Act, and the correspondence surrounding it, suggest that
Congress viewed at least the law of nations portion of the Alien Tort
Statute as an implementation of Article III alienage jurisdiction”—
336
that is, as restricted “to suits involving a U.S. citizen defendant.”
Whether or not one finds Professor Bradley’s reading persuasive, its
availability (and considerable textual and historical support)
demonstrates that a statute may well be concerned with “foreign
matters” and yet not meant to apply extraterritorially (especially in
the foreign-cubed sense). No one, after all, argues that Congress had
337
anything like contemporary Filártiga-style litigation in mind in 1789.
Nor does Sosa’s widely accepted assumption that the ATS was
meant to cover piracy demonstrate that Congress intended to permit
extraterritorial suits. First, the assumption itself may not be correct.
After all, the early Congress passed a specific statute dealing with
pirates, and the Marshall Court’s piracy cases all involved American
338
parties. Second, the extraterritoriality presumption aims to prevent
clashes with foreign governments and, in particular, foreign law that
would potentially apply to conduct regulated by the relevant federal

335. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–67; see Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No.
1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895).
336. Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 636–37; see also M. Anderson Berry, Whether
Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316, 320–21 (2009) (arguing that the drafting history of the ATS—
particularly, the change from “foreigner” to “alien”—indicates Congress’s desire to restrict the
statute to suits involving foreigners resident in the United States).
337. The Court seemed to have something like Dean Slaughter’s broader view in its sights
when it denied that “the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable
forum for the enforcement of international norms.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
338. See supra note 70. Indeed, the Court’s earliest extraterritoriality case refused to apply
the piracy statute extraterritorially. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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339

statute. Those concerns are particularly attenuated when laws deal
340
with generally stateless entities like pirates. When Justice Breyer
341
asserted that human-rights violators are “today’s pirates,” he
papered over a number of important distinctions, including the
frequently close relationship between defendants and foreign
governments in contemporary ATS suits, the possibility of
interference with legal processes ongoing in the state where the
events occurred, and the likelihood that the foreign state may have
considerable economic interests at stake. The Chief Justice was right
342
to suggest that “pirates may well be a category unto themselves.”
Finally, Professor Vázquez suggests that the Sosa cause of action
should overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality because
it is based on the Founders’ notion of “general” law, and in the
eighteenth century such general law would have been understood to
343
apply universally. This argument misunderstands the relationship
between the “general” principles of CIL that provide the rule of
decision in ATS suits and the source of the plaintiff’s right to sue. As
A.J. Bellia has shown, eighteenth-century American plaintiffs derived
their right to sue from the English common-law forms of action, not
344
general principles of CIL. Vázquez acknowledges that international
345
law generally does not confer rights to sue on civil plaintiffs —and I
do not understand him to argue that it did in the Founding era, either.
The English common law, of course, did not apply universally and
339. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (“Applying U.S. law to pirates . . . does not typically
impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy
consequences.”).
340. Justice Breyer correctly noted that “the robbery and murder that make up piracy do
not normally take place in the water; they take place on a ship. And a ship is like land, in that it
falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it flies.” Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in
the judgment). But it is not as if applying American remedies in piracy cases is likely to offend
those countries that consider piracy legal and object to their punishment. There aren’t any, at
least as a general matter. And in any event, we generally punish pirates under the federal piracy
statute—not the ATS—through a criminal process that can more readily take into account any
such foreign-relations objections that do materialize.
341. Id. at 1672; see also id. at 1672–73.
342. Id. at 1667 (majority opinion); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 78 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying the ATS to conduct on the high seas
does not pose the risk of conflicts with foreign nations that the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the ATS itself were primarily designed to avoid. The high seas are
jurisdictionally unique.”).
343. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1739.
344. See Bellia, supra note 285, at 785.
345. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1725.
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had to be received by positive act in each of the American states.
The common-law provenance of Sosa’s right of action thus cannot
power an argument that the right applies universally without regard
to geography. To the extent that history frames the appropriate
bounds of Sosa’s right of action, that history indicates that Congress
was concerned with a far narrower set of cases in which international
law required the United States to provide a remedy—primarily in
347
cases arising in U.S. territory or involving U.S. nationals.
3. Extraterritoriality as a “Special Factor Counselling Hesitation.”
Alongside arguments about Congress’s intent, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked concerns about ATS claims causing “‘unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations’” and “‘impinging on the
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
348
foreign affairs.’” These concerns echoed the Court’s domestic
implied-rights cases. Speaking of implied rights of action to vindicate
constitutional principles, for example, the Court has frequently
recognized that “‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial
determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation
349
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’” The same
reasons supporting a presumption against extraterritoriality in
statutory construction thus figured in Kiobel as “special factors
counselling hesitation” in extending an implied right of action under
federal common law.
Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia made this connection explicit a year
before his elevation to the Supreme Court, invoking the specialfactors analysis from the Bivens cases to reject an ATS claim against
former Nicaraguan Contras:
Just as the special needs of the armed forces require the courts to
leave to Congress the creation of damage remedies against military
346. See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951). States incorporated the common law, moreover, only to the
extent that each jurisdiction did not decide to modify it by legislative act or later judicial
decision. See id. at 798–99.
347. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra note
117, at 902.
348. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Sosa, 542
U.S. at 727; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (quotation
marks omitted).
349. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2012) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537,
550 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983))).
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officers for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of soldiers, . . . so
also the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the
creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy
officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects
causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implications of suits such
as this cannot be ignored . . . . [A]s a general matter the danger of
foreign citizens’ using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct
the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we
must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy
350
should exist.

The Supreme Court has likewise invoked foreign-affairs and security
351
concerns as reasons to cabin implied federal rights of action.
Those concerns have particular resonance in cases invoking
universal jurisdiction. International legal principles governing
universal jurisdiction and foreign experience with its exercise tend to
underscore the Chief Justice’s concerns in Kiobel. Likewise,
comparative analysis of foreign and American approaches to civil
litigation bears out Kiobel’s worry about conflict with foreign legal
regimes. The next Section thus fleshes out Kiobel’s “special factors”
from the perspective of international law and experience.
C. Universal Jurisdiction in International Perspective
In international law, universal jurisdiction remains controversial
in principle and extremely rare in practice. There are good reasons
for that. Even advocates of universal jurisdiction acknowledge that it
is “a potentially dramatic extension of judicial power and a
352
corresponding threat to judicial legitimacy.” To the extent that
consistency with international law is a goal of the extraterritoriality
canon, Kiobel’s limits on ATS litigation further that goal. It is equally
important to recognize, moreover, that the form of universal
jurisdiction exercised in Filártiga suits is profoundly different from
the universal jurisdiction exercised in human-rights cases by other
countries around the world. Universal jurisdiction in foreign practice
is a criminal phenomenon.

350. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Casto,
New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at 645 (“Because ATS litigation in Sosa’s wake is so
obviously analogous to Bivens litigation, the same caution is pertinent to crafting tort remedies
for violations of international law.”).
351. See Vladeck, supra note 264, at 268–75.
352. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168.
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Reading Sosa to recognize a civil form of universal jurisdiction
departs from foreign practice in two crucial respects: It wrests control
over the initiation and conduct of litigation from public hands, and in
particular, away from the Executive branch, which is responsible for
conducting foreign policy. And moving human-rights litigation onto
the civil side tends to emphasize exceptional aspects of American
procedure and remedies that may intensify conflict with foreign legal
systems. Foreign experience with universal jurisdiction should make
American courts hesitate to expand ATS litigation.
1. Extraterritoriality, Universality, and International Law. Justice
Breyer’s Kiobel concurrence emphasized that “just as we have looked
to established international substantive norms to help determine the
[ATS’s] substantive reach, so we should look to international
jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdictional
353
scope.”
Three distinct questions are worth asking: Does
international law require the exercise of universal jurisdiction? Does
it permit the exercise of such jurisdiction? And even if universal
jurisdiction is permitted, is it nonetheless disfavored?
Justice Breyer suggested that universal jurisdiction is not only
354
permitted but required by international law. Significantly, he did not
assert that international custom established this obligation, but rather
noted that “the Senate has consented to treaties obliging the United
States to find and punish foreign perpetrators of serious crimes
355
committed against foreign persons abroad.”
But even the
Restatement (Third) acknowledges that each of the treaties that
Breyer cited “include[s] an obligation on the parties to punish or
356
extradite offenders.” That is rather different from a requirement to
353. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). It is not clear that
this analogy works. After all, the very term “universal” jurisdiction fits uncomfortably with the
traditional mission of the American federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies
outside this limited jurisdiction . . . .” (citations omitted)).
354. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
355. Id.
356. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 Reporters’ Note 1, at 257 (emphasis
added) (discussing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; and the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192).
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“find and punish”; a state party to these treaties may satisfy its
obligations without exercising any sort of universal jurisdiction, so
long as it hands over perpetrators to other nations willing to
357
prosecute. These treaties have each been ratified by many, many
countries, and yet few of those countries provide for, much less
exercise, universal jurisdiction.
It is nonetheless impossible to say that international law
prohibits universal jurisdiction. As discussed in Part I, international
law has recognized universal jurisdiction in principle for some time.
Some of Kiobel’s critics, however, suggest that extraterritorial
jurisdiction has become so well accepted that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is no longer warranted. David Sloss, for example,
claims that “the international law rationale for the presumption
against extraterritoriality became untenable because international law
358
changed.”
Professor Sloss relies on a 1927 decision by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (a forerunner to today’s
359
ICJ) in the Lotus case, which rejected any “general prohibition to
the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside
360
their territory.” Instead, the Court said that international law
Each of the post-Restatement treaties that Justice Breyer cited offers signatories a similar choice.
See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
Art. 9(2) (2006) (requiring that each state party take measures to establish jurisdiction “when
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction, unless it extradites or
surrenders him or her”), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professional
Interest/disappearance-convention.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, Arts. 5(2), 7(1) (similar); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (requiring
each signatory to “search for persons alleged to have committed . . . such grave breaches” and to
“bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” or “hand such
persons over for trial”). Justice Breyer acknowledged this qualification in his string citation, but
he should have qualified his initial statement that these treaties “oblig[e] the United States to
find and punish foreign perpetrators of serious crimes committed against foreign persons
abroad.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676.
357. See, e.g., International Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction 154 (2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/taskforce-etj-pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter IBA Task Force] (emphasizing the importance of this distinction).
358. Sloss, supra note 238, at 2.
359. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
360. Id. at 19. It is worth noting that neither the Permanent Court (which was, of course, far
from permanent) nor the present-day ICJ has ever had authority to liquidate the meaning of
international law. Article 59 of the ICJ’s statute provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has
no binding force except as between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Statute of
the Int’l Court of Justice, Art. 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&
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“leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is
361
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.” Further, Sloss
denies that there is “any rule of international law that prohibits
domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign-cubed cases.
To the contrary, the universality principle is a widely accepted
principle of international law that authorizes States to apply their
laws extraterritorially to address heinous conduct that violates
362
universal human rights norms.”
This overstates the case considerably. First, Professor Sloss
conflates the sort of extraterritoriality at issue in Kiobel with the
broader meaning of that term in both international law and American
statutory construction. In general discussions, extraterritoriality can
entail any application of a state’s law to conduct occurring outside its
borders. That includes jurisdiction asserted over actions by a state’s
own citizens abroad (nationality), extraterritorial actions causing
impacts within a state’s borders (protective principle), and actions
363
harming the state’s citizens abroad (passive-personality principle).
Acceptance of these sorts of extraterritoriality in international law,
such as it is, would hardly establish the legitimacy of foreign-cubed
cases like Kiobel. Those cases rely on the distinct principle of
universal jurisdiction.
Likewise, Professor Sloss exaggerates by asserting that “the
universality principle is a widely accepted principle of international
364
law.” Accepted by whom? Sloss cites the Restatement (Third), which
p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_III (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). According to Sir Ian Brownlie, this
provision “reflects a feeling on the part of the founders that the Court was intended to settle
disputes as they came to it rather than to shape the law.” BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 20; see
also id. (noting that Article 51 was meant “to rule out a system of binding precedent”).
Although such decisions undoubtedly do have “a role in the progressive development of the
law,” id. at 21, Brownlie notes that the Lotus decision itself was decided on a narrow vote and
“was rejected by the International Law Commission in its draft articles on the law of the sea,”
id. Generally speaking, ICJ decisions are one source among many in settling the meaning of
international law—to the extent that it can be settled at all.
361. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), supra note 359; see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and
Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 331 (2012) (noting that the ICJ has reaffirmed this view as recently
as 2009).
362. Sloss, supra note 238, at 3.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30.
364. See Sloss, supra note 238, at 3 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 cmt.
a & b). Justice Breyer similarly invoked this Restatement section in Kiobel. See 133 S. Ct. at 1673
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Relying on the Restatement (Third) is problematic not
just because it has been criticized as more normative than descriptive, see supra notes 135–36,
but also because its function is not to restate international law or to survey other states’ practice.
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establishes that universal jurisdiction is accepted by a certain segment
of the American legal academy, and an article by two leading
365
international advocates of universal jurisdiction. Maximo Langer
has demonstrated, however, that universal jurisdiction is practiced
only by a handful of Western European countries, each of which has
366
taken steps to limit its exercise.
Moreover, as I elaborate in the next two subsections, the United
States is the only nation to exercise the sort of freestanding civil-side
universal jurisdiction at issue in Kiobel and other foreign-cubed
367
cases. Given the extremely mixed track record of such suits, it is
hard to say that civil universal jurisdiction was well established in
American state practice even before Kiobel. Notwithstanding Justice
Breyer’s assertion in his Sosa concurrence that a “procedural
368
consensus exists” in favor of universal jurisdiction, much of the
international academic commentary continues to treat universal
369
jurisdiction as controversial.

Moreover, the Restatement (Third) was promulgated over a quarter century ago, before
significant retreats from universal jurisdiction in the countries that had practiced it. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
365. See Sloss, supra note 238, at 3 (citing Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9). Those
advocates acknowledge that “state practice endorsing the exercise of universal jurisdiction” is
“embryonic,” but they assert that it is “beginning to emerge.” Donovan & Roberts, supra note
9, at 153. The Donovan and Roberts article stops far short of asserting, as Professor Sloss does,
that universal civil jurisdiction is “well established.” Sloss, supra note 238, at 3.
366. See Langer, supra note 32, at 43 (observing that universal jurisdiction is “applied
essentially by Western European and developed Commonwealth states”); see also Yee, supra
note 69, at 529–30 (Chinese scholar contesting general acceptance of universal jurisdiction).
367. See Anderson, supra note 104, at 166 (“Foreign parties don’t regard the ATS as
legitimate or as implementing genuine international law, and won’t ever—not our close friends
and allies, let alone China or Russia. Even the Canadians resent it.”).
368. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment). In support, Justice Breyer cited only the Restatement (Third), a report of the
International Law Association, a decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Supreme Court of Israel’s decision in the Eichmann case.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 86–104; see also IBA Task Force, supra note 357, at
151 (“The proper scope and application in certain instances or with regard to certain crimes of
universal jurisdiction is controversial among states and among commentators.”). One might also
consider the international-law rationale as a descriptive canon: Courts should assume that
Congress, as an empirical matter, generally wishes to comply with international law. To the
extent that we deal with the intent of the enacting Congress—as seems appropriate with
descriptive canons—then the relevant state of international law would be that law as it stood in
1789. Although the eighteenth-century world does seem to have recognized universal
jurisdiction over pirates, everyone agrees that extraterritorial jurisdiction was more tightly
circumscribed during this period.
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Even in its broader sense, extraterritoriality remains exceptional.
According to a leading treatise, “The starting-point in this part of the
law is the proposition that, at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is
370
territorial.” The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction does appear
to be on the rise, but a recent report by the International Bar
Association concluded that “[t]he steady increase in states exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction has not . . . resulted in an abatement of the
371
controversies surrounding such exercises.” An interpretive canon
presuming that statutes do not apply extraterritorially thus fits rather
well with the current state of international law, which occasionally
permits the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction but finds that
372
jurisdiction both unusual and controversial.
2. Political Control of Foreign Policy and the Leap from
Criminal- to Civil-Side Universal Jurisdiction. As discussed in Part I,
the primary difference between American exercise of universal
jurisdiction under the ATS and foreign practice is that the latter exists
as part of the criminal law. Justice Breyer suggested in Sosa that
“consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that
373
universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening.” But as he
acknowledged, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in other countries
is nearly always public—that is, it is initiated and controlled by public
officials rather than by private litigants. When private litigants do
374
play a role, they are subject to significant public controls. Public
domination of universalist litigation ensures that the same institutions
responsible for the conduct of foreign policy have the ultimate say
over the initiation and prosecution of international human-rights
litigation.

370. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 298, 301.
371. IBA Task Force, supra note 357, at 5. For a sampling of the controversy, see, e.g.,
Kathleen Hixson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127 (1988) (arguing that the
Restatement (Third)’s relaxation of limits on extraterritoriality was inconsistent with
international law).
372. See supra Section I.A.3. See also Macedo, supra note 66, at 11 (worrying that “[t]he
currently incoherent jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction is likely to result in confusion and, at
best, uneven justice”).
373. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (analogizing ATS
litigation to foreign countries’ exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction).
374. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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Intuitively, the civil nature of universal jurisdiction under the
ATS may seem to render such jurisdiction less troubling; the
Restatement, for example, suggests that “the exercise of criminal (as
distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in
375
another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive.” That may
well be true from the standpoint of the defendant and perhaps the
defendant’s state, although I argue in Subsection 3 that the
exceptional characteristics of the American civil-justice system may
create unique frictions. Other commentators blur the distinction
between civil and criminal remedies, noting that international
criminal law has increasingly provided for reparations and urging that
compensation for victims should be recognized as part of the
“effective remedy” that state parties must provide when they violate
376
international human-rights treaties. And still other commentators
even go so far as to say that accepting universal criminal jurisdiction
377
requires civil jurisdiction a fortiori.
But there are also good reasons to find the ATS’s civil regime
378
more troubling than criminal instances of universal jurisdiction. As
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have observed, “[w]hether in the
civil or criminal context, one nation’s examination of the validity of
another nation’s human rights record directly implicates international
relations. In the criminal extradition or prosecution context, however,
the executive branch has the duty, expertise, and discretion to
379
accommodate such foreign relations concerns.” In civil cases,
however, “human rights litigation is under the control of private
380
plaintiffs, many of whom are noncitizens, and unelected judges.”
375. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 403 Reporters’ Note 8.
376. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 153–54 (concluding that “the acceptance of
universal criminal jurisdiction should carry over to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction for
at least the same range of conduct”).
377. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2003) (arguing that the “greater” power to prosecute criminally
necessarily includes the “lesser” power to impose civil liability); but see Bradley, Universal
Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 343–46 (observing that “the theory of universal jurisdiction
hypothesizes that each nation is delegated the authority to act on behalf of the world
community, not on behalf of the particular victims. . . . To the extent that private civil causes of
action are designed primarily to redress harm to particular victims, they may be conceptually
outside of the universal jurisdiction authority”).
378. See Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 343–46.
379. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2158–59.
380. Id. at 2159; see also Morris, supra note 59, at 356–57 (urging that because universalist
prosecutions may precipitate international conflict, it is “imperative that high-level executive
decision-makers, duly informed by intelligence and analysis from foreign ministries, have the
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One would expect the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to bring
decisions to initiate proceedings at least somewhat in line with the
Executive branch’s foreign policy; executive officials could then be
held politically accountable for their exercise of that discretion.
Under the ATS, however, “private litigants make the decisions
regarding when to bring these lawsuits, which countries to target, and
381
what relief to seek.”
Other legal systems do allow somewhat more involvement by
382
victims in the prosecutorial process, and in fact some of the most
high-profile universalist prosecutions—including the Spanish case
383
against Augusto Pinochet—have been initiated by private parties.
Generally speaking, however, private involvement in criminal
prosecutions overseas pales in comparison to the autonomy of the
American private civil plaintiff (or her lawyers). The Pinochet case,
for example, involved a civil-law jurisdiction in which the presiding
384
judge took the lead in conducting the investigation. Moreover,
universalist criminal prosecutions initiated by nongovernmental
385
actors have been controversial for precisely this reason. Notably, in
Belgium, criticism of such prosecutions by other states led Belgium
386
largely to repeal its universal-jurisdiction statute.
power to preclude prosecutions that could lead to international catastrophe”). As Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith note, the British Law Lords “expressly encouraged Britain’s home
secretary to reconsider his decision to allow extradition proceedings against Pinochet to go
forward, even though the Law Lords had determined that there was a valid legal basis to
proceed with extradition.” Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2159. Although
the secretary demurred, “[h]is decision . . . was based on just the sort of balancing of legal and
political considerations . . . that is not available in private civil litigation.” Id.
381. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2181–82.
382. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Stephens, Translating Filártiga,
supra note 20, at 12.
383. See Wilson, supra note 48, at 3. The Spanish acción popular allows individuals with an
interest in a case or acting on behalf of a victim to bring private prosecutions. See C.E. art. 125,
B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain); Organic Law on the Judiciary art. 20.3 (B.O.E.
6/1985); L.E. Crim. § 101, 270.
384. See Wilson, supra note 48, at 3; see also Langer, supra note 32, at 33–34 (discussing
“people’s prosecutions” in Spain).
385. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 155.
386. See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
888, 896–97 (2003). Likewise, Britain has sharply curtailed the ability of private parties to
initiate universal-jurisdiction prosecutions. See John Bellinger, Britain Amends Universal
Jurisdiction Law, LAWFARE (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2011/09/britain-amends-universal-jurisdiction-law (“Britain amended its universal jurisdiction
law last week to require private individuals who seek arrest warrants for foreign government
officials for human rights offenses to obtain the consent of Britain’s director of public
prosecutions.”).
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A second functional consideration is that the underlying law in
criminal proceedings is generally statutory. Most analogous
prosecutions invoking universal jurisdiction have occurred in civil-law
387
countries where statutes play a more prominent role. Even in this
country, which has a rich common-law tradition on the civil side, the
388
criminal law has been a statutory preserve since the early Republic.
This tendency stems from separation-of-powers concerns about
judicial power and due-process concerns about the vagueness of
common-law crimes. Although judge-made law continues to play a
389
role in federal criminal law, it remains the case that, by making
human-rights violations a matter of civil tort rather than crime, the
ATS commits this American version of universal jurisdiction to a
390
judge-driven rather than a legislature-driven regime.
This separation-of-powers choice has several consequences. It
divorces not just the decision to prosecute, but also the development
of the law’s underlying content, from the political institutions also
charged with formulating American foreign policy. A consequence
for potential defendants concerns fair notice: it is far harder to
anticipate how judges may develop the vast corpus of customary
391
principles and open-ended human-rights treaties than to consult a
statutory codification of prohibited conduct, even if the latter may
inevitably retain some ambiguities around the edges.
Decoupling private civil litigation from executive foreign policy
is not without its virtues. As Gary Bass has noted, states are unlikely
to incur the political and logistical costs of universalist prosecutions
pursued out of a disinterested concern for the international rule of
law; rather, the states bringing such prosecutions will tend to be

387. Likewise, the Canadian universal-jurisdiction statute refers specifically to the
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the Rome Statute. See
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.24, § 4 (Can.).
388. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 36 (1812) (holding that
before federal authorities may impose criminal penalties, “[t]he legislative authority of the
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall
have jurisdiction of the offense”); see also Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1040 (1984); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1280 (1985).
389. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
345, 347–48; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 689–90.
390. More recent enactments like the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), by contrast,
retain a civil model but define the content of the underlying law in the statute. See Torture
Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73.
391. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 164, at 451 (emphasizing the indeterminacy of CIL).
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states—like Israel in the Eichmann case—that have suffered
somehow at the hands of the accused, or states that have a political
392
agenda to advance against another state. Private plaintiffs initiate
ATS litigation in American courts for strategic reasons of their own,
of course, but at least the claims are adjudicated by the courts of a
government that will often have little direct interest in the outcome.
Advocates of universal civil jurisdiction have argued that keeping
control of criminal sanctions in public hands while dispersing control
393
of civil sanctions strikes the right balance. But the clear message of
the Court’s implied-rights jurisprudence is that this balance in itself is
394
a question best left to Congress.
Finally, it may be possible to modify the ATS regime in ways that
would inject a degree of executive foreign-policy supervision.
Although the implied-rights cases recognize judicial authority to
make such modifications as a matter of federal common law, we are
better off if courts need not guess at the political branches’
preferences. In the Court’s previous extraterritoriality cases, the
presumption has often proved to be an effective “preferenceeliciting” rule; in both ARAMCO and Morrison, for example,
Congress responded to the Court’s rejection of extraterritorial reach
by restoring some of that reach but, at the same time, fine-tuning the
395
statute’s extraterritorial application in various ways. The specifics of
how that might be done are outside the scope of this Article, but it is
a mistake to assume that courts must bear sole responsibility for
reform in this area.
3. America’s Exceptional Civil-Justice System. The shift from a
predominantly criminal form of universal jurisdiction in other
countries to a civil form under the ATS also exacerbates the
possibility of clashes between domestic and foreign law. In particular,

392. See Bass, supra note 63 at 78.
393. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 156 (“If the recognition of universal
jurisdiction necessarily entails a balancing of traditional sovereign prerogatives and fundamental
human values, the balance should be struck by according those with the greatest incentive to
pursue reparations—that is, the victims of the heinous conduct—the right to do so in civil
actions, while reserving to public authorities the decision to seek penal sanctions.”).
394. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (“Congress is in a far better position than a
court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation . . . .”).
395. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 104–05 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing Congress’s response to ARAMCO and
Morrison); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 205–06 (2008) (discussing preference-eliciting rules of statutory construction).
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it brings into play the highly exceptional features of the American
396
civil-justice system. Many features of that system are highly
397
attractive to plaintiffs. But those features are also likely to strike
foreign defendants as unusual and possibly unjust. Wholly apart from
the substance of the particular claims advanced in ATS litigation,
then, the process of American civil litigation may well amplify the
discomfort that exercising universal jurisdiction in American courts
398
inspires in foreign observers.
Even within our own legal system, “[c]ivil litigation and criminal
litigation . . . occupy separate worlds. They employ different
procedural rules, often before different judges in different
399
courthouses, and with almost entirely unconnected bars . . . .” These
separate worlds differ in the degree to which they diverge from the
400
rest of the world. Although American criminal prosecutions differ
in significant ways from foreign prosecutions, American
“exceptionalism” seems markedly more pronounced on the civil side.
And although comparisons often emphasize differences between
America and the civil-law countries, “American procedure is very
401
different from its common law kin” as well.
In Kiobel, the governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands
filed two amicus briefs objecting “to the efforts of U.S. litigators and

396. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 287 (2002); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure
Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (accepting the
“holistic assessment that U.S. civil procedure is highly exceptionalist when compared to the civil
law systems in the rest of the world,” but arguing that “‘American exceptionalism’ is
diminishing in some, if not most, areas of civil procedure”); Richard L. Marcus, Putting
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709–10
(2005) [hereinafter Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism].
397. See Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 27–34; Roger Alford, Arbitrating
Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008).
398. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 47; see also Marcus, Procedural
Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 710 (invoking “the nasty aroma American litigation seems to
elicit in much of the rest of the world”).
399. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 684.
400. As David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have pointed out, the civil and criminal worlds
also differ in the degree to which they have changed since the early Republic. See id. at 737
(“Criminal procedure . . . is frozen roughly into the shape it had in 1800. . . . By contrast, civil
procedure[’s] . . . shape and general features would scarcely be recognizable to a lawyer from
the early Republic.”). This further undermines any attempt to derive a coherent civil-side
regime for human-rights enforcement from the text and history of the first Judiciary Act.
401. Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
441, 442 (2010); see also Chase, supra note 396, at 284 (observing that “the American dispute
process . . . is exceptional even when measured against its siblings in the common law family”).
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judges to bypass the legal systems of other sovereigns by deciding
civil cases involving foreign parties where there is no significant nexus
402
to the U.S.” These briefs emphasized that conflict with foreign
nations over ATS suits arises in part because the United States
403
“provide[s] a unique plaintiff-favoring system.”
“[T]he
attractiveness of the United States as a forum for foreign plaintiffs is
well known,” the foreign governments argued, “and [it] may, in part,
be traced by decisions by the United States to accord private plaintiffs
404
a set of advantages that most other countries have not accepted.”
Those governments cited six “special litigation advantages available
in the U.S.”: the “American rule” that each side bears its own costs
(including attorneys’ fees); the breadth and expense of American
discovery in civil cases; the constitutional right to a civil jury trial; the
availability of punitive damages; broad “opt out” class actions; and
405
the use of results-based contingent fees.
Each of these features is a staple of the literature on comparative
406
civil procedure. That literature also emphasizes American rules of
notice pleading, which Scott Dodson has described as “unlike any
407
other in the world.”
Some scholars have identified modest trends

402. Brief of the Governments of the K. of the Netherlands and the U.K. of Great Britain
and N. Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (filed June 13, 2012) [hereinafter
Netherlands & Great Britain Brief]; see also Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17,
at 29–33.
403. Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17, at 33; see also Netherlands & Great
Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 26–30.
404. Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17, at 33.
405. Id. at 27–28.
406. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (observing that class actions are “a
central feature of American procedural exceptionalism,” “resisted (if not rejected) by most
foreign legal systems”); James R. Maxeiner, The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share,
in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 287 (Mathias
Reimann ed., 2013) (decrying American failure to adopt a “loser pays” rule for attorney fees or
to regulate fee agreements); John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive
Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510, 513–16 (2007)
(observing that most civil-law countries “prohibit punitive damages in private actions because
they consider punitive damages a form of punishment that is appropriate only in criminal
proceedings”); Chase, supra note 396, at 288–96 (discussing civil juries and discovery as aspects
of American exceptionalism).
407. Dodson, supra note 401, at 443; see also id. (explaining that “civil law countries . . .
require detailed fact pleading and often evidentiary support at the outset, and . . . even most
common law traditions . . . also require some fact pleading”; American pleading, by contrast,
generally requires only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’” and “has traditionally
focused on notice rather than facts” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8)).
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toward convergence, particularly in pleading and aggregate-litigation
408
procedures, but important and contentious differences remain.
Foreign critics have argued, moreover, that these features compound
one another in practice. Broad discovery increases litigation costs,
which then cannot be recovered by prevailing defendants thanks to
409
the American rule on attorneys’ fees. Likewise, aggregate litigation
and punitive damages magnify defendants’ exposure to possibly
410
capricious jury verdicts. And notice pleading, the lack of feeshifting, and contingent-fee arrangements all work together to
411
enhance incentives to file claims.
The exceptional features of American civil litigation reflect a
litigation culture starkly different from that found elsewhere. The
point is not simply that, as Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco
have observed, “[t]wenty-first-century America is one of the most
412
litigious societies the world has ever known.” Rather, American
litigation differs from that abroad both with respect to who drives it
and to the purposes that it seeks to achieve. Many have observed that
American litigation elevates the parties and their lawyers over the
413
judge. The parties frame the issues and control fact-gathering in
American courts, for example, while judges tend to guide both
414
Lawyer-driven litigation also feeds an
processes elsewhere.

408. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), brought American
pleading closer to the rest of the world, but concluding that American practice remains
“significantly different from foreign models”); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009)
(“European receptiveness to new procedures for aggregate litigation . . . stops markedly short of
full-fledged embrace for U.S.-style class actions, much less related features of litigation
finance.”).
409. See Netherlands & Great Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 27.
410. Id. at 27–28; see also Richard Marcus, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in Goals for Civil
Litigation, in GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS 123, 134 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014) [hereinafter Marcus, Goals] (“One major feature of
American litigation is that the stakes are higher.”).
411. See Netherlands & Great Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 27–28.
412. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs’ Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102,
102 (2000).
413. See, e.g., Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 723–24 (contrasting the
adversary and inquisitorial systems); Maxeiner, supra note 406, at 290 (“That private lawyers
are the driving force behind civil justice explains the existence of the American practices of no
indemnity for attorneys’ fees and unregulated fee agreements.”).
414. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 694 (observing that the power of private
lawyers in our system “to compel sworn testimony and to require the other party and
unaffiliated witnesses to disclose information and documents . . . is broader and deeper than the
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“entrepreneurial spirit that has developed within the civil litigation
415
bar.” Second-wave Filártiga suits against corporate aiders and
abettors are, of course, an example of that spirit. The independence
of the bar from government, however, heightens the potential
disconnect between ATS litigation and national foreign policy.
The most distinctive element of American litigation culture is its
416
vibrant tradition of public-policy reform through litigation. This
tradition, which places international human-rights lawyers in the role
417
of Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education, makes civil
litigation a more instinctive strategy for human-rights advocates in
418
this country. And facilitating reformist litigation may explain our
system’s plaintiff-friendly rules; as Richard Marcus has argued, “[t]he
more one conceives of private litigation as furthering a public
enforcement purpose, the more one may be tempted to provide
incentives to pursue it, and the more one may be inclined to equip
those who do pursue litigation with the tools they will need to
419
succeed.” Conversely, “[t]he absence of a comparable private
enforcement goal helps explain why the procedures of the rest of the
420
world differ so markedly from America’s.”
Adoption of a civil-litigation model under the ATS thus
promotes vindication of human rights through a mechanism that is
out of step with practices in the rest of the world. This may or may
powers exercised by private lawyers in any other legal system”; in civil-law countries, by
contrast, “judges typically decide whether and how deeply to probe the disputed facts”); see also
Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 723–24 (comparing the role of the judge
in the American system with the German, Japanese, and English systems). Here, too, there are
some signs of modest convergence. See Dodson & Klebba, supra note 396, at 14–18.
415. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 693.
416. Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 24–26. Some attribute this aspect of
American legal culture to American suspicion of intrusive government, see generally ROBERT
A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001), while others
emphasize the common-law tradition, see Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 130 (“The very
heart of the common law system contemplates that the courts themselves will develop and
enforce—via private litigation—the sorts of legal protections that are ordinarily adopted by
legislative or administrative action in other legal systems.”).
417. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Koh, Transnational Public
Litigation, supra note 1, at 2366 (explicitly invoking comparisons with Brown).
418. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 416, at 15–16 (suggesting that “in the United States
lawyers, legal rights, judges and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large central
bureaucracies that dominate governance in high tax, activist welfare states”).
419. Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 133; see also Paul Carrington, Renovating Discovery,
49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (claiming that private civil “discovery is the American alternative
to the administrative state”).
420. Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 140.
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not be a good thing—I tend to be a fan of the American model of civil
litigation, but my purpose here is neither to praise that model nor to
bury it. Instead, I want to make two more modest points. The first is
that by transforming the universal criminal jurisdiction practiced in
the rest of the world into a civil phenomenon, the Filártiga model of
ATS litigation significantly amplified the risk of conflict with other
legal systems. Foreign governments and corporations are both
uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the American civil-litigation
system, and that exacerbates the political conflict inherent when
421
American institutions intervene in their affairs.
The second point, however, is that the use of civil litigation to
push social reforms—and to vindicate basic notions of justice—taps
into a fundamental aspect of American legal culture. This gives ATS
litigation an intuitive appeal to American lawyers. Who among us,
after all, would not pay good money to watch Joe Jamail depose
Bashar al-Assad? To the extent that Filártiga litigation is a natural
American analog of criminal prosecutions in foreign lands, we are
unlikely to abandon it entirely.
Nonetheless, the exceptionalism of American civil procedure and
remedies law, the incentives it creates for plaintiffs, and the
international resentment it inspires all suggest the need for care with
procedure and remedies in transnational public litigation. The
contrast with Bivens is instructive. The Court created an implied right
of action in response to two anomalies—the limitation of the general
federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to suits against state and
local officers, and the existence of a longstanding common-law right
of action for constitutional violations by federal officers in cases
422
involving equitable relief but not damages. Bivens filled the
resulting gap, and it made sense to apply the generally applicable civil
rules to the new class of claims. In an important sense, then, Bivens
normalized the law governing damages actions against federal officers
by conforming it to well-established practice in closely related areas.
Recognition of universal civil jurisdiction under Filártiga, however,
introduced something entirely new and different into the
international human-rights regime. And it exported, for the first time,
the American tradition of reformist civil litigation beyond our own

421. It also makes civil-side litigation an odd choice if the point of having universal
jurisdiction is to join in a common venture with other societies. Cf. Burley, supra note 7, at 493.
422. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 403 (1971); see also id. at 429 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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borders. Kiobel’s retrenchment is likely just the beginning of a
broader effort to rein in that development.
III. TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC-LAW LITIGATION AFTER KIOBEL
Kiobel imposed an important limit on ATS claims, but it is
hardly the end of the story. The Court did not explain its holding that
ATS claims must “touch and concern the territory of the United
423
States,” and it left unresolved longstanding questions about whether
ATS claims may be brought against aiders and abettors or corporate
defendants. Section A of this Part considers what the Court’s
approach so far can tell us about these questions. Section B then turns
to a broader set of issues about the future and structure of
transnational public-law litigation. Throughout, I argue that the
Court’s experience with public-law litigation generally, and
particularly the implication of private rights to sue, will (and should)
inform its approach to international human-rights claims under the
ATS.
A. U.S. Defendants and the Unresolved Pre-Kiobel Questions
In the wake of Kiobel, human-rights advocates sought a silver
lining in the continuing possibility of litigation against American
424
defendants. In addition to the Unocal case, a number of other
prominent ATS actions have been brought against U.S.
425
corporations.
“A majority of these cases are against U.S.
companies,” noted one advocate, “and [Kiobel] still means they can
426
be held accountable.” As Oona Hathaway put it, after Kiobel
“‘[f]oreign cubed’ cases . . . are off the table. But there may remain
significant scope for ‘foreign squared’ cases—cases in which the

423. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
424. See, e.g., Steinhardt, Short Drink, supra note 233, at 841 (“On closer analysis, however,
Kiobel, like Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain before it, adopts a rhetoric of caution without foreclosing
litigation that fits the Filártiga model.”). Other possibilities exist. For instance, Kiobel may not
bar suits against foreign defendants based on foreign conduct that causes effects within the
United States. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1737. I am not aware of any
examples of such a suit.
425. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010).
426. Quoted in Jonathan Stempel, Window Narrows in U.S. for Human Rights Abuse
Lawsuits, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/ususa-court-humanrights-idUSBRE93H15O20130418.
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plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where the harm occurred
427
on U.S. soil.”
Foreign-squared suits are closer to the First Congress’s likely
purpose in enacting the ATS. As already discussed, recent scholarship
has insisted that Congress intended to provide a remedy only for
wrongs for which the United States might be held accountable under
international law. That would include not only wrongs to aliens
occurring within U.S. territory but also, in at least some
428
circumstances, wrongs committed by American nationals abroad.
ATS litigation against U.S. defendants will raise at least three
sets of difficult questions. The first is the question raised by the
Kiobel concurrences: Exactly how much contact with the United
States is necessary to support a suit under the ATS? Such cases rely
on nationality, not universality, as a basis for jurisdiction; they are
thus less controversial than foreign-cubed cases as a matter of
international law and practice. The presumption against
extraterritoriality remains applicable, however. None of the Supreme
Court’s extraterritoriality cases before Kiobel, after all, involved
universal jurisdiction. In ARAMCO, for example, the Court held that
Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination did not apply
extraterritorially to a suit by an American national against a company
incorporated in Delaware, because the events in question occurred in
429
Saudi Arabia.
Cases like ARAMCO suggest that the mere
nationality of the defendant may not be enough to change Kiobel’s
result.
Early post-Kiobel decisions in the federal circuit courts bear out
430
this prediction. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the
Fourth Circuit held that an ATS claim by former detainees at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq against an American defense contractor
sufficiently “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the United States “to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” The
court of appeals did not think it sufficient that CACI was an
American corporation; rather, it emphasized other connections to the
United States, including allegations “that CACI’s managers in the
427. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared”
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/
kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases.
428. See Bellia & Clark, Two Myths, supra note 115, at 1638–40; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra
note 117, at 891–92; Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1736.
429. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991).
430. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014).
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United States gave tacit approval to the acts of torture committed
by CACI employees at the Abu Ghraib prison, attempted to ‘cover
431
up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly . . . encouraged’ it.” Moreover,
CACI acted pursuant to a contract to perform interrogations with the
U.S. government, and the alleged torture occurred at a United States
432
military facility.
433
Al Shimari seems like a fairly easy case under Kiobel. The
Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, rejected an ATS claim in
434
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Cardona was a class
action by Colombians alleging that the defendant, a U.S. corporation,
made payments to paramilitary groups that carried out torture and
extrajudicial killings. The court of appeals’ terse opinion noted that
“[t]here is no allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or
that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or
435
concerned the territory of the United States with any force.” The
majority implicitly rejected the dissent’s argument that the case
satisfied Kiobel simply because the defendant was an American
national, and because plaintiffs alleged “that Chiquita’s corporate
officers reviewed, approved, and concealed payments and weapons
transfers to Colombian terrorist organizations from their offices in the
United States with the purpose that the terrorists would use them to
436
commit extrajudicial killings and other war crimes.”
It seems premature to view Al Shimari and Cardona as a circuit
split: the former presented a considerably more compelling case
under Kiobel than the latter, and a court applying the same standard
might well come out differently on these two sets of facts. At the
same time, Cardona seems to have viewed allegations that the
American corporate defendant’s home office knew about and
participated in the planning of rights violations abroad with more
skepticism than did Al Shimari. It will always be possible to allege
431. Id. at 530–31.
432. See id. at 528, 530–31.
433. See John Bellinger, Two New ATS Decisions: Fourth and Eleventh Circuits Split on
Whether Claims Against CACI and Chiquita “Touch and Concern” the Territory of the United
States, LAWFARE (July 27, 2014, 8:53 PM) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/two-new-atsdecisions-fourth-and-eleventh-circuits-split-on-whether-claims-against-caci-and-chiquita-touchand-concern-the-territory-of-the-united-states (“Of the pending ATS cases, the CACI suit may
present the most compelling factual scenario for the extraterritorial application of the ATS to a
US corporation.”).
434. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
435. Id. at 1191.
436. Id. at 1192, 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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that sort of involvement, and if such allegations are sufficient to get
plaintiffs past a motion to dismiss then Kiobel may not prove so
severe a limit. The Supreme Court seems likely to apply its decisions
raising the pleading bar to these sorts of claims, so that plaintiffs will
need to plead specific facts demonstrating a plausible connection to
437
U.S. territory.
The second set of questions includes the laundry list of
uncertainties about the ATS itself that predated Kiobel and were not
resolved by that decision. These questions, like the extraterritoriality
issue, are transsubstantive—they concern not the limits of actionable
claims, but whether Sosa’s right of action covers aiding-and-abetting
liability or permits suits against corporations. Nonetheless, one way to
handle these questions would be to treat them as identical to
questions about Sosa’s substantive scope—that is, corporate or
aiding-and-abetting liability would be permitted only if international
law provides for such liability with the same degree of clarity and
universal acceptance required for the underlying substantive offense.
Hence, defense counsel in ATS cases have tended to argue that
international law governs all ancillary questions, probably because
438
corporate liability is relatively scarce in international law. Plaintiffs
(and sympathetic academics), on the other hand, have generally
439
argued that federal common law governs these ancillary questions.
I submit that both groups are partially correct; any Sosa claim
should have to clear both an international- and a domestic-law bar.
Sosa’s cause of action is limited to claims that would fit within the
ATS’s grant of jurisdiction, which requires “a tort . . . in violation of
440
the law of nations.” If international law does not recognize
corporate liability, for example, that standard is not satisfied. But

437. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))); see also Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557 (rejecting “naked assertion[s]” without “further factual enhancement”).
438. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 17–26, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (arguing that whether corporations may be sued under the ATS is
a question governed by international law). International law also arguably supports a relatively
demanding standard for aiding-and-abetting liability. See id. at 50–51.
439. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491), at 24–25 (arguing that “federal common law supplies the rules governing
the scope of tort remedies in ATS litigation”); Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23,
at 641 (arguing that “[t]he norm that a defendant is alleged to have violated comes from
international law, and domestic law supplies all other rules of decision”).
440. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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because the plaintiff’s right to sue derives from federal common law,
domestic-law limitations are relevant as well. That is evident from
Kiobel itself, which looked to the domestic-law presumption against
extraterritoriality to delimit Sosa’s right of action—another ancillary
question that Sosa left open.
The ancillary questions go away, of course, if one adopts Justice
Scalia’s conclusion in Sosa that “creating a federal command (federal
common law) out of ‘international norms,’ and then constructing a
cause of action to enforce that command through the purely
441
jurisdictional grant of the ATS, is nonsense upon stilts.” But no
justice seemed interested in revisiting the existence of an implied
right of action in Kiobel, even though it seems likely that at least four
442
current Justices would embrace Scalia’s view. In any event, the
Court’s unanimous rejection of both Sosa’s and Kiobel’s claims on the
merits strongly suggests that all the Justices share a concern about the
judicial lawmaking entailed by implied private rights of action. That
consensus has been particularly evident in the Court’s recent Bivens
cases, in which even the liberal Justices have generally refused to
443
extend the scope of that implied remedy.
The Bivens cases make clear that the Court’s hesitance about
implied private rights of action extends not simply to their existence,
but also to their scope. This is a critical point, because it presages a
likely resolution of the remaining ancillary questions under the ATS.
Even accepting Sosa’s holding that an implied right exists under the
ATS, the general presumption against implied rights will constrain
the scope of that right. A similar pattern has occurred in the Court’s
statutory implied-rights jurisprudence. In Central Bank of Denver,
444
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., for example, the Court

441. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment).
442. For those keeping score at home, Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas in Sosa. Id. at 739. It seems likely that Scalia’s position would
garner at least four votes today, with Chief Justice Roberts voting the same as his predecessor
and Justice Alito switching positions with Justice O’Connor, who joined Justice Souter’s opinion
in Sosa.
443. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (rejecting, by an 8–1 vote, an
effort to extend Bivens to cover an Eighth Amendment claim against employees of a privately
operated federal prison); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548–49 (2007) (rejecting, by a 7–2
vote, a request to extend Bivens to cover harassment and intimidation by the Bureau of Land
Management).
444. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180
(1994).
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rejected calls to extend the implied private right of action under SEC
Rule 10b-5 to aiders and abettors. The Court signaled its reluctance
to extend nonstatutory causes of action, emphasizing, inter alia, that
although Congress has enacted a general criminal aiding-and-abetting
445
statute, there is no such statute on the civil side. More recently,
446
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
refused to extend the implied right under Rule 10b-5 to suits against
entities who allegedly acted in concert with a company accused of
issuing a misleading financial statement. The Court observed that
“[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action
caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of
447
action is for Congress, not for us.”
Cases like Central Bank of Denver and Stoneridge Partners
suggest that further restrictions on the ATS right of action may be in
the offing. Both cases refused to extend implied rights under the
federal securities statutes to aiders and abettors. The Roberts Court
may well make a similar call under the ATS, largely shutting down
the second wave of Filártiga litigation and restricting ATS suits to
actions against the actual perpetrators of human-rights violations. If
Congress wished to curb private suits while preserving leverage to
spur reform abroad, it might choose to replace private aiding-andabetting suits with a more public form of human-rights enforcement
directed at multinational corporations, modeled on the Foreign
448
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Left to its own federal-common-law
devices, however, the Supreme Court is likely to view with
considerable skepticism each effort to expand Sosa’s implied right of
action to new situations or classes of defendants.
By locating the ATS within its implied-right-of-action
jurisprudence, the Court tilted the playing field strongly against any
expansion of ATS liability. On the other hand, the “special factors”
discussed in the previous Part will be more mixed in cases against
U.S. defendants. The potential for U.S. responsibility for
international-law violations by American nationals provides a reason
445. Id. at 181–82.
446. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008).
447. Id. at 165; see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1085, 1102 (1991)
(stating, as a “fundamental principle[] governing recognition of a right of action implied by a
federal statute,” that “the breadth of the right once recognized should not, as a general matter,
grow beyond the scope congressionally intended”).
448. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2012)).
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why ATS jurisdiction may actually further foreign-policy goals, and
the concern about offending foreign nations by holding their
corporations liable will be less substantial in these situations. Still,
other factors may counsel caution. For example, broad availability of
ATS jurisdiction against American corporations, even for actions
taking place entirely abroad, may place those corporations at a
449
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign corporations. And even
litigation against U.S. companies may offend foreign governments to
the extent that it brings embarrassing facts to light concerning their
own human-rights abuses or threatens a business relationship upon
450
which the foreign state depends.
Finally, it is not at all clear to what extent Filártiga-style lawsuits
against U.S. defendants will need to rely on the ATS at all. The ATS
remains a jurisdictional statute, but aliens suing U.S. defendants will
451
be able to get into federal court under the diversity statute. To be
sure, those plaintiffs will still need a cause of action, and to the extent
that they rely on the federal-common-law right of action recognized
in Sosa, plaintiffs will have to accept the limits on that right of action
identified in the Court’s ATS case law. But Sosa is not the only
possible right of action. For instance, the law of the place in which the
injury occurred may provide a cause of action. Or plaintiffs may
choose to sue under American state law—torture, extrajudicial killing,
452
and rape are torts, after all. Indeed, human-rights plaintiffs may
choose to avoid the federal jurisdictional questions altogether by
453
suing in state courts.
Each of these options would require American courts to decide
whether the various limits on the Sosa cause of action are tied to the
ATS or serve as freestanding limitations on any suit in an American
court based on human-rights violations abroad. I consider those issues

449. See Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s Unexpected Legacy,
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 829 (2014).
450. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper, 113 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 1997) (permitting
removal of a case to federal court based on these sorts of concerns).
451. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights
Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 12 (2013).
452. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the district
court had diversity jurisdiction over tort claims filed against Exxon by Indonesian citizens).
453. Childress, supra note 6, at 715; see also Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress
III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013) (introducing a symposium on
the topic).
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454

in depth elsewhere. The remainder of the present discussion focuses
instead on broader considerations about the enforcement of
international law.
B. The Broader Debate About Transnational Public-Law Litigation
The ATS is not just any statute; it is, as Harold Koh and many
others have suggested, the centerpiece for contemporary visions of
455
transnational public-law litigation. At least some federal judges
have read this mandate very broadly. Judge Jack Weinstein, for
example, has written that “[i]n judging international human-rights
claims against domestic corporations or others, courts in the United
States with jurisdiction act as quasi international tribunals,” applying
an “‘international law of human rights [that] parallels and
supplements national law, superseding and supplying the deficiencies
456
of national constitutions and laws.’” For that reason, it is worth
thinking about Kiobel and the ATS in light of broader debates about
the structure of international-law enforcement.
One longstanding debate has concerned the choice between legal
and political enforcement. Some critics of Filártiga-style litigation, for
example, have argued that judicial resolution of human-rights claims
gets in the way of efforts by the State Department and other public
institutions to improve human-rights compliance around the world
through diplomacy and action in supranational political
457
organizations. This position harkens back to the long period when
international human-rights law was largely aspirational. Legal
enforcement mechanisms were minimal to nonexistent, and
jurisprudes seriously debated whether international law was really
458
“law” at all. Aspirational principles of human rights proved more
459
efficacious than many observers expected during this period, but
454. See Ernest A. Young, After Kiobel: Legislative Reform of the Alien Tort Statute and the
Migration of Human Rights Claims in American Courts (unpublished draft on file with author).
455. See text accompanying note 1, supra; see also Childress, supra note 6, at 712 (“[N]o
other U.S. statute frames the issue of U.S. courts’ application of international law so starkly.”).
456. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER
& HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 645 (4th ed. 2001)).
457. See Bellinger, supra note 13, at 8–10, 13–14; Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 195–98.
458. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–16 (2d ed. 1997) (1964) (arguing
that international law is not law because it lacks a system of “secondary rules” for the creation,
interpretation, and enforcement of primary rules of conduct).
459. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 190–91 (2005)
(describing the role of the Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviet Union agreed to abide by basic
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their effect remained largely political. International law provided an
argument that could be employed in bilateral negotiations or in
multilateral supranational organizations; sometimes it provided a
rallying point for popular movements. But it was not ordinarily the
sort of thing one could go to court and enforce.
Those days are fading now, and international human-rights law
increasingly operates as law today. We are moving into a period in
which the most interesting questions involve not the substantive
content of human rights but rather questions of institutional design
460
for enforcement. International courts have proliferated, and they
461
increasingly demonstrate an ability to shape nations’ behavior. And
states face considerable informal pressures to comply even when not
462
subject to sanctions or binding judgments. Legal enforcement does
remain sporadic and often ad hoc in the absence of a centralized legal
system at the international level. Experience with universal
jurisdiction abroad suggests that courts must pick their spots carefully
in order to be effective; prosecutions are most likely against former
officials of defunct regimes who can no longer mobilize political
blowback, and the need to make such pragmatic calculations poses its
463
own difficulties for the international rule of law. But scholars
continue to advance evidence that human-rights law does impose
464
meaningful constraints on behavior.
In this environment, it is both unrealistic and unnecessary to
exclude an independent role for courts. An international rule of law

human-rights guarantees in what many perceived at the time as an empty gesture, in helping
bring down Soviet communism).
460. See, e.g., Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1145–50; Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 431–33 (2003); Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107
YALE L.J. 273, 276–79 (1997).
461. See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 327, at 32–67.
462. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 635–55 (2004).
463. One may expect, for instance, an international version of the debate in American
constitutional law over the legitimacy of the “passive virtues”—that is, doctrines by which courts
avoid taking jurisdiction over disputes likely to damage their legitimacy. Compare ALEXANDER
H. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH—THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 127 (1962) (arguing in favor of these “passive virtues”), with Gerald E. Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel’s view).
464. See, e.g., KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
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has been a goal of American foreign policy since the Founding, and
the increasing judicialization of international affairs may be seen as a
sign of that policy’s success. In this vein, Tom Lee has argued that “an
energetic role for the federal courts is fully consistent with the
466
original meaning of the ATS.” Professor Lee points out that the
federal judiciary historically served as a “safety valve” in foreign467
affairs controversies. This point mirrors a recurrent theme in the
evolution of foreign sovereign immunity and the act-of-state doctrine:
sometimes it is helpful to American foreign relations to separate the
dispute-resolution role of the courts from the foreign-policy role of
the national executive. The key question is how to preserve this
complementary role while minimizing judicial interference with
foreign policy formulated by the political branches.
Once we concede some role to the courts, then human-rights
enforcement raises at least two fundamental design questions. The
first is the choice between public and private enforcement—that is,
between enforcement initiated and controlled by government actors
(or international organizations), on the one hand, and actions brought
by private actors, principally victims but perhaps also other forms of
“private attorneys general.” Within the class of public enforcement,
more-specific questions arise concerning control over the decision to
prosecute. In some European countries, for example, individual
judges have been empowered to bring universal-jurisdiction
prosecutions largely outside the control of national executive
468
authorities. Some of the more extravagant episodes in this vein have
led to legislation consolidating executive control over such
469
Under the American FCPA, by contrast,
prosecutions.
prosecutorial authority is centralized not only within the federal
470
Executive branch, but within a particular office at Main Justice.

465. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 15, at 69, 74 (noting the Washington administration’s
insistence on neutral rights during the conflict between Britain and France); Burley, supra note
7, at 481–88 (discussing the Founders’ general concern with upholding the international rule of
law).
466. Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1650 (2014).
467. Id. at 1657.
468. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 32, at 5.
469. See id. at 10–41; Ratner, supra note 386, at 889–92.
470. See Mike Koehler, The Impact of Kiobel on FCPA Enforcement, OPINIO JURIS (Apr.
18, 2013, 9:30 AM), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-theimpact-of-kiobel-on-fcpa-enforcement.
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When public enforcement occurs at the supranational level, issues of
471
accountability and control become considerably more formidable.
The second choice is between enforcement by supranational or
national institutions. Supranational enforcement may occur through
permanent institutions, like the ICC; institutions created to deal with
a particular situation, like the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); or one-shot
decisionmakers assembled to hear a particular dispute, such as the
investor-arbitration panels convened under Chapter 11 of the North
472
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Permanent
institutions may be either human-rights specific, like the ICC, or
general-purpose, like the ICJ. National enforcement may also occur
through preexisting general-purpose institutions, such as the U.S.
federal courts, or through special-purpose institutions, such as South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At each level,
moreover, proceedings may be judicial or administrative in nature,
and in either case institutions may or may not have authority to make
new law in addition to interpreting and enforcing preexisting legal
principles. This is true even for courts: international courts modeled
on the civil-law tradition formally eschew any lawmaking function by
473
denying the authority to create binding precedent, while American
courts enjoy a robust tradition of common-law development of
474
human-rights norms.
As the chart below demonstrates, one can find examples of all
four combinations of choice along these two dimensions:

471. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Accountability of International Prosecutors, in LAW
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., forthcoming
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473778 [hereinafter
Turner, Accountability].
472. Although most consider NAFTA to be part of international economic law, the right
against expropriation of private property—the concern of NAFTA Chapter 11—is also
recognized as a human right. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 27, 43–44 (3d ed. 2013).
473. But see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 46–47 (2d ed. 1985) (observing that
in practice, the civil-law tradition is not as hostile to precedent as it is in theory).
474. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing an individual
right to bear arms); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating the juvenile death
penalty as “cruel and unusual punishment”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking
down laws banning homosexual sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(recognizing a due-process right to privacy); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(holding that racially segregated schooling denies “equal protection of the laws”).
AND
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This is not the place for a comprehensive evaluation of these options,
and I do not contend that one combination is optimal in all
circumstances. At least for the foreseeable future, the best approach
is probably a fairly eclectic mix of all four options. The remainder of
this Part identifies some more general considerations involved in
making the relevant choices.
1. Supranational vs. National Enforcement. Some critics of
universal jurisdiction have argued that prosecution of grave and
universally condemned crimes under international law should be
475
reserved to international courts. The high-profile work of the ICC,
as well as the ICTR and ICTY, tends to obscure the overall rarity of
476
supranational human-rights enforcement. These sorts of tribunals
must often overcome political pushback and typically suffer from
477
Experience in Rwanda and the former
limited resources.
Yugoslavia suggest that supranational tribunals may be an effective
response to particularly egregious and high-profile human-rights
atrocities, particularly when the perpetrating governments are
478
politically isolated or defunct. More generally, Karen Alter has
475. See, e.g., Kissinger, supra note 53, at 92–95.
476. See generally DONNELLY, supra note 472, at 161 (emphasizing that “international
human rights law creates a system of national implementation of international human rights”)
(emphasis added).
477. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 671–73, 676–77; Payam Akhavan, Whither
National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half, 8 J. INT. CRIM. JUSTICE 1245, 1247 (2010)
(“[B]ecause of the costly and time-consuming nature of international criminal justice, where
national courts have failed to act, the ICC can only investigate or prosecute a small fraction of
the perpetrators.”).
478. See, e.g., Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 647–48 (noting that supranational
criminal courts have developed a model of justice and procedure narrowly focused on
atrocities); Langer, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that Rwandans and former Yugoslavs were
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documented a remarkable expansion in the number and efficacy of
479
international courts over the last half-century. But no one thinks
that the international judiciary has developed the capacity to act as
480
the primary enforcer of human rights. Assertions of universal
jurisdiction by domestic courts developed largely in response to the
481
weakness of supranational criminal enforcement, and that weakness
seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
Domestic courts have advantages beyond their superior
resources. They enjoy established procedures for litigation, as well as
established powers to develop evidence and enforce judgments.
Advantages also arise from the generalist nature of domestic courts’
responsibilities. As much as they may strive for impartiality, a court
whose raison d’etre is to prosecute particular defendants or crimes is
likely to adopt a different perspective from one that sees human482
rights cases as just another subject on its general docket. Likewise,
“defendants about whom the international community has broadly agreed that they may be
prosecuted and punished, and whose state of nationality has not defended them”). The ICC,
which has a more general mandate, is off to a rockier start. See, e.g., Rebecca Hamilton, Guest
Post: When Should the ICC Call It Quits?, OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/10/guestpost-icc-call-quits (Jan. 10, 2015, 10:14 AM) (describing the ICC’s suspension of investigative
activities in Darfur after its inability to enforce its arrest warrants); Turner, Accountability,
supra note 471, at 1–2 (noting general concerns about the ICC’s accountability). That tribunal
may be most likely to succeed when it works in conjunction with national courts. See generally
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Turner, Nationalizing].
479. See ALTER, supra note 327, at 335.
480. See, e.g., Karen Alter, Remarks at Duke Law School (Apr. 15, 2014) (acknowledging
this point); International Criminal Court, Understanding the International Criminal Court,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (“The
International Criminal Court is not a substitute for national courts.”); CTR. FOR JUSTICE &
ACCOUNTABILITY, The Alien Tort Statute: A Means of Redress for Survivors of Human Rights
Abuses, available at http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=435 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (agreeing
that “human rights law—if it is to be effective—must be implemented on a national level,
through domestic courts”); Akhavan, supra note 477, at 1251 (observing that “the entire
complementarity scheme [of the ICC] rests on the fundamental assumption that national
prosecutions are essential to the viability of the international criminal justice system”); Turner,
Nationalizing, supra note 478, at 1–2 (“A less hierarchical international criminal justice system
that relies significantly on national governments is likely to be better informed by diverse
perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more effective in accomplishing its
ultimate goals.”); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2001) (“[T]he fact is that
international institutions can never provide first-line protection for victims of rights violations.
When protection at the national level is absent or breaks down, there are severe limitations to
what international enforcement mechanisms can accomplish.”).
481. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
482. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the domestic independent counsel mechanism on similar grounds).
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the frustrating abstraction of international human-rights discourse
may be tempered by the likely cross-fertilization arising from
deciding international cases alongside garden-variety domestic torts,
crimes, and discrimination claims.
The key point, however, is that courts function most effectively
483
when they are embedded within a larger legal system. This
embeddedness broadens the court’s legitimacy, enhances its access to
resources, provides executive aid to enforce its decisions, and permits
legislative adjustment of the governing law in reaction to the court’s
484
activity. Proponents of international adjudication typically worry
about domestic courts’ dependence on national governments, but that
dependence will often run both ways. Critically, national governments
and private entities depend on their domestic courts for a wide range
of functions—especially the prosecution of domestic crimes, the
resolution of private disputes, and the accommodation of local
practices to national law. Barry Friedman and Erin Delaney have
demonstrated, for example, that the U.S. Supreme Court developed a
strong role of reviewing the constitutionality of national legislation
and enforcing individual rights in part because the national
government depended on that court to bring state governments in
485
line with national law. The broader point is that because national
courts depend on domestic courts as instruments of state power, they
generally cannot afford to undermine those courts by defying their
486
rulings on human-rights questions. The costs of defying freestanding
human-rights tribunals at the international level are considerably less.
487
The U.S. government has been known to defy the ICJ, for example;

483. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 164.
484. Consider, for example, Congress’s expansion of statutory rights and enforcement
mechanisms to combat systematic racial discrimination in the United States, in reaction to the
course of the Supreme Court’s case law on that subject.
485. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of
Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2011); see also Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary
Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 543 (2014) (arguing
that the British judiciary is likely to become more powerful generally vis-à-vis the government
based on its acquisition of responsibility to enforce the rules of devolved power in the U.K.).
486. Cf. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at
414–15 (1996) (describing how President Eisenhower had to support the Supreme Court in the
Little Rock desegregation crisis in order to squelch Southern defiance of federal law).
487. See U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 1986 DEP’T STATE
BULL. 67, 68 (noting that “[o]ur experience in the case instituted against the United States by
Nicaragua in April, 1984 provided the chief motivation for the Administration’s review of our
acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction”); Andreas L. Pauls, From Neglect to
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it is much harder to imagine U.S. government officials defying an
488
order from a domestic federal court.
The two European courts demonstrate the same point. By far the
most successful supranational courts are the European Court of
489
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
And yet these courts are both embedded within communities of
European states bound together by a much thicker set of rules and
institutions than international society at large. The ECJ is a
coordinate branch of a full-fledged government for the European
490
Union (EU). Its human-rights jurisprudence has evolved, at least in
part, as a means of furthering the supremacy and integrative function
491
of European law. Much as in the United States, EU officials can
defy the ECJ’s human-rights rulings only at the risk of undermining
492
the Court’s power to check the Member States.
The ECtHR, on the other hand, is formally autonomous and
covers considerably more states than the EU. But the ECtHR’s
overlap with and connection to the EU legal order probably explains
much of its influence. The ECtHR is now formally integrated into EU
493
law in a number of characteristically convoluted ways, and the ECJ

Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 783, 788 (2004)
(discussing the United States’ refusal to accept the ICJ’s judgment in the Nicaragua case).
488. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (successfully ordering the President to
hand over evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the President and his staff).
489. See ALTER, supra note 327, at 103 (showing that “the extent of activity and influence of
[the ECJ and the ECtHR] can make all other [international courts] pale in comparison”);
Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Appraisal, 31
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1104, 1112 (2008) (observing that it “is undisputed . . . that the ECJ has
played a central role in shaping the human rights discourse and the treaties that now
incorporate human rights protection”). But see POSNER, supra note 40, at 158–59 (questioning
assertions of broad compliance with ECtHR rulings).
490. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 161 (suggesting that “the reason for its success is that the
ECJ is not truly an ‘international court’ for purposes of comparison with the ICJ, arbitral
tribunals, and other courts”).
491. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role
of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Rights Within the Legal Order
of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1118–19 (1986).
492. Cf. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 485, at 1152–59.
493. See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of
Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 645, 650–51, 655 (2011) (explaining that the Lisbon Treaty, which
came into force in 2009, gave binding legal force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
which in turn provides for parity of interpretation of those rights overlapping with the ECtHR;
the treaty also initiated the process of EU accession to the ECtHR itself); Tommaso Pavone,
The Past and Future Relationship of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights: A Functional Analysis 3 (May 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
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has for many years looked to the European Convention on Human
494
Rights and the ECtHR’s decisions interpreting it. And as one might
expect, the comparative autonomy of the ECtHR comes at a cost in
efficacy. That court has more limited remedial authority than the
ECJ, and its jurisprudence incorporates a great deal of substantive
495
deference to national governments.
The two most successful
international courts thus demonstrate the importance of
embeddedness in a domestic legal regime.
Domestic experience with public-law litigation likewise
illustrates the importance of situating judicial review within a full496
blown domestic legal system. Brown v. Board of Education is the
American paradigm of public-law litigation, yet the post-Brown
history of desegregation efforts demonstrates that courts are most
successful in combating entrenched and extensive human-rights
violations when they act in conjunction with executive and legislative
497
institutions. Much of Brown’s impact on the history of civil rights,
moreover, stems from the symbolic force of the Supreme Court’s
498
declaration that segregation violated the supreme law of the land.
That impact may well be less when the pronouncement comes from
outside the national legal system.
As with much public-law litigation, moreover, the critical
remedial element for desegregation was not damages but injunctive
relief; desegregation of public schools required extensive judicial
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042867) (“[T]hrough the 2009 Lisbon Treaty the EU member states
took action to unify the [EU and ECtHR human rights] regimes.”).
494. See Defeis, supra note 489, at 1113–14 (“In recent years, the ECJ has effectively
incorporated not only the provisions of the ECHR, but also the decisions of the [ECtHR] into
its human rights jurisprudence.”); Weiler, supra note 491, at 1135 (“The [ECJ] has indicated its
intention to look to the ECHR whenever an issue of human rights comes before it.”).
495. See Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Review: The
Case of the European Court of Human Rights, 40 J. SOC. PHIL. 595, 595 (2009) (observing that
the ECtHR exercises a “weak” form of judicial review in that “the ECtHR can find a law or its
application to be incompatible with the ECHR, but this does not directly affect the validity of
that law in the domestic legal system”); Pavone, supra note 493, at 10–11 (noting that the
ECtHR may only impose fines on a violating state, and that its doctrine incorporates both a
“margin of appreciation” protecting the discretion of national governments and a measure of
deference to majoritarian state practices).
496. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
497. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993) (demonstrating that judicial action is most effective when
combined with action by the political branches).
498. See, e.g., David Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152–53 (1994) (presenting evidence that Brown
inspired the efforts of civil-rights protesters involved in the Montgomery bus boycott).
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supervision of public institutions, often lasting for many decades.
No foreign or supranational court can hope to provide this sort of
relief, and ATS claimants have generally sought damages alone.
Finally, much of the judicial impact in support of the AfricanAmerican civil-rights movement came not in the form of decisions
mandating particular reforms, but rather through judicial holdings
that shielded various forms of political protest and limited the
500
oppressive power of the state criminal-justice system. Courts
outside the domestic legal system are poorly situated to perform this
role.
The considerations just discussed provide reasons not only to
favor national courts per se, but also to employ them in particular
roles. Brown and similar cases involve national courts engaged in
review of actions by their own governments (or subnational
governments). There are, of course, drawbacks to this degree of
embeddedness. Even in countries with well-developed norms of
judicial independence, courts called upon to enforce international law
against their own governments “often defer to governments because
the executive branch enjoys foreign affairs power, because
governments have more insight into what an international agreement
was supposed to mean, and because diplomats often have a better
sense of how different legal interpretations might impact foreign
501
relations.” That sort of deference may often be salutary—a means
of mitigating the countermajoritarian difficulty that courts otherwise
502
face. But of course the primary drawback to relying on national
courts to review acts by or associated with their own governments is
that judicial review will often be unavailable or corrupt in the country
503
in which the rights violations occurred.
499. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
(affirming the courts’ “broad power to fashion [an equitable] remedy that will assure a unitary
school system”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1991) (ruling on a request to withdraw district
court supervision of a desegregation plan for a Georgia school district first imposed in 1969).
500. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (relying on the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment to prevent use of libel litigation to deter coverage of the civilrights movement by news organizations); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning
convictions of civil-rights protesters involved in lunch-counter sit-ins on due-process grounds);
see also Ernest A. Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
THE CONSTITUTION (Mark Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551025.
501. ALTER, supra note 327, at 9.
502. See BICKEL, supra note 463, at 16–23.
503. See, e.g., Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing
International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 540 (2007).
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By contrast, transnational public-law cases typically ask national
courts to entertain challenges to practices by foreign governments
and officials or private entities acting in concert with them. Universal
jurisdiction is the pure type, but courts exercising jurisdiction over
actions and parties with little nexus to the forum state will have few of
the advantages that national courts ordinarily derive from
embeddedness within a robust domestic legal system. Consider a
hypothetical effort by a Belgian court in the late 1950s to exercise
universal jurisdiction over Orval Faubus, the segregationist governor
of Arkansas who sought to block desegregation of the Little Rock
504
schools. Such a suit would surely have aroused considerable
resentment in the United States; it might even have brought
Governor Faubus sympathy as the target of “outside agitators.”
Equally important, the Belgian court’s remedial toolkit would
have been extremely limited. The most promising option would have
been a damage award against some multinational company implicated
in Arkansas’ segregated regime—an American manufacturer of Little
Rock’s school buses possessing European assets, perhaps—but no
foreign court would have been able to undertake the sort of
continuing oversight that desegregation litigation turned out to
require. Most important, the domestic political branches would have
been extremely unlikely to make their own efforts to support the
Belgian court’s orders politically, supervise compliance with its
rulings, or enact complementary legislation. Proponents of ATS
litigation in foreign-cubed cases have rightly touted the symbolic
benefits of judicial rulings vindicating plaintiffs’ human-rights claims,
but few would argue that such cases can force meaningful reform.
The second wave of Filártiga suits may be an intermediate case,
to the extent they are directed at American corporations and
behavior with a significant nexus to the United States. That nexus
enhances the legitimacy of national court intervention; it also brings
the defendants’ conduct within reach of a broader range of remedial
tools. One could imagine, for example, consent decrees that would
require a corporate defendant to institute controls over cooperation
with foreign security forces; such a decree might well involve
continuing judicial supervision over compliance. Likewise, it is far
more realistic to expect complementary legislation and executive
action bearing on action by American defendants or conducted within
504. For an account, see Tony A. Freyer, Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 19541957, 66 ARK. HIST. Q. 145 (2007).
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the United States. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the basic
model of second-wave Filártiga cases can truly work; even if courts
impose large damages awards on corporate defendants implicated in
human-rights abuses abroad, those defendants may turn out to have
505
insufficient leverage to effect real change in foreign countries.
Given such uncertainties, we should temper expectations for
transnational public-law litigation in the Filártiga mold.
Notwithstanding the impressive accomplishments of public-law
litigation within the domestic sphere, American judicial power will be
hard to exercise to similar effect across international borders. Even if
our courts can exercise only limited leverage over the behavior of
foreign human-rights abusers, however, ATS litigation in domestic
courts may serve three more modest purposes. First, successful suits
against corporate aiders and abettors may compensate victims even if
they do not force reform in the victims’ home countries. A second
purpose dovetails with the First Congress’s likely intent that
American courts provide a remedy for violations of the law of nations
506
perpetrated within the United States or by Americans abroad. That
is not quite the “badge of honor” that Anne-Marie Slaughter had in
mind for the ATS, but it is nonetheless part of good international
citizenship.
The third purpose ought to appeal to both proponents and
traditional critics of ATS litigation. Human-rights cases in national
courts offer those courts an opportunity to help shape and articulate
norms of international law, rather than leaving those norms to
supranational and foreign courts. Generally speaking, the American
debate has seen internationalists pressing for the recognition of
international human-rights claims in domestic courts, while

505. Other problems may arise from the possibility that multiple jurisdictions may assert
authority to adjudicate any given rights claim. One can imagine, for example, an international
version of the infamous “Delaware settlement” in federal securities law, under which litigation
occurs in a friendly jurisdiction and results in a lenient settlement, which is then asserted to
preclude litigation in other more rigorous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388–99 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting this problem). Russia might purport to try Syrian war criminals, imposing light penalties
and then asserting that its judgment bars prosecution in any other jurisdiction. But there is no
reason the international law of conflicts and judgments cannot develop rules to address such
problems. Moreover, overlapping jurisdictions are a feature as well as a bug, because they
provide a check on any one nation’s unwillingness to prosecute a given claim.
506. See Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115, at 448–49; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra
note 117, at 836–38.
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nationalists have resisted that effort. But nationalists ought to
rethink that position. International human-rights law is unlikely to go
away, and it is more likely to develop in ways that are insensitive or
inimical to American interests if our own courts do not participate in
508
that development. Conversely, American jurists deciding humanrights cases are likely to exert considerable influence, given the
prestige of the American judiciary, its robust practice of reasongiving, and the ready accessibility of its opinions. The best way to
make international human-rights law more compatible with
American foreign and security policy is to make our courts active
participants in that law’s formation.
2. Public vs. Private Enforcement. I have already discussed some
of the concerns about private enforcement—in particular, that it
places the decision to initiate human-rights litigation in the hands of
persons with no particular mandate (and insufficient information) to
reconcile that litigation with their nation’s broader foreign policy.
Analogous concerns exist at the domestic level. American law allows
extremely broad scope for private litigation that coexists, often
uneasily, with public regulatory schemes. Sometimes both public and
private enforcement exist for the same statutory standards. The
federal employment-discrimination laws, for example, are enforced
through both public actions by the Equal Employment Opportunity
509
Commission and private suits by victims of discrimination; likewise,
federal statutes restricting securities fraud have been construed to
permit both public actions by the SEC and private suits by
510
shareholders. In other areas, private litigation under state common
law occurs alongside public administration and enforcement. The
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves the sale of
prescription drugs, for example, but private plaintiffs injured by a
511
defective drug may bring a state tort suit against the manufacturer.
Not surprisingly, a vigorous domestic debate addresses the
512
desirability of private enforcement. Critics of private tort litigation

507. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 6, at 710–11.
508. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1221–29 (developing this
argument).
509. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012).
510. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
511. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 580–81 (2009).
512. See, e.g., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) [hereinafter EPSTEIN & GREVE]; THOMAS O.
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over defective drugs, for example, argue that such litigation
undermines the FDA’s role as regulator and chills the development
513
and marketing of new medicines. In many areas, such as medical
devices and generic drugs, Congress has protected the primacy of
514
public enforcement by preempting private litigation; in others, both
Congress and the courts have recognized that private enforcement
515
plays a valuable supplementary role. The Supreme Court has thus
steered a middle course dictated largely by the details of particular
statutory regimes rather than broad preferences for or against private
516
enforcement.
The ATS debate in many ways fits comfortably within this frame.
Critics of the Filártiga line would rely on Congress and the Executive
to set standards for human-rights violations and to determine when, if
ever, enforcement actions under those standards should be brought in
517
American courts. Advocates, on the other hand, would likely
respond that Congress suffers from political gridlock and a crowded
agenda, and in any event it cannot draft legislation with sufficient
flexibility to accommodate the evolving imperatives of international
518
human rights. Likewise, the national Executive has traditionally
monitored and reported on human-rights violations abroad but has
shown little inclination to pursue foreign rights violators in American
519
courts.
MCGARITY, JR., THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL
JURIES (2008).
513. See, e.g., Daniel E. Troy, The Case for FDA Preemption, in EPSTEIN & GREVE, supra
note 512, at 81, 100–05.
514. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–30 (2008).
515. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 (rejecting preemptive effect for FDA approval of a
brand-name drug’s label).
516. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 302–06 (2012) (surveying the
Court’s preemption cases).
517. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 167, at 356.
518. See, e.g., Koh, State Law, supra note 165, at 1843–45, 1854 (observing that the
legislative process is “notoriously dominated by committees, strongwilled individuals, collective
action problems, and private rent-seeking” and suggesting that Congress should more
appropriately play a reactive role by incorporating norms of CIL in federal statutes after they
have evolved through judicial recognition); see also Jonathan Serrie, Gridlock in Congress Stalls
Human-Trafficking Bill,
FOX NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2012/10/02/gridlock-in-congress-over-human-trafficking (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
519. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (last visited Feb. 4,
2015).
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It ought to help simply to recognize the similarity between the
debates in foreign-relations law and domestic regulatory policy. As
exotic as cases like Filártiga or Kiobel may seem, the issues they raise
are hardly sui generis. The advantages of public and private
enforcement are familiar from the domestic debate: Public
enforcement is good for setting uniform standards and for integrating
those standards with other aspects of legislative and executive policy.
Public enforcement is likewise subject to majoritarian political checks
on both over- and underenforcement of public norms. Private
enforcement, on the other hand, leverages private resources to make
up for constraints on public-enforcement funding. It may provide
better back-end monitoring of harms (as opposed to front-end
standard setting). And it frequently provides compensation for
victims that is lacking in public-enforcement schemes.
Few areas of domestic law rely exclusively on public
enforcement, and a reliance on private enforcement is an integral part
520
of American litigation culture. If we take seriously an internationallaw obligation to address human-rights violations, at least when those
violations have some connection to the United States, then we should
think twice before either gutting the ATS or adopting an
untrammeled regime of private enforcement. Moreover, the case for
exclusive public enforcement in the domestic context typically relies
on Congress’s delegation of authority to an expert agency that sets
521
standards and, to at least some extent, monitors compliance. There
is no such federal agency charged in this way with enforcement of
human rights. The State Department monitors human-rights abuses,
but its primary role is to conduct diplomacy. It might well undermine
the Department’s diplomatic role to expect it to take a position on
every alleged human-rights abuse; for this reason, some degree of
institutional separation between human-rights enforcement and
diplomacy may actually further the Executive’s ability to conduct
522
foreign policy.
520. See supra notes 416–20 and accompanying text.
521. See, e.g., Troy, supra note 513, at 103–104 (emphasizing the role of the FDA).
522. In the mid–twentieth century, federal courts deciding cases involving foreign sovereign
immunity routinely deferred to the State Department’s position as to whether a nation should
be accorded immunity in the circumstances of that case. Both Congress and the Executive
ultimately considered this so-called “Tate Letter” regime detrimental to American foreign
policy, because it pressured the State Department to take a position on immunity whenever a
foreign nation requested it to do so—even when the Department preferred to remain silent.
Congress enacted the FSIA in part to allow courts to decide foreign immunity issues
independently of the Executive. See generally BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 395, at 74–

YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

1124

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2015 8:46 PM

[Vol. 64:1023

Notwithstanding the ubiquity of private attorneys general, our
domestic law typically subjects private enforcement to important
limits. Courts have not hesitated to find preemption where private
tort suits interfere with federal regulatory policy, and the Supreme
Court has been increasingly cautious about inferring private rights to
sue where Congress has not made its intent clear. And ever since
523
President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation in 1793, American
law has asserted a particular concern with maintaining public control
over foreign policy. Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality
seems likely to weed out the cases most likely to threaten that
control. Where ATS claims do have a significant nexus to the United
States, the benefits of leveraging private litigation resources and
providing compensation for victims suggest a continuing role for
private enforcement.
***
At the end of the day, these judgments about the role of national
courts and private enforcement are ones that Congress ought to
make. Scholars writing about the ATS have worked hard to milk
every ounce of meaning out of a terse statutory text and a sparse
historical record. But at some point, we should recognize that the
drafters of the ATS neither anticipated nor provided answers to the
questions posed by contemporary human-rights litigation. As AnneMarie Slaughter has acknowledged, the drafters of the first Judiciary
524
Act “could not have anticipated a case like Filártiga.” It would be
surprising, then, to discover in the historical materials answers to
questions about aiding-and-abetting liability or an exhaustion
requirement. It would be even more surprising if those answers suited
the international situation of the contemporary United States. As
Tom Lee has emphasized, the foreign-policy and security imperatives
of a small, weak, and geographically isolated nation were rather

75. This episode suggests there are advantages to letting the Executive deny responsibility for
judicial determinations.
523. See id. at 12–26 (discussing this episode). Likewise, the Logan Act makes it a federal
crime for private citizens to conduct foreign diplomacy. See Logan Act, 1 Stat. 613 (1799)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012)). But see Confrontation in the Gulf; Jesse
Jackson Meets Hussein on Gulf Crisis, Iraq Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1990, http://www
.nytimes.com/1990/08/31/world/confrontation-gulf-jesse-jackson-meets-hussein-gulf-crisis-iraqreports.html.
524. Burley, supra note 7, at 488; accord HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 55.
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different from those of today’s continental superpower with three
525
hundred million people and vital interests all over the globe.
If Congress declines to act, however, the courts will need to fill in
526
the interstices of the ATS through federal common lawmaking.
Sosa recognized that ATS cases rely on a federal cause of action
527
implied as a matter of federal common law, and courts have been
willing to construct federal-common-law doctrine as needed to fill in
the procedural and remedial details for other implied rights of action
528
under the federal securities laws and other statutes. Both the
Court’s ATS decisions in Sosa and Kiobel and its implied-rights cases
generally suggest that the Court will fill gaps conservatively—that is,
that it will continue to view the appropriate scope of ATS litigation
more narrowly than some lower courts and the human-rights bar
might like, but also that it will preserve the Founders’ basic notion of
a private federal remedy for violations of the law of nations. However
one might hope for a more original insight at the end of a long article,
that approach strikes this author as fundamentally sound.
CONCLUSION
As Ingrid Wuerth rightly observes, the “real difficulty” with the
debate about the ATS is that “[b]oth sides of the debate capture
important and deeply-held values”—on the one hand, “redress for
horrific violations of the most fundamental human rights”; but on the
other, “the basic sense that many of these cases have very little to do
with the United States, may impose foreign policy costs, and may not
529
enhance net social welfare for those most harmed.” Often these
values are presented through high-stakes rhetoric: Beth Stephens
hails the ATS as “a means to hold the most egregious perpetrators
530
accountable for the most egregious violations of international law,”
and a pre-Kiobel statement by EarthRights International predicted

525. See generally Thomas H. Lee, Theorizing the Foreign Affairs Constitution (Fordham
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1996734, Jan. 31,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1996734.
526. See generally D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 467–73 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing the need for courts to fill statutory gaps with federal common law).
527. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
528. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 297–98
(1993) (fashioning a federal-common-law right of contribution in suits under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5).
529. Wuerth, supra note 4, at 620.
530. Stephens, Sosa, supra note 204, at 535.
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that “human rights law [would] be set back decades” if the defendants
531
prevailed in that case. Similarly, a prominent study criticizing the
ATS posed a “nightmare scenario” in which “100,000 class action
Chinese plaintiffs, organized by New York trial lawyers,” file suit
against major multinational corporations like General Motors,
Toyota, and Siemens in federal court “for abetting China’s denial of
political rights, for observing China’s restrictions on trade unions, and
for impairing the Chinese environment. These plaintiffs might claim
532
actual damages of $6 billion and punitive damages of $20 billion.”
Such a suit, and the settlement pressures it would engender, might
massively “chill . . . trade and investment” and place the United
States “at loggerheads with traditional allies, trading partners, and
533
developing countries.”
As a legal academic, one always hates to argue that the law is less
exciting than people think. But one implication of my exploration of
ATS litigation is that the stakes may not be as high as they sometimes
seem. The “most egregious perpetrators” of human-rights abuses are
unlikely to find themselves in the ATS dock, and—as Professor
Stephens acknowledges—the ATS is unlikely to “plac[e] the federal
courts at the cutting edge of the progressive development of
534
international human rights norms.” Nor is the business community’s
“nightmare scenario” likely to come to pass: no large damages awards
have been rendered against corporate defendants; settlements have
been relatively modest; and massive class actions remain largely on
the horizon. Likewise, the federal courts’ efforts to narrow the ATS,
including the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel, are unlikely to
usher in a new era of expanded impunity. The courts’ limits have
limits, and other avenues—including the TVPA and state litigation—
remain. It is, perhaps, time to step back and take a breath.

531. The U.S. Supreme Court Must Preserve the Alien Tort Statute for International
Corporate Human Rights Cases, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (June 13, 2012), http://www.earth
rights.org/legal/us-supreme-court-must-preserve-alien-tort-statute-international-corporatehuman-rights-cases; see also Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in
Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 119, 132 (2010), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/HILJ-Online_52_Giannini_Farbstein.pdf (suggesting that the Second
Circuit’s exclusion of corporate liability in Kiobel “would have permitted the German state to
privatize the gas chambers with the result that a company like I.G. Farben would then have
been able to exterminate millions of people for profit with impunity”).
532. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 1.
533. Id. at 1–2.
534. Stephens, Sosa, supra note 204, at 535.
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In this Article, I have argued that the tension between the
competing values implicated by ATS litigation should not be resolved
based on sui generis doctrines of foreign-relations law, but rather in
two more traditional ways. The first is to fit the problems arising
under the ATS into traditional federal-courts doctrines governing
implied rights of action. The second is to apply those doctrines using
data to be gleaned from foreign experiences with the actual exercise
of universal jurisdiction. These approaches, however, can only take us
so far. Where they run out, we should not assume that judicial
lawmaking can answer every question. It may be that only Congress
can construct an appropriately nuanced and workable regime for
private human-rights litigation.
Any decisionmakers addressing the ATS after Kiobel should
consider its unresolved issues in light of broader debates about the
structure of human-rights enforcement in international law. Humanrights enforcement should not be left to supranational institutions,
both because they lack the resources and legitimacy to do an
adequate job and because the development of international humanrights law would benefit from the participation of American courts. In
assessing the way domestic institutions enforce human rights,
moreover, we should consider another broader debate—that
involving the proper balance between public and private enforcement
at the domestic level. Domestic experience suggests that a mix of
public and private enforcement is best, and one may hope that the
Supreme Court remains committed to this sort of balance.
International human-rights law has largely succeeded in
establishing a core of widely accepted prohibitions on torture,
genocide, and similar acts. The challenge now is designing institutions
to vindicate those principles. Because sovereign states continue to
dominate the international scene, these institutions will have to be
built primarily at the domestic level. And they are more likely to
endure if they accommodate both the moral imperatives of humanrights law and individual nations’ needs to maintain security and
pursue other national interests. The complexities and compromises
that this will entail are, after all, part of what it means to treat
international law as law.

